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DISSENT, issued September 1, 1970, is published bimonthly, January-February, March-April, May-June, July-August, September-October, November-December, by DISSENT Publishing Corporation, 509 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. Subscriptions: $7.00 for one year; $12.00 for two years; $4.50 for students for one year; foreign subscriptions, including Canada, add $1.00 for mailing costs per year. All payments from foreign countries must be made by United States money orders or checks payable in United States currency. Single copy, $1.25. For special rates on bulk orders from organizations, teachers, etc., write directly to DISSENT. For information on newsstand and bookstore distribution write to: Eastern News Co., 155 West Fifteenth Street, New York, N.Y. 1001.

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
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

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"YOU OLD RASCAL--YOU'VE BEEN OUT PLAYING IN THE MUD AGAIN!"

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES SYNDICATE
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OLIPHANT

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Politics Across the Country

August 6, 1970

Pat Watters

The South

THE ELEVEN STATES OF THE SOUTH will be electing 7 governors, 5 U.S. senators, and 106 representatives in 1970. Whatever improvements might come in the elections of lesser officials, it seems a safe bet that the quality of those in higher office will not increase.

This has nearly always been true in the South, but developments in the rest of the country make it discouraging this year. In the past, no matter how garish or tragic our politics might be, we could always look to a semblance of governmental responsibility in the rest of the country, and feel that the few decent Southern political tendencies were thereby encouraged. No more. We see now a foundering Democratic leadership and a racist-tending Republican one, and everywhere debilities that once were exclusively Southern: racism in campaigning, irrelevance of party affiliation, candidacies based on personality rather than principle. And the effect on the South has been to make these debilities more pronounced. George Wallace's victory in the Alabama gubernatorial primary can be at least partly attributed to the bad influence of national politics, and this has pushed the general tone of Southern campaigning several notches downward and to the Right.

Where there is optimism, it is that the worst of the candidates might be defeated, as in the South Carolina gubernatorial race, or the prospect of defeating Byrd in Virginia. Yarborough, a weak liberal, was knocked out in the Texas Democratic primary with the help of the former President and charges that he was somehow to blame for riots and student rebellion.

The black vote and the emergence of increased numbers of black elected officials are the most hopeful signs. But this hope no longer signifies immediate promise of coalition with liberal whites or a neo-Populist movement. It is concentrated on consolidation of control in the relatively few places where black voting power is predominant. In South Carolina, the greatest hope is that blacks from among four who have survived the primary may be elected to the state legislature for the first time this century. In Alabama, blacks are running for everything from governor to justice of the peace, but most enthusiasm centers on local offices where there is a chance of winning. Elsewhere, blacks seek statewide office, as in Arkansas and Georgia, simply as an exercise in swing-vote strategy. All this means a general lessening of black interest, if not influence, in statewide and Congressional offices.

Never mind that the black candidate for governor of Georgia, C. B. King, alone among a dozen or so candidates, speaks to the real interests of most of the people, with pledges to reduce the sales tax and improve education. The contenders with a chance to win offer no real choice to the people, and this is true generally in the South. In Alabama, the lack of choice between the super-racist Wallace and the sleeker-racist Albert Brewer gave rise to reports (not confirmed) that black leaders deliberately discouraged black voting in that contest. The assumption was that the Wallace victory assured party recognition and patronage for the black-led National Democratic party of Alabama, and that was one thing more than they would have gotten from Brewer.

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Lack of choice was akin to the meaninglessness of party affiliation. The inanity of this situation has long been evident and hurtful in the South with the spectacle of men like James O. Eastland, Mendel Rivers, Lester Maddox, and Wallace himself claiming allegiance to the party of Kennedy, Eugene McCarthy, and Senator Mondale. Politicians themselves acknowledged some of this in 1970, depending more than ever on personal style. Some kind of height of personality politics was the country-music candidacy of Tex Ritter in Tennessee for the U.S. Senate.

The amateurish racism of the Nixon administration is notable not merely for its aid to the established and skilled, button-down racist Republicans of the South, like Fletcher Thompson of Atlanta, but for its encouragement to racists of both parties to keep right on with their worst practices. This after all was nothing new, merely a matter of degree, exemplified in the decision of one J. B. Stoner, long noted as one of the South's most rabid racist fanatics, to run for governor of Georgia on a flat anti-Negro, anti-Jew platform. If the South had Nixon to thank for such debasement of its politics, it also had an assortment of more polite-spoken Democratic racists and reactionaries who for more than three decades have held it down and hindered any hope for national progress. John Stennis is unopposed for reelection this year in Mississippi, as are all but one of its Congressional candidates, including Jamie Whitten, and Mendel Rivers in South Carolina.

When an able and idealistic black candidate did oppose Rivers two years ago on an anti-war platform, he received no help from the peace movement, and lost even a chance to win for lack of funds. The beginnings of reform of Southern politics would have to be the funneling from the North of campaign money for such candidates. Schemes for achieving this have become a common concern. Julian Bond, the popular Negro leader from Atlanta, envisions a southwide political movement aimed at reforming Southern government and influencing the faltering federal one. A main purpose would be to encourage decent men to run for office and to find for them the kind of money that indecent men now get from Southern and national big business. The nucleus of the movement, as Bond envisions it, would be black elected officials of the South who already have an informal network of communication—but it would encourage and carry along whatever white progressive leadership it could find. This seems about the only realistic hope of reviving any kind of black-white coalition in the South. It would correct failed past attempts at a labor-liberal-Negro coalition which was notable for a predominance of white leaders, a lack of white voters, and a continuing turnout of faithful black ones.

Al Bilik

Ohio

AT THE TIME THE POLITICAL POT should have been stoked, summer was cooling the campuses of Ohio and soothing its streets which, if not exactly safe, at least in the main were without barricades. Because the deadline for voter registration comes early in Ohio, new voters had to be signed in by September 24. But the registration job is not an easy one. Except for a single day each year in mid-September when all polling places are opened for registration, the prospective voter must travel downtown to the Board of Elections office and appear between the hours of 8:30 AM and 4:30 PM if he wishes to register. Systems of permanent or door-to-door registration are unacceptable to Republicans and even some influential Democrats. When the Democrats controlled the Ohio General Assembly a decade ago, their Cleveland contingent killed a door-to-door measure on the premise that

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Democrats were in charge in that city, and why take chances with new voters? But this year in Cleveland and the other seven major metropolitan areas, early estimates indicated that only about half the adult population was registered. Spot checks by the Ohio AFL–CIO revealed a worse record among union members. Similar canvasing by Ohio chapters of the A. Philip Randolph Institute produced the same pattern among blacks. The state leadership of the Democratic party, energized by the disarray of the Republicans, seemed ready for the supreme effort. And the candidacies of the two top Democratic contenders, Howard Metzenbaum for the U.S. Senate, and John J. Gilligan for governor, would appear to have provided just the incentive needed to whip up a massive and unified registration campaign. Metzenbaum, in his primary battle, supported the militant student demand for immediate U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia; and Gilligan endeared himself when he led the "peace plank" fight at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. Although totals will not be known until shortly before Election Day, all the signs point to a record registration and vote in Ohio.

If new records are set in Ohio, it will not be because candidates, students, labor, Democrats, liberals, and blacks came together to mobilize an effective campaign. Perhaps it was J. Edgar Hoover's indictment of the National Guard in the Kent State killings, or simply a lack of money, but the vaunted student crusade that was to register an antiwar electorate just never came off. Each of the eight large cities of Ohio was to have a paid student coordinator who would direct student activists in a registration drive, and also work with other groups in the community. The difficult tasks of identifying the unregistered; assigning target areas; keeping the records; driving for the follow-up —all require a degree of planning that never took place. Certain candidates may have turned off the students by imposing dress codes and behavioral standards. It is also true that during the summer, when the tough work had to be done, students were not by and large onstage in Ohio. They were more often under the microscope. University presidents in Ohio were kept busy reporting to the state legislature the exact number of students suspended and expelled during the previous academic year by way of proving that they had not really "capitulated" entirely to student demands.

Backlash against students can be felt everywhere in this state. It is shared and/or politically feared by politicians, candidates, and labor leaders who much prefer other issues on which to base their campaigns. A candidate who is actively identified with student groups has attributed to him, like it or not, an "end the war now!" position. And Democratic candidates, while they want to remain beneficiaries of the youth vote, are anxious to woo the older vote, including the backlash segment as well. The dilemma of Ohio Democrats is that of Democrats nationally: how to construct a platform upon which to ride into office but not necessarily stand on after election? The Ohio Democratic party, because it smells victory, put together a low-threshold platform accessible to practically everybody. The scandal that last spring saw the GOP gubernatorial nominee demanding the ouster of two fellow candidates has generated a confidence among Democrats that is hardly justified by the stature of most of their candidates. John J. Gilligan, former congressman and Cincinnati councilman, is an imposing figure as he reaches for the governor's seat.

Gilligan, not noted for reticence in his previous campaigns, has this time sought to ride in on the mistakes of the opposition. The stakes are high for him, and as he sees it, for the party nationally. Not one major industrial state can today boast a Democratic governor. Gilligan views a victory as the start of a trend that will sweep Democrats of his stripe—intelligent, progressive—into various statehouses and, even as early as 1972, into the White House. But, Gilligan aside, the real Democratic party stands up only with difficulty. Last May's primary was literally a field day for aspirants. The state organization adopted a hands-off policy in deference to the assorted favorite sons put forward by the eight big-city machines that normally dominate the Ohio party, and which, almost at will, can and have rendered it immobile. Tony Calabrese, a state senator from Cleveland, emerged as the primary victor for lieutenant governor. Calabrese is an old-timer who has had a very special reputation in the General Assembly. Suffice to say that should both Gilligan and Calabrese win, Gilligan would be morally compelled to serve out

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his full four-year term. The other Democratic candidates are no more inspiring.

Robert Taft, the late Senator's son and the Republican nominee for U.S. Senator, has his hands full coping with a tough opponent, Howard Metzenbaum, and at the same time disassociating himself from fellow Republicans who had been caught up in the loan scandal.

The collapse of Bernard Kornfeld's Overseas Investment empire also shook the GOP house in Columbus. The State of Ohio has loaned some $12 million to Kornfeld enterprises, money that under state law may be loaned out of current income only for short periods to "safe" concerns and at a total amount never to exceed $50 million at any one time. The Kornfeld loans, which ran the overall total to $62 million, were approved by the state treasurer and later reviewed by the state auditor. A 4-percent "finder's fee," amounting to a juicy $480,000, was paid by the state for the loans to a firm headed by a man who was very recently the first assistant attorney general of Ohio. This man later made a $15,000 contribution to the virtually uncontested primary campaign of the state treasurer who sought the nomination for secretary of state.

Labor's political operation this year seems symbolic of the way it is in Ohio: each to his own and with his own. No coalitions. In past years, register-and-vote drives usually brought together labor, the Democratic party, liberals, and civil-rights organizations. Ostensibly nonpartisan, such campaigns were understood to have as their target precincts with relatively low-income families, white and black. It also seemed clear that nine out of ten registered in these precincts would vote "right" on Election Day. This year, where student groups have functioned as such in Ohio, they have pursued their separate routes as have the components of what once was the liberal-labor-left coalition. Even the Independent Voters of Ohio, a small but extremely effective band of liberals, conducted its own register-and-vote drive.

Nothing much has changed in Ohio, other than the fact that the Republicans grew careless and the Democrats have outstanding candidates for governor and U.S. senator. That combination has at other times in our history given us valuable presidents, governors, mayors, and senators, without however altering significantly the basic power distribution. Perhaps it will be so in Ohio in 1970.

Jeremy Larner

California

A NOTE for liberals and radicals who have decided to give politics in America yet one more "last chance," as well as for those committed for the duration, win or lose: Jess Unruh's campaign against Ronald Reagan is the most important contest we have going for us in 1970. For the following reasons:

• No other victory would represent a more direct repudiation of that mixture of hawkery, racism, student-baiting, corporate patronage, and patriotic piety through which Nixon governs and Reagan out-Nixons him. Reagan's administration is a holding company for monied interests that perpetuates itself by creating and exploiting violence among students and black people. (A "ministry of fear," Unruh has called it.) It would be tonic for American politics to show that that sort of thing won't work anymore, that it can be defeated by political participation.

• Unruh, from a Texas tenant-farm background, is running a distinctly populist campaign. On primary night, after beating Sam Yorty 2 to 1, Unruh said in his victory speech

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that he wanted "to give California back to the people"—taking it away from the oil companies, real estate interests and big money men who run Reagan. Unruh does not hesitate to name such people, and he will be specific about what they are doing.

• The election of Unruh could have a strong effect on the quality of life in the country's largest state. Under Reagan, California has come to the brink of disaster in education, environment, employment, and taxation. One of Unruh's weaknesses as a campaigner is his tendency to discuss these problems in overlengthy detail. But it is a pleasure to have a candidate who can do that. As majority leader in Sacramento, Unruh modernized the legislature and got the state's most progressive legislation onto the books. As an administrator, no one else would have a better chance to get the job done. He even threatens to stop freeway-building and put in a mass transportation system.

• Unruh represents a hard-boiled and practical rejection of the war in Vietnam. When he urged Robert Kennedy to oppose Lyndon Johnson, he laid his political career on the line. After the assassination, Unruh again stuck his neck out by coming out (unsolicited) for Gene McCarthy, a move that antagonized both Kennedy hard-liners and ever-hopeful Humphreyites. In Chicago, Unruh put together a delegation that included all three factions and yet held together in support of every motion for peace and party reform. His leadership there impressed everyone who came in touch with it. Unruh has said that he would use his position as governor to influence the California congressional delegation in stronger efforts against the war. He might just do that—no one has yet accused him of not knowing how to use power.

OBVIOUSLY, Unruh will be the underdog in California. Aside from Reagan's past popularity, Unruh must tackle some distinct liabilities.

The "Big Daddy" image. In his salad days in Sacramento, Jess Unruh weighed 300 pounds and, as he says, "I didn't care whose arm I twisted to get things done." He still has the reputation of a political boss *par excellence.* Compared to Reagan's slickly "sincere" TV presentations, Unruh sometimes seems uncertain and nervous on the tube—a behind-the-scenes man rather than a polished candidate.

During the campaign, however, Unruh has grown in confidence and learned to laugh off the boss image. He has begun to believe that declaring himself a professional politician may be an asset in a state where an amateur has let things go to hell. Knowing he can't beat Reagan as an actor, Unruh can afford to relax and be himself—practical, factual, and very much engaged—using all his experience to point up the discrepancy between Reagan's rhetoric and the reality of California. That discrepancy will become all the more obvious, if, as Unruh believes, the state will be sunk in economic depression by election time. The current recession has had an intensified effect on the West Coast, which is heavily dependent on government contracts. If the trend continues, Unruh's chances may be better than the conventional wisdom has so far recognized.

At any rate, people in California came here in search of a better life and are deeply frustrated by rapidly worsening living conditions. A campaign where the governor can only win by "rising above" what is happening in his state, and the challenger will make it the central issue, has got to be chock-full of "relevance."

Student skepticism. College students, however, find nothing more relevant than moral purity. (In this they are the direct descendants of the affluent liberalism they despise.) The most practical campus development this spring was a revulsion against destructive "confrontation" tactics, and a growing acceptance of the responsibility to take the issues to the people. When schools were suspended in the wake of Cambodia and Kent, California students quickly set up large-scale canvasing for peace candidates. Yet there was little action for Unruh. The most impressive operation was in behalf of George Brown, a kind of McCarthy without charisma, who has been against the war from as early as anyone and is the only congressman never to vote a cent for war appropriations. Like McCarthy, Brown was neither a doer nor a leader, but his positions were the best to be found. After the student effort began, Brown rose dramatically in the polls, shot ahead of the better-known John Tunney, then lost the

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Senate nomination when Tunney put on a barrage of TV spots, recoiling in unctuous horror as he announced that the mild-mannered Brown believed in violence, that Brown had "voted against ending the war," etc. (Tunney now has an excellent chance to defeat superhawk George Murphy, who is hurt by his ill health and scandalous financial connections. But the campaign will be muddy in terms of the issues; the cautious Tunney did not even support the grape strike.)

Activists who have held back from Unruh point to his position on Angela Davis, the Communist professor whom the Regents are trying to oust from UCLA. In the fall, when the faculty defies the Regents, Reagan *vs.* Davis will pull big publicity. Unruh has said that personally he wouldn't hire Miss Davis, but he defends the autonomy of the academic process. Given the hysteria of California, a more liberal position would mean that Unruh would be compelled to spend his whole campaign on the defensive, in behalf of a woman who has already received far more attention than her political importance merits.

Unruh prides himself on being able to come to the campuses. But as a self-made man among the children of leisure, he simply cannot mouth the buttery phrases about "a whole new generation." At Valley State College I heard him answer a student harangue by shouting, "bullshit!" The applause drowned out the boos and jeers, but many of the activists present were turned away by Unruh's inability to proclaim all-out identification. Later that same afternoon, Unruh stood in the California sun for hours answering student questions and arguing head-on where he disagreed. If he would learn simply to wave a V-sign, pay homage to "doing your thing," and duck into a limousine, perhaps he would not be tabbed as a "politician."

No one knows for sure whether student support will in the last analysis have a positive effect in California. But this much is obvious. Reagan will launch another offensive against the universities. If he feels himself slipping, he will try for spectacular confrontations. In the face of this Unruh will try to present an approach of sanity and support for education, at the same time carefully distinguishing himself from the snobbery and destructiveness of the apocalyptic Left. His success may well depend on whether the mainstream of campus activism will back him up and validate his position. This would leave Reagan and his anti-intellectual counterparts working together to ravage the university, while Unruh joins the majority in trying to stop the war abroad, keep the peace at school, and generally attack the root causes of student and racial alienation.

Tactics. Some degree of student support is necessary for the kind of campaign structure Unruh is trying to build. He is planning to invest a major part of his finances in a strong organization rather than in lavish TV saturation. To do this successfully he must attract an impressive number of volunteers—first, to show his political strength; second, to bring to the polls a maximum number of black people, Mexican-Americans, and workers—in behalf of whom both his record and programs are excellent.

As far as TV is concerned, Unruh will openly admit that advertising is Reagan's bag. He will concentrate instead on a daily challenge to Reagan to debate the issues, both on TV and in public appearances. Whether he goes to Watts or to a Sunday interview on the tube, he will invite Reagan along and comment on his absense. As long as Reagan refuses (which he will do as long as he can), the refusal is an issue in itself. If Reagan accepts, there is evidence that he will crack in an unrehearsed pressure situation.

The Sunday before the June primaries, Reagan got flustered under direct questioning and denied on TV that he had made most of his 1966 campaign promises. Unruh's advertising will run these denials along with the original promises. Reagan floundered again when pressed on his statement that if a "bloodbath" was needed on the campus, then let there be a bloodbath. The more indignantly he explained, the clearer it became that the man meant exactly what he said.

If Unruh does succeed in forcing a public debate, it will be the most dramatic political occasion since McCarthy debated Robert Kennedy—and not nearly so likely to fizzle.

My own contact with Unruh makes me wish he could solicit each voter one at a time. He's the only politician I ever met who is completely without pretension—who can laugh at himself without losing authority. It is ironic

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that his public "image" is tinged with undertones of manipulation. Seeming sincere and guileless from a distance is one of the high arts of politics, and those who master it always turn out to be pompous and sneaky when you get up close. In a stage show of public sincerity, Unruh can't compete with Nixon or Reagan. But when he is being that terrible thing, a politician, he is straight, credible, and working with obvious zest for the things the performers are supposed to believe in.

Perhaps an ancedote will best express Unruh's quality as a leader. In 1968 Robert Kennedy had put 12 college students on his slate for the Democratic convention. But after the assassination, Unruh added McCarthy people and Humphrey people to the delegation, hoping to make it more representative and effective at Chicago. The Berkeley kids lost their chance to serve on convention committees, and when the delegation caucused at a hotel in Sacramento, they refused to call on Unruh. "Let him come to us," they said, and when Unruh got the message he cheerfully came to their room.

"Unruh," they greeted him, "you're screwing us."

"That's right," he said, "I'm screwing you. I'm doing it to get us more power in Chicago."

Face to face, Unruh registered, and the kids came away respecting him. With the right kind of help, and luck, his fall campaign could put him face-to-face with the people of California.

Stanley Plastrik

New York

A MID-SUMMER LOOK AT THE PROSPECTS for "new" or "radical" politics in the New York-New Jersey region produces mixed reactions. At one end of the political spectrum is a not very attractive candidate for governor of New York, Arthur Goldberg, with little prospect of winning in November. A bland and issueless candidate, he was almost nudged out in the primaries by Howard Samuels, a newcomer with a decidedly demagogic image. At the other end, Kenneth Gibson, a black man, has skillfully won an election for mayor of Newark, thanks to a fair amount of white support. He has taken over his thankless job in a serious and considered way. Or to continue the contrast: Paul O'Dwyer, a candidate in the Democratic primaries and surely the most attractive among the lot (but without much of that luck of the Irish), runs a close second in a lethargic campaign dominated by TV extravagance, while a number of important New York unions are supporting Rockefeller for a fourth term round as governor when his writ as "progressive" has clearly run out. Not to mention a number of conservative white professional unions of firemen, policemen, etc., endorsing Bill Buckley's brother for the Senate.*

In a word, some change, some progress, but a long way to go before one can speak of a transformation of the Democratic party into an instrument representing a new coalition of urban masses, minorities, and new middle class. Perhaps most encouraging of all were the results in the Congressional primary battles where candidates like Herman Badillo, Edward Koch, Mrs. Abzug came through successfully, and a youthful reform challenger like Peter Eikenberry almost defeated the hack John Rooney in Brooklyn's 14th Congressional District. Similarly, Reform Democratic candidates,

* Have conservative movements (as distinguished from crackpot reactionary groupings like the Birch Society) finally found the formula for a mass base and a wide appeal: to police and firemen professional associations, the "hardhat" type of unions, small property owners and, above all, lower white middle class. Of course, the only answer to such a development would be the transformation and realignment of the Democratic party through reemphasis on domestic programs. No one will get anywhere just because he's against Vietnam. Who, after all, isn't?

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New Coalition Democrats, etc. did well in a series of local races provided, however—and this is important to note—their appeal to the enrolled Democrats (only 25 percent of whom went to the polls) was broad-based and not merely a reiteration of quasi-New Leftist slogans.

If there is one thing the polls did not indicate it is a serious tendency toward a new party. Not one candidate had made that a part of his platform, even as a matter for discussion. Hence, it is not surprising to find Jack Newfield, ace political analyst of the *Village Voice,* writing on July 2, 1970 that "election results confirmed the existence of several long-term political and sociological trends favorable for the growth of a new party that can either win a four-way race in 1972, or at least replace one of the two old parties immediately." Which is something like saying that the presence of dead cells in the urine of a two-year old confirms the "long-term trend" of its approaching death. What seems behind Jack's premature yearnings for a new party is that, except for Bella Abzug, none of his candidates won. *Jack, spare us thy blessing!*

But arguments in favor of a new party deserve a serious hearing. In my view, the principal tactical argument against a new party is the clear indication that such steps are self-isolating and fruitless. Study the life of American political movements and parties. Each new party has emerged after long travail out of an old party; none has ever been formed or conceived outside of the host body. Apart from this truism of American history there is the fact that, right now, calls for new parties are considered by the bulk of the American people as divisive, polarizing, and separatist—which is precisely what they are. Admittedly, we pay a price for the prevalence of this viewpoint, which is largely but not entirely a conservatism reflecting the nation's mood. The price is that it enables conventional, machine politicians (Daley, O'Brien, Wagner, LBJ, Humphrey, etc.) to exercise an influence they ought long ago to have lost. It slows down the vital process of changing the parties to conform with modernizing trends. New-party talk, however, is probably empty, steering attention away from the real issue of organization. That is, how to do something with the creaking political machinery (remember 1 out of 4 enrolled Democrats took part in the recent primaries!) so that it will reflect some realities of our political life and the actual concerns of people. In this respect little if any progress can be reported. No one in the metropolitan area is talking "new party," but the number and influence of independent "swing" voters is growing, and the party affiliations of candidates mean less than ever. A good many Democrats for example will support Goodell over Ottinger this fall.

PROFOUND APATHY AND INDIFFERENCE to the political process strikes this writer as a far more serious matter than vague hopes for a new party. Here is a phenomenon that anyone who has contact with ordinary people finds shocking. There is a widespread attitude among the electorate that it "really doesn't matter" for whom they vote. Does it go beyond the cynical conviction that the "machine" runs the show and hand-picks the candidates? After all, the "machine" has been around since the day Aaron Burr formed Tammany Hall. And the game of making and breaking the machine is an old American sport. Perhaps what is new is a feeling that it is not so much the machine but the system which makes participation unimportant: the machine absorbed into the system which operates in a computerized, programmed manner to punch out some candidate who mouths phrases largely devoid of sense. Or the system produces a TV candidate (Ottinger, Samuels, etc.) whom one cannot place in any familiar context and who seems disturbingly artificial.

The mass of voters appear puzzled and dis-

DISSENT sends its congratulations to the grape pickers of California and to Cesar Chavez on their splendid victory.

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turbed. No one in the New York area looks forward with much eagerness to whatever the campaign will bring after Labor Day.

Meanwhile, off to the side is the much subdued Mayor Lindsay who may be the key figure on the national scene, particularly with respect to liberal-left politics. Cautiously and with some skill, Lindsay watches the moves of others. Perhaps he has grasped the fact that today coalitions come and go, quickly forming and then decomposing around the image of some national figure. Apart from avoiding a premature move, the problem for Lindsay seems to be: which coalition shall or can he command?

It is a moment of uneasy calm in New York politics, not nearly adequate as a response to the national crisis. Things could change and we hope they will, but right now we are experiencing an unhappy consequence of the decomposition of the labor-liberal-minority-intellectual alliance.

Irving Howe

Vietnam and Israel

August 3, 1970

This article was written before negotiations for a temporary cease-fire in the Middle East were concluded. Naturally I hope that this temporary cease-fire will become a permanent one, and that in turn will lead to a peace treaty. Still, both in regard to the specific situation in the Middle East and the larger issues they touch upon, I believe the points made below remain urgent.

As is usual with articles in DISSENT, only the author is to be held responsible for these opinions. When the article was circulated among our editors, some indicated disagreements and perhaps they will express them in future issues.

CERTAIN THINGS need to be said about Vietnam and Israel. They will cause irritation in some quarters, but had better be said anyway.

In principle, there need be no conflict between favoring rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and supporting U.S. material and military aid to Israel. You can, if you wish, discuss both of these matters under the abstract rubric of "interventionism," but if so, you are not contributing much to political clarity. Unless, of course, you are convinced (a) that the U.S. has an "obligation" to intervene everywhere in the world, settling all conflicts in accordance with some fixed moral principle or measure of national interest; or (b) that U.S. intervention abroad is necessarily reactionary and to be opposed unconditionally. Which is to say, unless you are a cold-warrior on one or the other side.

But if you do not think in such ultimatistic categories, you must face the burden of specific judgment. If you believe there are instances in which it may be desirable for U.S. power to be exercised in one rather than another direction, even as you remain skeptical about the likely consequences of any sort of U.S. military action, then the problem is by no means an easy one.

The war in Vietnam—we can say—is reac-

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tionary, or criminal, or not worth its domestic social costs. The defense of Israel—we can say—is an urgent need, though saying this by no means implies unconditional approval of current Israeli policies or negotiating positions.*

Where it is a mockery to speak of "democracy" in Vietnam, it is a reality to speak of democracy in Israel. Where it is a crude simplification to speak of the Vietnam war as a struggle for "national survival," it is quite cogent to speak of national survival as being at stake in the Israeli cause. (As for the propaganda about the Arab states being part of "the Third World Revolution," it is worth remembering a point stressed in the recent statement by black-community and trade-union leaders: that some of these Arab states are still guilty of conducting a slave trade in Africa, with blacks as its victims, while Israel has been giving concrete economic help to a number of the new African nations.)

It therefore seems foolish or demagogic to insist—as have both the more bellicose hawks and the more fanatical doves—that one must be in favor of intervention in both places or in neither place, ready to send arms and perhaps troops to Vietnam and Israel or to neither country. It is foolish and demagogic to insist that opposing the role of the U.S. in Asia while urging that the U.S. help Israel maintain itself betrays an inconsistency. (Sometimes—let us be blunt about it—this inconsistency is charged to the inclination of some radicals to apply their principles to Vietnam and their ethnic loyalties to Israel.)

We know that any policy that dominates the life of a nation for a decade or two is likely to create unexpected and undesirable consequences. The containment of Communist power in Europe after World War II struck most socialists and liberals as a prime necessity; and in my judgment, they were correct. To have "supported" Western policy *vis à vis* Communist expansion in Europe, or to have seen a temporary coincidence of objectives between the Western powers and socialist interests, was not at all to claim that the *motives* of the Western powers were necessarily democratic or humanitarian; it was only to make a careful estimate of likely *consequences* in the given relationships of power, and then to decide that from our point of view it was crucially better for Berlin to remain a Western city than to fall under Communist domination.

Yet we knew at the time that the application of this policy, while it yielded some major benefits in Europe, also led to styles of political rhetoric, habits of national outlook and increasingly rigid ideological assumptions about the contemporary world which might, later on, have dangerous consequences. They did. A policy that had significantly positive consequences in Europe, though even there, of course, not without some reactionary effects, proved in Asia to be disastrous. Or more precisely: even if the motives of the U.S. government were not radically different in Asia from what they had been in Europe—that is, to consolidate regimes opposed to Russian and, later, Chinese goals—the consequences in Asia were radically different from what they had been in Europe. And the reasons, of course, were that conditions in Asia were not at all comparable to those in Europe.

Now, certain New Leftists have tried retroactively to argue from the Vietnam war back to the Marshall plan and the Berlin airlift. They have tried to show that the disaster of the later events was "ineluctably" lodged in the success of the earlier. Whether or not they acknowledge this to themselves, they would have desired a paralysis of American power, for *whatever* purposes (whether to help Berlin or Tito, on the one hand, or to engage in its frequent reactionary policies, on the other). The result, also "ineluctably," would have been to leave Europe helpless before the armies of Stalin and the various agencies of the Communist movement.

NEITHER IN LOGIC NOR POLITICS is there any reason, then, to accept this effort to equate Vietnam with Europe. In Vietnam the role of the U.S. has been a reactionary disaster; in Europe it contributed, with, of course, unde-

* One may argue that the recent Israeli position on negotiations, borders, etc. has been mistaken and has done harm to the Israeli cause. What would be crucial in such an argument, however, is whether it is made from the perspective of someone committed to the survival and protection of Israel, or someone who attacks the Israeli negotiating position out of enmity to its fundamental nature and role in the Middle East.

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sirable complications, to saving that continent from totalitarian domination.

Yet it would be disingenuous if we were to say that there was no connection whatever between the policies in Europe and the policies in Asia. It was a connection drawing upon the inevitable excesses, crudities and simplifications of rhetoric and ideology that accompanied the role of the U.S. in Europe directly after the Second World War. The urgency of holding back Stalin's armies could not always be disentangled from chauvinist or apocalyptic versions of anti-Communism. And, as a consequence, one of the deplorable results of the major achievements in postwar Europe was the rise of political rationales that could too easily be exploited in Asia.

Which brings me to my main point:

There may soon be a similar connection between the excesses, crudities and simplifications of our present Asian policies and future American attitudes toward Israel. The very fact of continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam has already had deplorable consequences in the Middle East. With U.S. energies sequestered in Asia, the Russians have felt themselves emboldened in their pro-Arab policy. If the U.S. can send "advisers" to Saigon, the Russians can send "advisers" to Cairo. And if the U.S. is bogged down in an unpopular war, the Russians can strengthen their positions in the Middle East.

Nor is it only U.S. policy in Vietnam that contributes to a weakening of the Israeli position. So too, it must be said, does at least a portion of the peace movement. I have in mind that portion which, following the rhetoric of Noam Chomsky, has succumbed to the notion that *anything* the United States does abroad must automatically be designated as reactionary and therefore opposed. This response within the peace movement takes at least two forms. The first I saw at an ADA convention last spring where some fine people were so carried away by their entirely valid opposition to the Vietnam war that they began slipping into a kind of moralistic isolationism. If asked about their feelings on Israel, most of them, I am sure, would have indicated one or another degree of support. But the rhetoric they were employing, the concepts toward which they were moving, propelled them in another direction—toward a refusal of all "entanglements" abroad, toward a politics that would in effect paralyze or negate U.S. power in the world.

The second form that this attitude among segments of the peace movement takes is a rather coarse version of traditional Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, according to which the U.S. is inherently and unavoidably imperialist and therefore to be opposed at all points. Some of the people who say this are, in fact, mere apologists for the Egyptian and Syrian dictatorships who suffer from a principled distaste for the liberal democracy prevailing in Israel. In a sense, they are right: whenever political freedom exists, they wish to destroy it. But other people who use the argument about imperialism do so with good will. They simply fail to understand that the term "imperialism" has by now been employed so promiscuously as to be largely drained of precise content and that even if one does make a serious argument for the view that U.S. conduct is imperialist, that does not necessarily tell people on the Left what view to take of a *particular* action or policy.

The group employing a coarsened version of Marxism-Leninism seems unlikely to exert much influence on American politics, but the trend toward what I've called a moralistic isolationism—that is another matter. It is a trend flourishing along the entire spectrum of American politics, and flourishing because it can easily be confused with the entirely legitimate and valid opinion that the U.S. has greatly overextended its reach in world affairs, often behaving with brutal indifference to the needs of small nations. This new isolationism flourishes, of course, in the virulently anti-American New Left, which in matters of foreign policy has simply stood the Cold War on its head. It flourishes among many liberals who cannot bring themselves to look and think beyond Vietnam. And it flourishes among large segments on the Right, which have always been inclined toward "minding our own business" and are not exactly overcome with sympathy for a Jewish state.

NOW, TRY TO ENVISAGE THIS SITUATION: a crisis erupts in the Middle East, Russian planes flown by Russian pilots intervene in the fighting, and the survival of Israel is at stake.

What will Americans say? At least some por-

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tions of the Left—mistakenly reacting in terms of the Vietnam issue, quite as an older generation mistakenly reacted to Vietnam in terms of the Berlin issue—will scream against U.S. "imperialist" intervention. The liberals will be torn and divided, with at least some persisting in a moralistic isolationism. And this ideology of neoisolationism will be exploited by the American oil lobby, which does represent a visable component of U.S. imperialism and believes its interests to be aligned with those of the Arab nations.*

Meanwhile, the rhetoric now increasingly favored by the peace movement and on the campus will be available to those who are, at best, indifferent to the survival of Israel. Large segments of the Right, as well as many ordinary Americans, will feel no intolerable sadness at the thought of refusing help to the Israelis: "Why should we get mixed up with those Jews? Why pay taxes to bail out Tel Aviv? Didn't we have one hell of a time clearing out of Vietnam, and didn't you guys on the Left raise the roof so that we should pull out? Why then should we now get mixed up to save Golda Meir? What are those Jews to us?"

The incipient merger of New Left rhetoric with anti-Semitic sentiments, signs of which can already be noticed, could become a powerful and disastrous force at such a moment.

People like Noam Chomsky, whose good will is not in question, must now ask themselves whether they are contributing ideologically to this potential catastrophe. *Are they prepared to take responsibility for the consequences of an Arab victory?* If not, they must consider the need for complicating and modulating a politics on the Left that would deny the employment of U.S. power anywhere in the world. To be sure, we may be told that the Arabs no longer wish to "drive the Israelis into the sea," and an Arab victory would not mean the destruction of Israel. But who is prepared to put that assumption to the test?

Still, let us not make things too easy for ourselves. Those being criticized here might well say in reply: "Very well, but how far are your prepared to go in your support of Israel? To the brink of war? Beyond it?" Such questions are not easy to answer, and for myself, if no one else, I must say that if driven to an extreme they are simply agonizing. What we would say or do in the event where a possible war between the U.S. and Russia were entangled with the possible destruction of Israel is not a question that can be answered with a phrase. It is the kind of situation that would require nerve and intelligence, a weighing of the most difficult alternatives. Right now, however, there is reason to believe that a policy of helping Israel with military material would, if combined with flexibility in peace negotiations, forestall such a terrible eventuality and lead to a negotiated peace.

Those of us who care both about the survival of Israel and the maintenance of peace must therefore try now, while there is still a little time, to counter the kind of ideology and rhetoric in the peace movement and on the campus that I have been arguing against. A little caution, a little forethought, a little sense of historical complication, a little skepticism about unqualified slogans—we need these desperately. Nothing in the experience of our time indicates that they are qualities easy to come by.

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* To which one should add the strong segment of the State Department that has been consistently pro-Arab these last few decades.

I do not see how U.S. policy in the Middle East over recent years can be explained by a simple or even not-so-simple version of a Leninist theory of imperialism. The overwhelming bulk of American investments in that area are in oil; those investments are in the Arab countries; and it would seem that a policy resting upon a strict concern with American investments would have had to be decisively more favorable to the Arab nations than U.S. policy has in fact been. Indeed, all the meretricious propaganda spread by the New Left and others concerning Israel as an "agent of imperialism" studiously avoids the precise nature of American economic interests in that part of the world; as it studiously avoids identifying the forces—the oil companies and a portion of the State Department—which would like to change U.S. policy in a pro-Arab direction.

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Lionel Abel

The Two Nihilisms

This essay was first delivered as an address to the Phi Beta Kappa chapter of Columbia University.

WE ARE LIVING in a period of nihilism, of cultural nihilism—no doubt there are many who would prefer to describe it as one of cultural revolution, of cultural change. But many of those who prefer the word revolution are also likely to tell you that they do not look forward to revolution; and as to change, many more are convinced that change as such is desirable, than that it is possible to get something they particularly desire. There is a feeling that one is right only when attacking, whatever be attacked, and that one is wrong only when defending, whatever it be one defends. And with this feeling there has come a mounting violence in the kinds of rhetoric employed, a violence, which, by the way, does not seem adjusted to any special or favorite target; it is not exclusively directed against governments and their representatives. Thus, it is not only the violent who are violently attacked nowadays, but also, and sometimes especially, those who have made a point of being moderate. These are days when as a result of having given thought to some matter, one is likely to be accused of not having made up one's mind. Throughout the field of what we call culture, the negative, violently at work, continues to affirm itself, while the positive negates itself, and is either faltering or mute.

The cultural nihilism we are witnessing today began, of course, before this age, which, however, it characterizes. If the arts and sciences are now under attack, yet attacks of this sort are by no means new, nor are the ideas that are advanced to justify them. It has been said that whatever date one gives for the beginning of some trend can always be set aside in favor of some earlier date, and it may be that the dating of any trend cannot but be arbitrary. For my own part, I cannot think of any better date for the modern and even contemporary assault on culture than 1749, called by the philosopher Ernst Cassirer the "midpoint of the enlightenment," when Jean-Jacques Rousseau made his violent and impassioned attack on the arts and sciences, which he accused of having weakened and depraved humanity, of having destroyed man's innate sense of manners, artistry, order and justice, and of ignoring the real needs of men while arousing desires that never can be satisfied. This discourse, says Ernst Cassirer, "shook eighteenth-century rationalism to its very foundations." The attack has been repeated many times of late, but no version of Rousseau's discourse has equaled the original in eloquence or in finesse. Rousseau gave his attack on culture the most exquisite expression, so that Voltaire wrote him: "Never has anyone employed such wit to turn us into dullards . . . you are like Achilles, inveighing glory and like le Père Malebranche, who with brilliant imagination wrote against the imagination. . . ." And Voltaire added: "after reading your work one almost feels like going down on all fours. However, since for more than sixty years I've lost that habit, I feel . . . that it would be impossible to reacquire it; and so I leave this natural posture

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to those who are worthier of it than you or I. . . ." But in the margin of his copy of Rousseau's essay Voltaire wrote: "how you condemn yourself, you ape of Diogenes!"

WAS ROUSSEAU'S ATTACK on the arts and sciences an invitation to humanity to go down on all fours? But before trying to answer this question, let me describe to you an event which took place in Paris almost 200 years to the year after Rousseau's discourse. It is 1948, three years after the ending of the Second World War with the terrible bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the city is Paris, whose intellectual elite has decided to aid and honor the poet Antonin Artaud, the one living representative of those French poets—some of the greatest in the language—who have been called "accursed," the reason being that their poetry is connected with unhappiness of some unbearable yet exemplary sort. Now Artaud was surely of this company; where did he belong if not in the collegium of "the accursed"? If he had physical beauty, this was befouled by cancer; if he had talent, he was psychotic, and had formed the habit of alcohol and drugs. He was filthy, in rags, full of accusations; his speech was larded with the four-letter words which were not used so frequently some twenty years ago, and which, partly because of his example, we seldom stop hearing today. Artaud was poor, and close to death, and the great of Paris were determined to do him honor. And so a soirée was arranged for him in an elegant Paris apartment, where he was to read some of his verses. Few were invited, but these few were famous, and all were expected to contribute substantial sums against Artaud's grim future.

I heard of the affair from the conductor and composer René Liebowitz, who already had made sufficient stir to be invited. In the audience were André Gide, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Pablo Picasso, Alberto Giacometti, and others of like fame. Here was the quintessence of French art and literature, but also the quintessence of French science, French philosophy, French society, and even French finance. Before this audience Artaud appeared, in the last stages of decomposition, dirty, in rags, and instead of reading poems, what he did was to scream and howl. Only that. Our own poet, Allen Ginsberg, in the fifties recited a poem which he entitled *Howl*. Yet it was a poem. Artaud's contributions to that evening in Paris were just howls. Now these were treated by the audience, René Liebowitz told me, as poems.

It was simply terrible, Liebowitz said, to hear Artaud screaming and howling before that audience. It was like hearing a monkey reciting Racine. "Was there any applause?" I asked him. "Prolonged applause," he replied. "We had come there to approve, and we would have applauded no matter what we had thought of his poems, had he recited poetry." And then Liebowitz related the event to Georg Simmel's famous essay on the tragedy of culture, in which, according to Cassirer, the problematics of culture is stated with "complete decisiveness." Simmel thought that as culture develops, cultivation tends, and necessarily, to become soulless. For, he pointed out, the soul which is "vibrating, restless, endlessly self-evolving" seems always to die in its products, its motion is arrested by the very forms which it creates, for these are frozen, timeless and still. Said Liebowitz: "Perhaps the tragedy of culture was being played out for us, and we were hearing the very motion of the human soul refusing to become objective, to be formalized, to die. Who knows?"

The audience sat through it all, not sure that this was the real thing, some hoping it was not; some pretended, of course, that what they were listening to was, no matter what it sounded like, the very essence of poetry. Said Liebowitz: "Did I compare Artaud to a monkey? It was us he turned into monkeys." I thought of Voltaire's comment on the margin of his copy of Rousseau's essay.

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According to Voltaire, Rousseau condemned himself in that essay. Certainly the artists and scientists of Paris who applauded Antonin Artaud that night were joining in a condemnation of their art, and of their science, and making of this condemnation a sacred rite. Now if art has always been quite prone to self-condemnation, this was certainly not true of science, at least in the first part of the century. What had happened to make it possible for scientists to join with artists in such a display of contempt for their disciplines, and for culture generally?

How is it that in this age the negative has taken over the role the positive is normally called upon to fill? I have called this an age of cultural nihilism; it has also been called by a modern philosopher, Martin Heidegger, "the age of the worldwide liberation of atomic energy"; and I think this designation a perfectly accurate one, too. For we should realize that an age in which atomic energy has been liberated on a world scale could not but pass through a period of cultural nihilism.

The discovery and utilization of atomic energy for military purposes placed the whole of humanity in jeopardy. Would humanity respond to this new situation and act in its own defense? Very soon it was realized that it could not; it was realized that humanity, as such, is incapable of action. Negatively, humanity was indeed in a situation insofar as it could be destroyed; but positively it could not situate itself so as to take up an attitude and act. The political expression of the fact was the impotence of the United Nations, which grew more garrulous and absurd as the atomic weapon whose use it should either have been able to forbid or control became more precise and threatening. And as the United Nations became more and more exposed for fulsome phrases and lack of deeds, so, too, was the human race. For it now became apparent that the human race was a whole only insofar as it could be destroyed, and that its members could not represent its wholeness if they were indeed to act. And with this realization came a devaluation of the universal, which became synonomous with weakness, and also a dynamization of the particular, which now alone seemed capable of drama and definiteness. At once all the particularist tendencies in modern society acquired a new strength. It was as if the exposure of the weakness of humanity made all those groups within it proud to be so much smaller and less inclusive than it, as if in their very lack of number was their real force. Suddenly the part was stronger than the whole.

But the part is also the negation of the whole, and as the partial took on greater and greater importance, so did the negating action of the whole which it implies. At one stroke all those past cultural values which have taken their meaning from the notion of universality became as questionable as that notion itself. Every form of separatism asserted itself more strongly, the French against the English in Canada, black against white and white against black in our own country, and throughout the world, man against woman, woman against man, children against parents, students against teachers, and even, in the mayoralty campaign over which Norman Mailer presided, New York City against the state. The adjectives "red," "brown," "black," "yellow," and "white" suddenly became more forceful than the substantive "man," whose meaning we had thought of as merely limiting. What was art? What was science? And what could they represent in a world in which nothing could be justified now in terms of humanity taken as a whole?

Science had provided a model in the atomic explosion which art would not ignore. Some of you perhaps witnessed on television the explosion of ice boxes in Nevada staged by the Swiss artist Tinguely. Asked why he should be interested in the destruction of his chosen object, Tinguely replied that he was asserting the right of the artist to destroy as equal to that of the technicians and of

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the military. I mention Tinguely's television stunt simply because its very obviousness points up the much more subtle destructions now being pursued in all the arts. In the 1920s, novelists were interested in creating what was called the "pure" novel, and poets were interested in a poetry possibly "pure" of all prose elements, and among playwrights there was talk of a "pure" theater, and in the new art of the movies of "pure" films. In our time, in our age—and I mean in this period which began with the atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki—it has not been the "pure" novel that has been pursued, but rather the negation of the novel, the destruction of the novel. And this negation and this destruction has been called the anti-novel. In poetry, the anti-poem has been solicited; in the theater, first the "absurd" play was put on, and then, that not being sufficiently destructive of dramatic form, the anti-play. If we have not yet had any thoroughgoing cult of the anti-film, this is no doubt going to come; it is certainly on the order of the day. You will notice that I connect two phenomena: separatism, a virulent separatism in politics, and an aggressive attack on the very forms of art. In both cases there is the assertion of the part, precisely that which requires justification, against the only thing which could justify it, the whole.

IN HIS ESSAY, ROUSSEAU, after all, had not attacked everything. If the arts and sciences had encumbered the human race with useless artifices, there was yet something worth saving, something which human beings could still remember, and which Jean-Jacques himself remembered well. Now this was the naturalness and simplicity of rustic manners and rustic life. Thus Rousseau was not quite as nihilistic in his essay as was Sigmund Freud in his repetition of it known to us as *Civilization and Its Discontents* or Norman O. Brown in the repetition of both Rousseau and Freud which he entitled *Life against Death*. For Sigmund Freud and Norman O. Brown could not look back on or remember any such rustic simplicity of manners; nor, by the way, can we. Anything like that was long ago pulverized by the onward march of industry and science. And there was another value Rousseau could hold on to, and did hold on to in his essay. The natural man, the simple man, the rustic—this was Rousseau's thought—could also be the moral man. For our part we must all admit that we have had no contact with any such men. Against the arts, against the sciences, Rousseau could assert the value of the primitively unspoiled, and simple life. We, for our part, can repeat Rousseau's negations, but we cannot with any honesty say we share his positive faith. Let me recall for you just one of the moral principles Rousseau set himself to defend in his essay against the debilitating effects of art and science. It is, as no doubt some of you will remember, the love of the fatherland, and the readiness to die for it, the simple martial valor of the good citizen or member of a tribe. Which of us today shares that faith?

It used to be said that in philosophy one had to choose between Plato and Aristotle, and then it was said that such a choice had already been made for us, and by none other than Aristotle, who, for his part, chose Plato. I would say similarly that in social questions, but also on this question of the arts and sciences, we have to choose between Voltaire and Rousseau, and in making this choice, we can do no better than follow Rousseau himself, who may be said to have chosen Voltaire. For the style of Rousseau's essay was intended to please Voltaire most of all, as in fact it did. Moreover it was Voltaire Rousseau wanted to convince, more than any other of his contemporaries. But most important of all, the values of tact and manners and artistry together with those of individual feeling and the sense of personal worth, were not values Rousseau was willing to sacrifice any more than Voltaire would have been; certainly not for the primitiveness of a rustic scene. Rousseau, too, wanted the values

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of civilization. He hoped to find them in a different environment, but not in one unrecognizable to a Geneva citizen.

But how can we today not choose Rousseau, and choose him against Voltaire? How can we choose the arts and sciences which have condemned themselves already? How are we not to be cultural nihilists, if this is indeed the spirit of the age? Or to put the matter more pointedly, are we to pretend this is *not* the age of the worldwide liberation of atomic energy? How are we to counteract the cultural effects of that liberation: the dynamization of all the forms of separatism, the insurgence of the part against the whole, and the destructive attitude of our artists toward the very forms of art?

I would like to speak to you encouragingly; I would like to point to positive values and say things to you that might cause you to open your eyes, and yet not harden your hearts. Unfortunately, I cannot say anything to you which would be very hopeful and in which you could really believe. The effects of the discovery of atomic energy remain with us, and so the entire race remains in jeopardy. The messiah, if you like, has turned out to be negative, and there is no positive messiah to be found. How then continue to believe in or work for the values of culture? Why support science and art?

I would suggest this to you, though; you do not really have to choose between the alternatives represented by Voltaire and Rousseau. I would even say that our modern situation is far too drastic for us to accept the problem as it was put by them. Yes, we lack the grace of the natural man, whom we have encountered only in books. But I should say that our loss of grace goes deeper than the loss of the style once possessed with some naturalness. To understand what we have lost, we should think of that almost irrecoverable grace which Heinrich von Kleist found not in nature or in primitives or in rustic man, but in an art object, in the marionette. The damaging effect of conscious thought and conscious culture, to which Kleist objected as strongly as did Rousseau, may be seen in the fact that conscious art and conscious culture have excluded men not only from the spontaneity of nature but also from that of the marionette, from that of the machine. Now in a world of such powerful machines as those around us, the spontaneity of nature seems to me insufficient. We would not be able to hold our own against such machines without the spontaneity precisely of the machine. And this spontaneity, Kleist told us, we could regain not by trying to be simple and natural once again, which we could hardly succeed in being anyway, but by pushing our damaged and damaging self-consciousness to its furthermost limit, so as to reenter the paradise of spontaneity through the gate of a supreme consciousness. Well then, can we get back to a true simplicity by any other route than that represented by the arts and sciences? But if we are to take that route then, as another poet has said, we must be absolutely modern.

And if we are absolutely modern we may become aware of new facts, some of which may give us heart. So much has been destroyed! But among the things destroyed and also damaged there have been many things that were hardly positive. And among these I would place one of the forms of nihilism, indeed the most attractive form of it. For there was something precious in nihilism, and what was precious in it has, I think, been destroyed. And it is about this precious and no longer available form of nihilism that I would like to speak now.

A theologian has distinguished subtly between grace in the morning and grace in the evening, and I would like to make a similar distinction between nihilism of the morning and nihilism of the evening. What was nihilism of the morning? It was set forth in the clearest way in the middle of the last century by the young Russian nobleman Dimitri Pisarev, who had the audacity to exhort his fellows thus: "whatever can be smashed ought to be smashed to bits; only what can resist our blows is worthy to survive them.

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So let us strike out right and left. Whatever we can destroy is just rubbish." I must note here that this optimistic nihilist twice attempted suicide. Perhaps he felt that the fact he survived these two attempts entitled him to live. We can always question, however, whether he tried hard enough to die. In any case, it must be said that his efforts at suicide were less impressive than that of the French philosopher Jules Lecquier, who cast himself into the ocean with the resolve not to swim to safety unless God made him do this. God, as we know, did not, but Lecquier did not renege on his defiance of life, and drowned. I must add that Pisarev also died by drowning. But we do not know whether his death was willed. In any case, whatever we think about Pisarev in connection with suicide, his nihilism was of an optimistic cast. Pisarev expected resistance to his effort to destroy. He expected the resistance, as he said, of all whose existence was deserved. Far different is the enervated nihilism which looks forward, as did Ernst Renan, to the invention of a painless odorless gas which men could turn to when their problems became too pressing. Different, too, is the nihilism of Swinburne, who found whatever gods may be worth praising for this and only this:

> That no life lives forever;
> That dead men rise up never;
> That even the weariest river
> Winds somewhere safe to sea.

Nihilism of the evening has read all the books and finds the flesh sad, alas. To be sure, we are all of us in some vague sense nihilists both of the morning and of the evening; even the strongest of us may search for idols during twilight, and even the weakest of us may think of destroying idols at the break of day. But in any less vague sense than that, the nihilism which I have called the nihilism of the morning, active, ecstatic, arrogant, and destructive, however we judge it, is not for us, is not for this age; for we now know something Pisarev did not know; namely, that there is nothing on this earth which cannot be destroyed; we know even that the earth itself can be destroyed. Shall we say then that the earth, too, has no right to exist? No, I think we have to say that nihilism of the morning, however attractive we find it, has no right to exist. It, too, is a casualty along with many other precious things our time has seen destroyed.

What about nihilism of the evening? This was already present in the 1890s, one of whose artistic styles known as *l'art nouveau* is enjoying a vogue right now. Certainly such nihilism is coherent with this age and supported by it. It is the one kind of nihilism which it is possible to hold. But is it proper for you, is it proper for the young? In any case it is the style our age offers you, and if you elect to be nihilists, this dispiriting style of nihilism is the one you will have to adopt.

But, of course, you do not have to accept these alternatives, which those of us who belong to this age more completely than you do are unable to see beyond. Perhaps you will create a new age with new alternatives. Will it be a better or worse age than this? On that topic you yourselves will have to speak. But in any case you will be free of one illusion by which many of my generation were bound. I suggest that you can be aware now, at the outset of your careers, that the only kind of nihilistic style possible to you is a most dispirited one: a stale nihilism, a tired nihilism, a bad nihilism; one not for young idealists; good only for old frauds.

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René Dumont

The Militarization of Fidelismo

When René Dumont published the book Cuba: Est-Il Socialiste? *earlier this year in France, it created a sensation throughout Europe. A distinguished agronomist who occupies a chair at the Institut National Agronomique in Paris, Dumont (born 1904) is also a veteran French leftist who had paid several visits as an expert adviser to and sympathizer with Castro's Cuba. His richly detailed portrait of economic mismanagement and militarization is all the more devastating because it comes from a friend of the regime. This portrait has recently been confirmed by Castro himself, who, as the* New York Times *reports on July 26, 1970, "drew a bleak picture of the Cuban economy, with conditions in many sectors bordering on chaos." Nothing more need be said here except that in our judgment Dumont offers further evidence for the view that without democratic criticism, institutions, and opposition, no society can be built on socialist lines. This first English translation of lengthy sections from* Cuba: Est Il Socialiste? *is published by arrangement with Georges Borchardt, Inc., and reprinted by permission of Éditions du Seuil,* © *Editions du Seuil, 1970.* *Our title has been supplied by the editor.*—ED.

For a Few Days, I Believed . . . .

DURING THE FIRST FEW DAYS I was in Cuba in late June 1969, I believed that an imminent transition to a communism without marked privations was feasible. I did continue to register very explicit reservations about the projected 15 percent annual increase in agricultural products, which was to be spread over a twelve-year period. Yet in the course of the six-and-a-half- hour tour I made with Fidel Castro on the afternoon and evening of Sunday, June 29, his assurances were rather convincing. . . . That night, however, when, in the euphoric start of my visit, I said to Fidel that perhaps he was going to beat all records for agricultural progress in the socialist world, he seemed to hesitate. "You think so?" he said; then, with that sincerity of which he is sometimes still capable, he added, "You know, a revolution is hard." It was a courageous admission.

AT THE OUTSET, let me emphasize that in Cuba one does not encounter the extreme poverty of some parts of Mexico, numerous regions in northeast Brazil, or much of the Andes region, from Columbia and Peru to Bolivia. No one in Cuba is very hungry; nonetheless, austerity is widespread, and food shortages are again as severe as they were in 1962, if not more so.

The basic food rations are very cheap. Wages have been raised, and most Cubans have more money than they can spend. They hardly want to save or invest it, nor are they encouraged to do so, for one would have to promise them interest—a heretical promise. They all want to spend their money, and quickly, but have very few opportunities to do so. When the occasion does arise, everyone rushes to the scene and the lines grow longer and longer. Here, too, a big change has occurred since 1963 [the year of the

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author's previous visit], but a change for the worse. Of an evening in Havana, you can stand in line three hours in order to enjoy a "Coppelia" ice [1]—which truly is as delicious as ever.

Consumers have been divided into groups, to reduce the queues at the official ration stations. Still the lines lengthen, because firstcomers are better served as to quality, and they are more sure of being served. In one small city, a long line waited throughout the night under the rain for espadrilles; there were two pairs. Often one small orange or half of a big orange is given out for a child.

To have the right to a meal (without tickets) in a restaurant one endures, standing and unprotesting, a wait of a half hour to two hours; this was true of all the cities I passed through. Bayamo was a radiant town in early 1960, in the midst of the joys of traditional holidays and the liberation. But Ania Francos would no longer choose the title "Cuban Festival," were she to see sad Bayamo (or any other city) as it was in July 1969, with its empty shops and haggard passersby. Children are sometimes dressed in odds and ends of old sacks, and young girls are ashamed of their rags. The old section in Havana was once so gay. One does not mourn the prostitution, but not everything was negative then.

You queue up for the films, queue up to make a cab drive around Holguin, queue up to sit on the terrace of a café, which sells neither coffee nor beer . . . but lemonade and fruit juices that are more sugared than fruited. You queue up for the too infrequent bus; this last lengthens the work day and aggravates the fatigue of pregnant or overworked women. As wage increments outpace production and as consumer goods imports are so reduced, the queues cause an *unproductive* fatigue, and the living standard is lowered. Prior to March 1969, one used to find vegetables, books, some clothing.

Economic laws—and not all are abolished under a socialist government—sometimes take a diabolic revenge. With the same basic resources, a more correct distribution of the available money and a better scheme for the distribution of goods would have avoided, or at least much reduced, all the waiting. It cost the U.S.S.R. dear to forget basic economic laws, and its slowness in rediscovering them hindered its moving ahead. Must Cuba repeat all the economic mistakes of the socialist camp?

"You must write how we lack everything," a housewife of ordinary means said to me.

> Many tickets are not honored. Chicken is reserved for invalids and pregnant women. My neighbor's son is now two years old, and she has still to get the chickens due her when she was carrying him. I've not had a pair of shoes since 1963.[2] Some of my neighbors have been able to get them, but what lines they had to stand in! For the last four years, no trousers—just one pair a year, with a shirt, at the work centers. If you cook pork, the whole neighborhood can smell it and if the Revolutionary Defense Committee in your part of town hears about it, they denounce you. By the end of the month, you can't wash yourself except with a horrible detergent. The monthly ration of beans makes three meals. With the monthly minimum salary of 85 pesos, if you have a lot of children, there's scarcely any question of buying extras. Pizza costs 1.20 pesos, a small bottle of beer is 0.80—when it's available—and a hot dog (in Spanish, *perro caliente*) costs 0.40; 0.60 if you add cheese. If you miss a day's work you are not paid; with a medical excuse, you get a third of your pay.

Apparently, in public everyone is for Fidel; in private, his partisans are much less numerous. Everybody goes to demonstrations in the Plaza de la Revolución; you leave from wherever you work, and it's obligatory. If the truck stops en route, many

[1] The capitalist manufacturer of these ices is still in Cuba, where he is the object of friendly attentions, and even enjoys some privileges.

[2] Since the fall of 1969, only plastic or, occasionally, canvas shoes are distributed.

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people slip away. Sometimes melons and oranges are sold on the square. A windfall! Quickly, up with the barriers, for there are immense waiting lines. During the main speech, the sale must be suspended, and the people who draw near the pot of gold grow angry. "One hundred years of struggle," says the propaganda; "plus ten years of lies," add the people. Anyone who works in a factory is fed by his canteen, and this supplements his rations. However, the ladleful of corn cooked in water is predominant in the meals of the young people of the Columna while on the tables of high officials one finds chicken and rice, avocados, cigars, and coffee. The foreign guest of the Protocolo has the right to a banquet. But for women alone with children, people who are no longer young, and the elderly housewife—what trouble they must go to. . . .

It had been planned to have everyone who was eating in a canteen turn in his own food card, but this had to be given up because in practice it was too hard to enforce. As a result, those who have workers or students in the family, all entitled to meals away from home, benefit from what are, in effect, supplements. . . . Salaries range from 85 to 900 pesos monthly, which preserves marked inequalities. . . . There is hardly any place to spend extra money except at a restaurant or on the black market. A simple meal of soup, spaghetti, an ice, coffee, and beer costs 4.5 pesos; were the minimum salary spent on such meals, it would pay for 19 of them in a month. A good meal costs more than twice as much.

The young civil servant fresh from the university earns 300 pesos, and while on his official rounds—sometimes real, sometimes fictitious—he receives gratis meal tickets that are worth 7 pesos. His situation contrasts too sharply with that of the elderly couple whose pension only just enables them to pay for the meager official ration, so that sometimes they literally go hungry (1800 calories a day, at times).

I PROVOKED ASTONISHED LOOKS when, in talking with foreigners and Cubans, I stressed the fact that concrete, tangible possibilities exist for increasing Cuban agricultural production very rapidly—even if the percentages announced by Fidel are on the face of it unbelievable. One young French expert declared he was amazed to see my evaluation of the Cuban situation fall so short of what he was kind enough to consider my habitual clear-sightedness. The diplomatic corps, in the main—even representatives of the East European countries—privately believes that the Cuban economy is moving toward imminent catastrophe. I hesitate to reach this conclusion, for I have looked carefully for all the positive factors; also, remembering 1963, I had never believed the earlier promises, which have come to nought. And not having been on the spot in the meanwhile, I have not experienced the disappointment of these people.

"Quadruple the Milk Supply in Two Years"

IN MAY 1967, Fidel addressed the peasants attending the second—and probably last—congress of the National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP). He explained the advantages of large-scale cultivation, and sharply condemned the *microfundi,* or small, peasant-owned farming. His theories kept him from taking advantage of peasant experience, which is very valuable if one knows how to interpret it—obviously, not following it to the letter. It was this which led him into the errors of the special Plans.

Some delegates tried timidly to defend those small farmers who were doing a good job. Fidel supported his position with marginal examples: he cited cases of extreme poverty in the Sierra Maestra. He counseled —logically—against planting bananas on the steep slopes of that historic mountain, where every planting precipitates erosion. For, he said, the *granjas,* were going to plant 2000 *caballerías* (27,000 hectares) in bananas for Oriente Province alone, and these state farms

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would be in full production in 1969. "Then we will have so many bananas that we will not sell them to you, we will *give* them to you." In 1969, he added, Oriente Province would produce 1.3 million liters of milk a day.

In July 1969, I studied Oriente, and in the Cauto valley came across nothing except, bordering the island's central road, across some hundreds of hectares of banana trees that were dying because they had been planted in a much too wet locale with very poor drainage.[3] Any ordinary peasant would have avoided this gross mistake; in a state enterprise that justifies its existence only on the grounds of its technical superiority, such an error is inadmissible. At the agricultural command post for the province, they told me that, as of then, there were still 4,350 hectares of banana trees, state-owned, that were in good condition. This was less than one-sixth of what, two years earlier, had been promised for 1969.[4] Milk production there, they estimated, was reaching 310,000 liters a day, or less than one-fourth of what had been promised. . . .

It was late in 1968 that Fidel Castro formally promised to quadruple Cuban milk production within two years. To quadruple it in two years, with a bovine population of 7 million heads—when I read that in France, my few remaining hairs rose on my head. Of course, with the use of artificial insemination, Fl heifers are born en masse of zebu cows; they would have 500,000 that would begin producing milk in 1970. In the best small dairies in the vicinity of Havana, if one eliminates the mediocre or short-term producing cows, and if the animals are well cared for, one often obtains 3,000 liters in first lactation. Five hundred thousand times three, and one has 1.5 million more tons of milk a year, Fidel told us. Adding this to the current 800,000 tons, one would almost have tripled the output; with a little imagination, of which Fidel has a great deal, this can quickly be called quadrupling.

In the Camagüey dairy triangle, there were already 6,000 Fl heifers producing milk; they were being maintained in moderately good conditions, probably comparable to those the whole herd will enjoy in 1970. Instead of 10 liters over 300 days, they were giving on an average 6 liters for 250 days, or 1,500 liters per lactation. However, the proportion of milch cows pregnant annually through artificial insemination had not yet reached 70 percent of the total. Let us suppose that one were to reach that rate in 1970; one would then obtain a production of 1,050 liters per existing milch cow, which, with the existing 500,000 Fl heifers, would make 525,000 more tons of milk. This more realistic hypothesis would already represent very considerable progress (for which there are few precedents in agrarian history), but one would not even be doubling the output in two years; far from it. . . .

Fidel often confounds the conception of a project and its realization. To obtain those 525,000 tons, a large number of preconditions would have to be met, first among them improved pasturage. Then eliminate 40 percent of the more mediocre Fl heifers . . . to improve the yield and raise the production mean . . . but "management" wants to keep them all, which is a big mistake. . . . The possibilities of agricultural growth are becoming indeed enormous, with the acceleration of scientific advances. However, the difficulties of putting these advances into practice increase proportionately—above all, when one wants to go too fast.

Absolute Priority for Exports

THE PRIORITY ACCORDED to exports is understandable, for at least two reasons. Cuba has a high trade deficit, especially vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and is terribly short of convertible currency. This hinders her in purchasing all the equipment she needs, and places her in a position of economic, ergo political, dependency on the U.S.S.R. The

[3] There is magnesium sulfate in the subsoil water.
[4] In Cuba the banana is not a luxury but a basic food, actually preferred over daily bread.

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almost total lack of most consumer goods and the stiff rationing are also somewhat justified by Cuba's very high investment rate, which approaches 30 percent and thereby beats all records for underdeveloped countries. However, sacrifices that have been prolonged since 1961 have become unbearable for the people today. To what extent does a ruling group have the right to impose its concept of the future on the country? Or to permit privations caused by an urgent preoccupation with future development to be aggravated by economic disorganization? One may ask this especially when those who are in control in Cuba do not practice austerity in their own lives, as do their Chinese counterparts. If there were a truly democratic participation in decision-making one could talk of sacrifices voluntarily accepted. And as we shall presently see, the all too modest effectiveness of Cuban capital investments greatly reduces their true value.

The structure of the economy is such that it has become almost impossible to establish valid estimates whereby it might be better oriented. In my view, to achieve a more rational order of priorities for investments that would maximize production growth, one should grant responsible autonomy to the units of production, establish less arbitrary domestic and foreign price scales, and levy some interest rate on the capital supplied to various enterprises. As for agricultural production, when I was studying the Soviet agrarian situation I attempted to show that, in order to avoid undue injustices, a ground rent was an economic and social necessity; in this way, one seeks not to penalize workers in enterprises that have received land with natural conditions (soil, climate, water) and economic conditions (markets, infrastructure) that are highly variable.

Cuban agrarian plans are determined in terms of physical objectives, above all—in hectares to be planted and sown. To this point, the quality of work has not been taken sufficiently into account. Everyone bustles about in an attempt to move fast, even too fast—which makes for poor work. Production costs rise in proportion to mounting mistakes, and revenue is thereby lowered. Since the farm co-operative as a solution was —unjustifiably—rejected, no one, insofar as he belongs to a limited social group, has a direct interest in seeing that state enterprises are more efficient. This is very apparent. Even if, in general, the top managers have a lofty awareness of their national and revolutionary responsibility, at the same time they satisfy their thirst for power. As for the worker who suffers under a cruel sun and in badly ventilated barracks, he suffers even more when he gets complaining letters from his family, relating the multiple difficulties of daily life. At that point, he begins to feel he's had enough, and his production reflects it.

Superhuman Effort for 10 Million Tons of Sugar

. . . FIDEL CALLED 1969 "the year of the decisive effort." The phrase made some people think of one *last* effort and even, lurking in the background, of the possibility of failure. It is a military figure of speech: the guerrilla fighter must often be asked to make superhuman physical efforts.

However, one remains a guerrilla for only a few months, at the end of which is defeat or death or exhilarating victory. The battle of economic development in Cuba is far from ended, for all that in 1970 it is already in its eleventh year. Of course, posters everywhere say "All energies tensed," but such a superhuman effort cannot last for several decades.[5] Fidel adds that if he had not called as early as 1964 for 10 million tons of sugar for 1970, he would have got much less—his first hint that perhaps he will not get them. The battle of the 10 million tons was

[5] In October 1969, many of those mobilized for future work in the canefields tried in their medical examinations to persuade the doctors that they could not work standing up. The doctors answered, "The Commission will decide." In the Commission's offices, the lists of those "leaving for the big battle" were already drawn up.

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launched with the Cuban mentality in mind, presenting the goal as a challenging sports record, "an engagement of honor for the entire nation." It is difficult to believe that is was, or is, reasonable.

To meet the goal, a part of the 1969 harvest had already been sacrificed, and it barely exceeded 4.3 million tons. The central agricultural stations, which were then in the process of being enlarged, did not all function well; new equipment was not all in working order or well geared to earlier machinery. Furthermore, the priority assigned to plantings for the "*zafra* of 10 millions" disorganized the 1969 harvest, especially its transportation. In Camagüey, some cane had to wait as long as a month between being cut in the fields and ground in the factories, although it is advisable for the interval between cutting and grinding not to exceed 24, at the most 48, hours. Sugar losses are immediate, and this time, instead of the average 12 percent yield, the rate dropped to as low as 3 percent. In terms of a national average Fidel stressed that more than 1 percent of the sugar had been lost, since in Camagüey 11 percent had been realized. The surplus of molasses does not compensate for this.

A certain quantity of cane that could have been ground in 1969 was carried over into 1970. The harvesting, or *zafra,* which traditionally is done almost entirely between January and May, was officially begun for the first time on July 14, 1969, then halted and started again on October 27. It will be extended into July 1970. It has been necessary to leave excessive quantities of refined sugar from the 1969 harvest in the vats to permit crystallization of the juices coming from this unseasonable harvest, which had only a 5.5 percent sugar yield. From July 14 to November 1, 1969, a total of 200,000 tons of sugar was produced, or 2 percent of the goal. The fact that Castro announced on November 6 that the Army would have to cut 20–30 percent of the cane emphasizes the seriousness of the labor shortage. The fact that it is estimated one man will cut 1,150 to 1,300 kilograms a day, whereas a good *machetero* can manage 4 tons and a champion 7 tons, proves that unenthusiastic mobilized workers have predominated among the field hands. Among the 200 *macheteros* feeding one loading point, there have often been only 5 to 7 experienced cutters.

Where have the others—the real, the good cutters—gone? Some are in the Ministry of the Interior, where they are politically safe. Older men have retired, and the young men are not rushing to replace them, preferring instead the technological institutes. Still others have become soldiers, tractor drivers, sowers. . . . They are replaced by workers and peasants, pre-university and university students, and, last, the Army. . . . One result is that much cane has been cut out of season—when it was either too young or too old, or during the rains—and hence the yield is diminished. In July 1969, it had seemed to me probable that the 10 million tons of sugar were potentially there in the canefields.

But not all the tonnage has been turned into sugar yet,[6] for there is urgent need to improve the coordination of all harvest activities and of loading; transport facilities are inadequate, and much repair work is delayed. Even assuming that 10 million tons will be harvested in 1970, the average yield for the 1969 and 1970 harvests would not reach 7.2 million tons. A higher goal would subsequently be less difficult to maintain, for 500,000 hectares of new cane have been planted. Haste has caused so many mistakes that one should know better how to avoid them in the future, but it is now more than ten years that Cuba has been making mistakes and not very many lessons have been learned from them.

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[6] As of February 1970, the general opinion in Cuba was that the goal would not be met. [On March 6 of this year José Milian, then head of the Control Department of the Sugar Ministry and since then deposed, announced that by March 5, 4 million metric tons of sugar had been harvested. (The goal was 10 million metric tons.) —ED.]

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A Militarized Agriculture Unique in the World

MUCH WORK AND DISCIPLINE are needed to build socialism, especially when starting from a low economic level. The moment one refuses to make use of the formidable profit motive, mankind's most potent incitement to activity, or as soon as people have moved out of primitive or patriarchal societies, other motivations must be found. . . .

From the outset of the Cuban agrarian reform, the Army has played a crucial role. Today an increasingly militarized agriculture is directed from a national command post—*puesto de mando*—the headquarters of which I have seen. Major Parra would have liked me to share his enthusiasm by just imagining the immense relief map of Cuba, 27 meters long and 8 wide, which was soon to be installed in the big room. At the time of this writing, all the Agricultural Plans are already depicted there, with individual lights that allow one to quickly illuminate all the rice plantations, citrus orchards, grazing savannahs, etc. It should mightily impress foreign visitors, who are a little too much kept in mind when such displays are set up. . . .

Similar *puestos de mando* have been or are going to be established at provincial, regional, and national Plan levels, and the country's agriculture will be somehow codified. Posts are beginning to receive from the production units that have been placed under their orders, daily, weekly, and monthly information, which is transmitted in various ways—by telephone, telex, radio, telegrams, and courier. There is much concern, and rightly so, to learn what information will be necessary at this or that level, at what frequency it should be given, and by what means it can most suitably be transmitted. This is a difficult problem: if one supplies too much information, production-unit cadres will be drowned in paper-work, like those of the *granjas* (state farms), and they will no longer have enough time for productive work. If the command center does not have sufficiently detailed information, its decisions risk being irrelevant to the actual situation. However, it is the command center that decides, albeit far from the field of operations. As I watched my Cuban friends debate this question, I was casting about for a solution more in the direction of decentralization, toward greater local initiative and autonomy—in a word, greater responsibility on the spot. I caught myself just in time, for I was on the verge of pronouncing the phrase "self-management of base units," which would have led to my being accused of the Yugoslav heresy.

Because the structure is military—that is its essential characteristic—not enough confidence is placed in the base. Too many things are decided on paper from above, so that the workers who have been mobilized and organized in brigades have become mere performers carrying out orders, quite like ordinary soldiers. The supervisor of one section of a rice plantation—a noncommissioned officer—receives instructions covering everything he must do day by day, from J-Day, the germination date of the particular rice that has been sowed, to J-Day + 110 or + 120, the date forecast for the harvesting.

Cuban agriculture, however, carries out an ensemble of tasks that is infinitely more complex than those of a peacetime army. Nonetheless, a centralized structure offers certain advantages: one can impose a series of innovations simultaneously throughout the country; one need not win, by sometimes difficult persuasion, the voluntary adherence of a peasantry that includes many independent farm owners, not all of whom are well enough informed to grasp quickly the anticipated benefits. What quantity of manure, what equipment, what growing techniques—all these questions are decided at the "technocratic" level, which is *supposed* to keep abreast of the most modern methods.

Elsewhere in this study I note the many problems one encounters on the spot. One minor instance: the military in charge of the

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work crews carry revolvers, which is understandable (sabotage) but makes me uneasy. . . . In the south of Central America, one recognizes the boss on a plantation, whether he be owner or manager, by the fact that he carries a revolver, whereas his workers have machetes. Such symbolization of power does not make him very attractive.

The Che Guevara Brigade

ESTABLISHED IN 1967–68, the Brigade was composed of 36 mechanized squads, each comprising 117 men and 20 heavy tractors and bulldozers, which enabled it to reclaim tens of thousands of hectares for cultivating sugarcane, rice, or *pangola*. The clearing of the land followed a line of march roughly paralleling that of the rebel columns ten years before—a sentimental, guerrillalike work criterion that did not allow for adequate economic evaluation. Elsewhere I have emphasized how, in the plans for improved pasturage in Camagüey, land was reclaimed everywhere at the same time, instead of the crews' systematically beginning where it could have been seen in advance that the investment would be most productive.

More serious still: the clearing tactics are most brutal. To uproot trees, the crews scoop up a significant amount of surface soil, which is rich in organic matter, and push it onto the ranks of felled tree trunks, setting fire to the whole, which burns the soil and disperses nitrogen in the air. As early as 1963, I had emphasized how the danger becomes still more grave when clearing very poor soil that rests on a gravelly, completely infertile layer of iron granules.

Following behind the noble squads of the bulldozers come the modest foot soldiers, a group of unskilled laborers who, with their little axes, endlessly chop up all the limbs that can be used for posts, sawmills, or fuel. If one less bulldozer had been bought—so many are underused that it would have sufficed to organize the repair shops better and speed up repairs—it would have been possible, by spending the same amount of foreign exchange, to equip the crews with hundreds of electric saws, with which one man can do the work of 50. By giving priority to the heaviest equipment, one does not necessarily acquire the most economical or most productive equipment per unit of foreign exchange spent; until now, this calculation seems to be neglected in Cuba.

The brutal clearing that I have seen in Camagüey has uprooted too many trees that were useful for their shade, or as protection for riverbanks, or could have served as posts for wire fencing around the pastures, etc.; thus vast stretches of land were left unprotected against dangerous wind erosion. Antihurricane windbreaks will eventually crosshatch the country, of course, but it takes time for them to be planted and grow to sufficient height—long, long years. In the meantime, until the windbreaks are widely established, the big trees could have been left standing; when they were no longer useful, one could have blasted them out with "dynamiters," which use a fertilizer, nitrate of ammonia, as explosive. This method would have removed the trees without the bulldozers' destructive scraping.

The fear of hurricanes haunts Fidel, especially since October 1963. Hurricane Flora flooded all the Oriente savannahs, and he himself almost lost his life there, together with a crew of rescuers. Yet erosion worries him less, although this indiscriminate clearing of land encourages erosion on all the moderate slopes, and no adequately serious measures are being taken to halt it. Another consideration: it was estimated that the irrigation reservoirs will not have to be refilled with lime for 25 years. If all the feeders of these reservoirs were protected and if the cultivation of steep hillsides were forbidden, their span of usefulness could be greatly extended. This would seem more urgent than building the terraces of Pinar del Rio.

To achieve this, one would have to hand over to the Sierra Madre peasants—who do have to go on living—more moderately sloping fields, which would be assigned to

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them in exchange for too precipitous hillsides that the government could protect by reforesting or planting cover crops. However, a rather dogmatic principle stands in the way of this. It says that the Cuban government shall progressively repurchase all peasant-owned lands but never, even by way of a provisional exchange, cede land to the peasants. The result is that thousands of Sierra Madre families are still cultivating—and thereby eroding—many steep hillsides. Moreover, often these families are underemployed because they have inadequate land at their disposal, especially for growing their own foodstuffs and the feed for their pigs. Had they more level fields, and such do exist, they could supply neighboring cities with meat, which is in very short supply. But the peasantry's farm production is largely disregarded and is disappearing.

In Michel Gutelman's study of socialized agriculture in Cuba, he stresses the fact that all workers, tractor drivers, and officers attached to the Che Guevara Brigade earn the same wage: 160 pesos a month, plus lodging, food, and medical care. It should be pointed out that this makes them a privileged group in comparison to the ordinary workers on the *granjas* and the Plans, who earn 85 to 120 pesos a month and who generally must pay for their own food. Nor, for that matter, does the Brigade's egalitarianism prevail throughout the Army. As a rule, the Army offers three separate messes—one for officers, one for noncommissioned officers and regular servicemen, and a third for the temporary recruits, who do not feel much like praising the food after listening to their comrades who wait on table at the officers' mess.

Agriculture: A Military Drill Field

THE CASTRO ADMINISTRATION'S first step was to eliminate a capitalistic agricultural system that did have many flaws—both men and land were underemployed—but was quite efficiently organized. The succeeding socialist system, one of co-operatives and *granjas*, mobilized all available resources and was mechanized, even overmechanized; but it did not come up with equivalent organizational abilities. Its failure is implicitly recognized in the present reorientation—the Special Plans—which we will be studying here. Within the framework of the revolutionary offensive here outlined occurs the militarization of the whole Cuban economy.

All important posts are entrusted to the Army; all important enterprises are headed by a major, a captain, or a first lieutenant. The rehearsal for the Army's takeover seems indeed to have begun in October 1967, by the Che Guevara Brigade. Almost 1,000 caterpillar tractors, bulldozers, and tanks (their turrets removed) were assembled on the Cauto plains and received the signal to take off from Castro himself, as he stood in his command car and passed the troops in review.[7] The Brigade was going to "cut to ribbons" Castro's new enemy—nature—by indiscriminately leveling everything that once made for the charm of the island. . . .

It was genuine warfare, complete with communiqués. However, after the Army moved into Camagüey, the Brigade broke up into small groups and there was less talk of it. In April 1968, it arrived at Las Villas, but the column had thinned out considerably and the rearguard still remained in Cauto. In 1969, one learned occasionally that such and such a plan had been assisted by elements of the Brigade. In the end, it was disbanded and absorbed into the DAP, a mechanized Army group especially equipped for agricultural service, which in June 1969 assumed the management of the country's hydraulic resources.

This amounts to a genuine takeover of a faltering socialist agriculture, by the military, for the Army directs all motorized activities. "Those 50,00 tractors more or less badly maintained by agricultural incompetents—

[7] The same military ceremony was repeated in 1969, with female battalions driving Piccolinos, the small Italian tractors. What a waste of time!

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what a marvelous training school that can be for us" is approximately what a famous major said. As of March–April 1969, the men in charge of the machinery on the *granjas* were replaced by lieutenants, and the militarized tractor drivers were assigned fixed wages (thereby eliminating overtime pay), military schedules, 25 days of continuous work with no Sundays off, and a five-day leave once a month—work permitting.

Schools were established for tractor drivers or machine operators, which served also as schools for young recruits. The work proceeded at full speed and with wide-open throttle; extraordinary records were cited—24 hours, and presently 72 hours of uninterrupted work! Tanks yoked in tandem with heavy chains brought all trees toppling down, without regard for those that should have been preserved. It was a grandiose spectacle, all those great trees falling like so many straws—unless they were too tough and stalled even powerful Soviet tanks.

Agriculture had become more than a pressing problem hopefully to be resolved; it was now a splendid terrain for Army maneuvers. Militarization was pushed forward to cope with the general disorder, such as the passive resistance of a growing percentage of unwilling workers. The Cuban people were made increasingly subservient to the Party and the Army, and it was becoming more and more difficult to distinguish between the two, inasmuch as both groups wore uniforms and carried revolvers.

Death of the Farm, Killed by Nomadism

A GRANJA COMPRISING 2,000 hectares of rice paddies had, by way of stable personnel, only a manager, a two-man service team of storekeeper and cook, and two elderly, virtually retired section supervisors. Starting in 1969, the rest of the work was done by a succession of brigades; thus, more than 1,000 men moved into the fields, the majority of whom remained for one to two weeks, sometimes less than a week. The manager did what he could, but he was only the executor of a series of (sometimes conflicting) orders received either by shortwave (permanent monitoring post) or by impromptu visits. At any hour of the day or night, Provincial Plan directors could arrive, from 80 kilometers away, or even national directors. The section supervisors quite understood their own insignificance and were resigned to it.

These are no longer true agricultural enterprises that manage their own personnel, equipment, and livestock; most important, they cannot act on their own initiative. In this [1969] campaign, two trial efforts were ordered—stockbreeding and sugarcane cultivation and both failed. However, no one is really responsible for crops when successive waves of workers, who arrive from different places, and of equipment that is also nomadic, have shared in the cultivation. Men and machinery are summoned to points where the severest lack exists, always in the midst of great confusion. A lot of time is lost not only in moving them about from place to place but also in setting up and organizing each work camp; often the work is halted before things are beginning to run smoothly. The observer may leave an overstaffed camp where the machinery is hampered by overcrowding, only to tumble into immense, deserted fields of crops where no one is around to give any instruction or information.

Also, the Plans are always falling behind schedule, so one must always work too fast, to the detriment of quality. The assignment of equipment to mobile brigades, which are separate from the farm production units, somewhat resembles the all too famous Soviet MTS [Mechanized Tractor Stations] of unhappy memory; the tractor and machinery stations were always embroiled in discussion with "their" kolkhoz, and in the end had to be discontinued. Men are moved about constantly; they live in barracks and cannot organize any kind of family life; and they see too little attraction in farm work, which is, in turn, too little esteemed and too badly paid. No one is permanently on hand

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to watch over the crops closely enough, except perhaps the experts in insect and plant diseases. We have always taught that agriculture depends on knowledge of locality. Even if modern changes diminish the value of this dictum—today man is better equipped to master nature—they do not annul it. To master nature one must understand it well, that is, study it thoroughly.

In the camps, a man carries out decisions that have been taken at the Plan level, which is certainly less removed from the area under consideration than was Havana from its *granjas* in 1963. Nonetheless, accidents occur every step of the way— rain, mechanical breakdowns—which the best-planned work schedules do not anticipate. To adapt to or correct unforeseen situations, more local initiative should be allowed. Above all, each agricultural enterprise should have the minimal means of production at its own disposal. Large-scale work has as its main justification the full exploitation of equipment; the Cuban organizational structure is demonstrably incapable of effecting this, which permits one to ask whether it is indeed well founded. . . .

Management Plans Are Too Uniform

AT THE PROVISIONAL SEAT of the *puesto de mando* [command post] for Oriente Province, which at the time of my visit was in Bayamo, they explained to me how agriculture for the entire province was going to be organized. I welcomed the apparent rationality of the scheme, but pointed out that I was "slightly concerned" about how it would be practically, concretely, worked out on the land. " 'Slightly concerned,' " Captain Chardan repeated, standing at attention (we were a mixed Army-civilian group), who was responsible for the agricultural Plan. "I am very much concerned." He had grasped the irony of my remark, and was clearly aware of all the difficulties that were going to arise. His colleague, who was responsible for experimentation throughout the province, asked me to get him a book on the organization of labor in agriculture. . . . I suggested that he check into East German or Hungarian material, rather than Soviet studies.

Units of this scope, with the overcentralized direction of enterprises that extend over tens and even hundreds of thousands of hectares, require altogether exceptional organizational abilities. These abound only in an advanced stage of development and are highly remunerated in well-developed countries. Such organizational capacity was still widely lacking in Cuba in 1969, which was normal, for this is a characteristic of underdeveloped countries. Responsibilities that would be crushing for thoroughly trained personnel are placed on people who cannot yet carry such weight. Offices are staffed by relatively uninformed advisers who will not listen to those who know more than they do. Here again, the wish has been to go full speed ahead, which is not necessarily the best way to win a race.

Plans are quickly elaborated on the basis of too hasty or even nonexistent studies. However, in dealing with the peasantry, the new leaders disregard most of the peasants' traditions of empirical local knowledge, which would have made it possible to avoid a goodly number of the grosser errors I have mentioned. Let me simply cite here the pumpkins of Ciego de Avila, which rotted in June–July 1969, because they had been planted in poorly drained fields totaling dozens of hectares.

EVERYONE, THEN, receives a plan, which generally has been elaborated at the national or provincial center, and this he must apply. Fifty-four hectares in *pangola* for grazing, plus 27 additional hectares in fodder that should, it was decided, feed 288 Fl milch cows. Accordingly, everywhere sheds for this number of cows were built, following specifications handed down from above. The mechanical milkers arrived, whereupon another type of building was advised. The parceling out of pasture land in small plots

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is patterned after the example of Voisin.[8] This agriculturalist from Dieppe had been able to achieve his checker pattern very economically because he had received heavy war indemnities. Fidel Castro took his book, *La Productivité de l'Herbe*, which does contain interesting information, a bit too much as holy writ, and has gone about ordering a pattern of small pastures all over the country. . . .

As I have said, centralized planning permits one to take a rapid first step, but it slows down later advances, which have to be more closely adapted to local conditions. Such plans provide for the same intensity of cultivation everywhere, whereas the natively richer or better irrigated areas are economically able to advance further than others. Everyone observes the same pace of development, whereas the better trained, more judicious unit chiefs should have the possibility of striking out ahead of the others and of trying new techniques—such as the adoption of electric fencing. Finally, in a period of shortages, something is always missing that prevents prefashioned plans from unfolding as anticipated. Southeast of Havana, in the Guinés region, 40 percent of the *malangas* or *taros*, which are much relished by Cuban housewives and their children, could not be harvested in the winter of 1968–69 for lack of both manual labor and machinery. Had one mobilized city dwellers, promising them by way of pay 15 or 20 percent, say, of the tubers they dug up, hardly any would have been lost, for the needed supplementary volunteers would have been found. Here I am again, incorrigible that I am, recommending materialistic incentives.

The Plans, then, lack flexibility; they do not leave enough room for initiative and do not take production costs sufficiently into account. Accordingly, they lack dynamism. It would be more worthwhile, for example, to start building modest cowsheds, and expanding this project proportionately as the pasture lands demonstrate their real potential. If the Plans are to be flexible, the organizational structure, on the other hand, cannot continue with impunity to change so often. It is now 11 years that Cuban agriculture has been in a state of perpetual transformations: the cost of each has come high. This fact of perpetual transformation enables one to explain to visitors what the difficulties are; but still, it ought not to be overdone. And why should one install such uniform structures everywhere? Sugarcane has demonstrated over the centuries that it fits well into single-crop cultivation and that it can be grown indefinitely in the same soil. This is not to ignore the British system of alternating temporary meadows and annual crops, which demonstrates how the soil can be refortified with humus.

Foreign Technical Assistance Underexploited

I CITE ONE OTHER EXAMPLE of the very high cost of overambitious goals and of the disorganization introduced by the militarized bureaucracy. A French technical mission was sent to Cuba in late 1967 to build rice paddies in horizontal terraces, using French equipment—scrapers, scoops, and levelers. By 1968, the Cubans saw that the scrapers could be put to many other uses. Of the 50 scrapers that were to be provided for the three French teams, one group received 17, and another 5, which for all practical purposes were useless for a period of six months, the accompanying tractors having been despatched elsewhere. On December 10, 1968, after a meeting with Castro, it was decided to prepare 1,340 hectares of level rice fields south of Havana, before the May rains, using 25 scrapers.

On December 15, when the project plan was received, the French team learned that they would have to be content with 10 scrapers and begin work December 22. At the end of the month, the preassigned loca-

[8] Voisin died suddenly in Cuba and was tendered an official funeral. A number of institutions were named after him, for he is considered on a par with the Heroes of the Revolution.

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tion was shifted 61 kilometers to the east because—I shall come back to this—the future highway must pass through the original site. One month went by before a commission produced a too sketchy topographical survey of the area. On February 2, it was decided to prepare only 33 hectares of rice paddies, but a more detailed topographical study was still needed before bringing in the equipment. At a subsequent meeting . . . the French expert was asked to be content with 13 hectares—1 percent of the initial project—and with two scrapers. However, he proposed doing 54 hectares if he could get topographers.

The students who were to work with this project had, in the meantime, been assigned elsewhere. However, as of March 1, 30 student rice specialists were available 50 kilometers away from the site. They waited two weeks for the truck that was to transport them (they could have covered the distance faster on foot). They finally turned up; in three days of intensive training (they were full of good will), they learned how to do surveying, and within two weeks completed an impeccable relief map. Thereupon they received orders to rejoin their classes and, much discouraged, took off, convinced that they had worked to no purpose. The Party representative swore on his honor as a revolutionary that he would allow the work to be finished. . . .

The scrapers arrived the following day, April 19, when the students were no longer on hand to help the drivers in leveling the terrain. The drivers had to be taught how to do the work, four other men who had been trained for it had been sent to cut cane. Soon one scraper broke down; the other began work the morning of April 21. By three o'clock in the afternoon, a series of torrential rains began, earlier than usual. This meant that it was too late to start, and everything was snafued. "We'll begin again in October." At that, the French expert let it be understood that he was "disgusted to have been paid to do nothing, out of exchange saved on food for the Cuban people," and he refused to stay on.[9]

One of his colleagues had noted down the actual daily cutting time for reaper-beaters during the rice harvest; he had found that it was two hours and twenty minutes a day. With co-operative organizations, where everybody has an interest in keeping up the work's pace, one would surely not do worse—indeed, that is scarcely possible. A better structure, one adapted to the real situation (abilities, mentalities) and not to what one wishes were the case, would have permitted the purchase of less equipment, while more work would have been accomplished. The savings in foreign exchange and the savings in time would enable the Cubans to resolve their food problem. Their food shortage is due, in large part, to the dogmatism of their managers. (This is not to exclude other contributing causes.)

In Wishing to Manage Every Detail, Castro Sometimes Introduces Disorder

ULTIMATELY, FIDEL CASTRO has confidence only in himself, and he is unable to delegate full responsibility. He remains the one leader; it is essential, in his estimation, that he see everything, rectify everything. Indeed, he is the universal moving spirit in Cuba, his goals quicken people to make an effort, and his speeches arouse a degree of enthusiasm still, especially among his most faithful followers, the sugarcane workers. But when he begins "to promise the moon," many Cuban listeners flick off their radios; they no longer believe. Castro wants to do everything himself; he has too many ideas at once—every day, every minute—and he wants to put them to work without clearly envisaging all the problems.

Let us follow him on his tours. He comes upon a bridge in bad condition. He gives orders that it be repaired immediately. Fifty

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[9] Technicians from Eastern Europe are even more severe in criticizing Cuban inefficiency and the fact that they themselves are underemployed, which scandalizes them at least as much.

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kilometers farther on, a stretch of road is badly deteriorated, his jeep gets stuck (the time is October) and churns its way out of the mud with difficulty. "You'll build me a real road, a good asphalt road here." Another time (on this occasion, during the dry season), a whole area under cultivation is visibly suffering from drought: "You'll build me a *micropresa* near here"—a small dam. At another place, the crops are more neglected than elsewhere: "I want an agricultural school in this sector."

I want . . . I want to do everything . . . instantly. All this has its usefulness and is part of an undeniable will to do the right thing. His orders are successively noted down by his entourage, his slightest word is hung on respectfully, often recorded. Everything is transmitted to the province, where responsibility is assumed for carrying out the essential line. This is "progressive decentralization": one no longer need go so often to the capital. However, at the first of the year, the poor provincial technicians receive their official work programs, which has been established and agreed upon by the planning junta and the technical ministries. They have been given the means, generally very closely estimated, to achieve their assigned goals. The prevailing disorder cuts down on the efficiency potential of their equipment, and programs are often late. Then Fidel's independent ideas are laid down and received, adding a further and truly official work program that is at least as imperative as the first. So one tries to do everything, although the same bulldozers cannot be both on the road bed and by the dam on the same day. So one does a *bit* of everything, and loses still more time in shifting equipment about. Such scattering of work activity cuts down on productivity—and sometimes annuls it.

WHILE QUESTIONING A JAPANESE RICE GROWER, Fidel Castro learned that an essential secret of Japan's triple yield of rice per hectare, as compared to Cuba's, lies in the use of a potent fertilizer, very rich in potash, which prevents its being beaten down by the rains. A rational plan would have called for this formula to be tested at the six small experimental stations that had, indeed, just been set up in several provinces, with control plots to keep track of differences in the soil. Criticizing the Institute of Animal Sciences harshly for such tests, Castro used to say scornfully, "Five experiments, five errors." His rejection of statistical calculations shows,[10] on some scores, that his scientific education leaves much to be desired. This would be quite acceptable in a chief of state if he did not insist on directing everything himself.

In the course of his tours, he did order a "test" of the Japanese formula,[11] in three large fields of more than a thousand hectares in all, "in order to see." The test was made during the dry season of 1968–69, when there was scarcely any danger of damage from rain beating down and therefore less need of potash. But the fact that it was Fidel himself who ordered the test invested it with many supplementary chances of success that have nothing to do with science. For "Fidel's test," one most certainly chose the richest land, the best quality of seed, the optimum dates for optimum sowing, and the most advanced and best tended growing techniques. The old manure formula, which by comparison is very badly handled, is hardly in danger of yielding more—which could provoke a memorable burst of anger from Fidel.

He is no longer content with his military and political claims to glory, or his unquestionable human value. It is essential to him that he also be recognized as first in scientific research and in agricultural education. He is the one who knows everything,

[10] Calculations without which one could not have selected the Filipino "miracle rice," which is so useful in Cuba.

[11] The Japanese formula is 18 percent nitrogen, 24 percent phosphate, 18 percent potash.

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and the peasants used to be open-mouthed in admiration. Now that they have been brushed aside, Fidel wants to show the researchers, like Preston and Willis in animal husbandry, and the Plan directors that he is the one most capable—if not the only one capable—of making the synthesis between science and common sense. He has foreign experts come to Cuba, then for a long time keeps their confidential information to himself, in order to boast of being the one "who makes the miracles happen."

Grandiose Projects, Mistakenly Conceived

IN THE SOUTH OF CAMAGÜEY, 440 hectares of heath were cleared for the cultivation of rice IR 8. A drainage canal was needed to complete the job. The official in charge, who had understood the usefulness of the canal, was transferred. His successor said that he was going to do the job "using dynamite, it's quicker," and then did nothing. After the heavy June rains, the 440 hectares, each bearing more than four tons of well-ripened grain, were covered by three feet of water. The rice was lost. To multiply varieties of rice quickly, an expert advised putting the seed beds under a plastic tent. Fidel mobilized 200 Party volunteers for a period of one month to build by hand, on some undulating hills (when there is so much level ground in Cuba), 6 hectares of terraced rice fields. To hasten the sprouting of the rice, he interpreted the technician's advice in his own fashion and ordered 3,000 big lamps, circus spotlights, to be installed on 12-foot posts "to keep the rice continually warm." He forgot that warm air rises, also that a too prolonged exposure to light retards the maturing of certain rice varieties. Most serious of all, no member of his technical staff dared show him his mistake (his multiple mistakes).

As difficulties accumulate, Castro asks his fellow citizens not to linger over the present but to turn their eyes toward a more and more distant horizon—1980, for example. And he draws an ever more idyllic picture of that future—on condition that his people accept a program of work that becomes more and more extravagant, especially in the eyes of anyone who thinks first of the Cubans' daily rice ration.

Everything for the Foreign Visitor

NONETHELESS, CASTRO IS WELL INFORMED in agricultural matters and many of his decisions are justified. It was he who decided on the priority of agriculture, since which time he has been, and is still, an important agent in the acceleration of agronomic progress. But he also exaggerated the priority of sugar and, above all, alienated many competent technicians who became disgusted and were ultimately driven into the opposition; I prefer not to mention names so as to avoid causing them harm. Anyone who opposes Castro's ideas is quickly thrown out; therefore, when he announces a mistaken proposal, no one dares oppose it anymore if he wants to keep his job. His entourage seems to be subjugated by a mixture of fear and admiration.

The first rice plantations south of Havana had in part been situated, according to the provisions of the first Plan, on the clayey soil of Matanzas, where the earth has a gritty consistency; it is too porous for rice, but very fertile and suitable for other crops. The French technicians had difficulty in getting the site shifted to a marshy zone. Today it is across these rice fields that Fidel wishes the southern highway to pass, although this narrow, marshy strip will require enormous and futile preparatory work. One will have to pour cement by the tens of thousands of tons as deeply as possible into the ooze, or haul tens of thousands of truckloads of earth to build a dike-road, which will never be strong. A bit to the north, the Matanzas clay rests on a bed of limestone; this highway would cost infinitely less there, it would be a better road, and it would pass nearer to inhabited centers. "I want it to be possible to see rice on both sides of the road" is the

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answer Fidel is reported to have made to the countersuggestion. If this is so, it is not the reply worthy of a leader who would be careful of the economy—that is, of the well-being of his people. It is the reply not of a socialist but of a *grand seigneur*.

The Havana harbor must increase its port facilities, for the provincial crops (citrus fruits, pineapple, bananas, coffee, early vegetables) and the output of new factories will augment the traffic flowing through it. Therefore, to the rear of the port a new area of warehouses must be created. The Institute of Physical Planning found a very favorable location—directly behind the port, requiring no demolition of existing buildings, and well serviced by road and rail, etc.

But Fidel decides, with one stroke of the pen, that this section will be handled like the rest of the belt encircling Havana, which was planted with fruit trees interspersed with temporary coffee bushes. Temporary they proved to be, and most of the dying bushes have been pulled up. Each of the remaining fruit trees—and many have been lost—is surrounded by a protective grill, since Fidel now wishes to plant grass and graze sheep there. Why sheep at the gates of a city that has such need of fresh milk, a product for which it is important to cut down on shipping distances and costs? I sense once again foreign visitors in the background of this project, for many are easily impressed. . . .

It will be possible to have the visitor first see Havana, once the capital of prostitution and gambling—in a word, of all the vices of the capitalist era. A few kilometers by car, and he will stand at the foot of reforested hillsides, with artificial lakes and anti-erosion terraces (which are badly lacking farther out into the country). In the foreground, sheep graze in the midst of orchards. What picture could be more idyllic, more Marie-Antoinette? The contrast is calculated to please the progressive city dweller, especially if he is won over in advance and is expecting to have a rosy picture of socialist achievement painted for him.

In July 1969, the Havana-Santiago de Cuba highway was begun. The first lap leading from the capital is an eight-lane road, four lanes each way. . . . When this highway project was being discussed at the Institute of Physical Planning, a major—one must have this rank to permit oneself such license—timidly pointed out that the Revolution wanted no part of private automobiles (they still exist) and that therefore the volume of traffic foreseeable within the next few years (trucks, public buses, official business cars, tractors) would be amply accommodated by two lanes in either direction. It would be enough if space were reserved for eventual expansion. However, Fidel had just read two beautiful books on the Olympic Games in Japan, with superb photographs of highways and interchanges: "The Japanese are more——than we are, and they've done it. And we, we couldn't do it?" People looked at each other, stunned; this was the reaction of the proud *Caballero,* not of the economist who is realistically aware of the present disproportion between the economy of Cuba and the tremendous might of Japan—the "third big power," according to Robert Guillain.

For the departure point of the two highways that will extend from Havana to the west and to the east, Fidel proposed the Plaza de la Revolución, and with one stroke of his red pencil indicated their position on a map that specialists had been studying for weeks. His route would have required a very wide avenue to provide access to the port—city traffic augmenting the flow of vehicles on the two highways—and the old quarter of the city would have had to be disemboweled at great expense. This time, Fidel gave in to the opposing arguments and agreed to let the highways start from the port; however, his next diagram would have required a hospital to be razed. He agreed to circumvent the hospital, but his third sketch was still much inferior to the plan the specialists had prepared; his, however, is the one that is being executed.

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Would His Retirement Be Desirable?

IF FIDEL HAD THE MENTALITY OF CHE—he is far from it—one could raise the question "If he were voluntarily to give up the country's leadership, would it benefit Cuban development?" [12] It is a question that makes one hesitate, certainly, for if Fidel is a *caballero* he is also the *caballo,* the horse that, for better or worse, pulls the Cubans onward; it is he who puts women to work, he who pushes the country ahead quite as much as he meddles in everything. It would seem desirable that a Central Committee at long last aware of its responsibilities make him understand that, on the basis of a partial view of the whole, he cannot decide every single detail himself without upsetting an order of priorities that has been established after mature consideration. It would be indispensable that he respect the responsibilities he himself has delegated to others and, above all, that he make use of all available abilities instead of extolling people's revolutionism. On October 20, 1969, he finally did ask that "united with patriotism and conscience, intelligence and ability may prevail." Some people feel that my reports are not unconnected with this new attitude: he can be influenced.

Cuba is definitely not a case of a classical Latin-American dictatorship. In the United States, people who often compare the present situation to the preceding dicatorship of Batista are wrong. Batista wanted power so that he and his clique could profit from it; he depended on the U.S. and made every concession to U.S. interests. Fidel defends the Cuban national interest; he has restored dignity to the poorest group, the farm workers, and to the most despised, the blacks and mulattoes. These things cannot be measured in economic terms. He does everything within his power for the people, for education, and for public health. But he does all this according to his own ideas, convinced that his are the best. What is done is done for, not by, the people. Thus he assumes unchecked personal power, which fosters around him a courtier-like atmosphere. When he throws his beret on the ground and flies into one of his big rages (I sparked only a mild one), everybody quakes and dreads punishment.

Fidel is a remarkable being—and would be altogether extraordinary if he were better able to master himself, to listen, to reflect more, and to stop promising the moon—a man who is capable of feeling and expressing the aspirations and potentialities of the Cuban people. His retirement would risk plunging the country into chaos. He is an intuitive man who understands very quickly but who is very susceptible to influences. The doctrinaires in his entourage, not all of whom are Cuban, have posited philosophical-political principles that are debatable but that in Cuba must now be accepted as revealed truths. Instead of starting, in scientific fashion, from the observation of facts and deducing guidelines for action from them, these people propose to bend facts to theory, to transform nature and man. . . .

As the Chinese remind us, however, man remains the decisive element. Today, in their majority, the Cuban people are no longer convinced, as they were in 1959 and 1960. They are disenchanted, and they have many reasons for being so. In October 1969, for the first time Fidel was booed in a working-class neighborhood. The moment has come for him to do some serious thinking, but he is so overwhelmed by the daily tasks he has taken on as part of his office that unfortunately he has no time.

Were Raul to replace him, as some people in Havana were envisaging early in 1970, the situation would risk becoming more difficult. How is one to make the people's voice heard in high places? It can be heard mur-

[12] A *gusano,* an opponent of the regime, said in this connection, "Sometimes indeed one would wish for Fidel to disappear, but then one would have his brother Raul, who's now in charge of the Army, and that would be worse." No doubt, without Fidel there would be less fantasy but also less genius. From the economic point of view, organization would stand to gain if Raul were able to surround himself with the best brains available. It is not certain that he would.

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muring down below, at many meetings, and echoes have reached Fidel. But they are muffled by his entourage, which bears, without always realizing it, the heaviest of responsibilities. Stalin was not alone responsible for the abuses of Stalinism; the proof is that they survive him, beyond their semi-eclipse under Khrushchev.

Political Participation, the End of Democratic Centralism?

. . . . WHENEVER SOCIALISM is in power, discipline is essential, understandably so, in order that national planning can be rapidly devised, especially when the country must emerge quickly from economic underdevelopment. But as we have shown and as the popular saying reminds us, one must not confound speed and haste. Such discipline does not seem incompatible with the participation of all in the working out of decisions, especially when we take into account Fidel Castro's exceptional gifts of persuasion, which he could put to better use than he has done. Such participation should assume the setting-up of democratic discussion—the absence of which the best Cubans bitterly regret—first within Party cells and other proceedings of the Party, and then in the various production units. Without denying socialism—indeed, quite the contrary—all could be permitted to share more widely in local, regional, and provincial power, as well as in the management of social services.

A very limited participation exists today, but it may not infringe on the domain Castro reserves for himself—even though this domain would gain by being limited to the essential elements of defense and security. The socialism we are looking for in no respect entrusts to one man alone all the decisions, big and small, nor the power to delegate responsibility to *his* men alone, chosen solely by him. Socialism demands real popular participation at all decision-making levels. Present Party procedures in Cuba really provide for nothing more than the registering of approval. No one makes any effort to gather ideas from workers, cadres, intellectuals, or peasants. (It is most unlikely that the majority of the latter would have approved their recent dispossession). Cuba could try to disengage herself from personalized government; perhaps it was partly justified by the underdeveloped conditions that prevailed in the early years, but as the average cultural level rises, it loses more and more of its reason for being. Yet this is just the moment when personal power by depending upon the military and bureaucratic castes, the Army and the Party, seeks to maintain itself against the majority, which is unable to express itself. Many Army and Party leaders are hard workers, but they also defend their caste privileges and, even more than the material advantages deriving therefrom, their *appetite for power.*

Who will have the courage to propose to Cuba that she establish democratic discussions along with the forms of popular control such as Che used to speak of and that Lenin considered to be an obligatory counterweight to democratic centralism?

Certainly Castro's personality is very different from that of Stalin. But this has not prevented in Cuba a rather similar sociological process to that which took place in Russia. Control of the workers over the Party, of the Party over the Central Committee, and of this body over Fidel Castro must be restored. . . . Fidel would not accept this, because he has savored absolute power too much to be able any longer to divest himself of it by stages. So it is up to other political leaders of the country, and I mean here especially Raul Castro, Osvaldo Dorticos, C. R. Rodriguez, Armando Hart, and Blas Roca, to advise him to move in this direction, if they have the courage to do so and if they realize that the present power structure, set up as a personal dictatorship, risks leading quickly to a series of difficulties that could end in catastrophe. . . .

—*Translated by* ADRIENNE FOULKE

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How I Remember Lenin

On the centenary of the birth of Lenin (April 22, 1970), the distinguished Italian writer Ignazio Silone granted an interview to the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan in which he reminisced about his relationship with the leader of the October Revolution. The interview is here reprinted with the permission of Ignazio Silone.

Q: You knew him, knew the men who surrounded him and who rose to power beside him. Who was Lenin, really? What was the secret of his fascination, of his success? What exactly did he represent in the history of Communism?

SILONE: The first time I saw him—in 1921, in Moscow—his apotheosis had already begun. Even then Lenin was living somewhere between reality and myth. The Congress of the Third International was in session at the time, and Lenin only took part in some of the meetings, rather like the Pope in relation to the Vatican Council. But whenever he came into the hall, the atmosphere changed, became electric. It was a physical, almost a palpable phenomenon. He generated contagious enthusiasm, the way the faithful in St. Peter's, when they crowd around the Sedia, emanate a fervor that spreads like a wave throughout the basilica. But to see him, to speak with him face-to-face—to observe his cutting, disdainful judgments, his ability to synthesize, the peremptory tone of his decisions—created impressions of a very different kind that overrode any suggestion of mysticism. I remember how some of his terse remarks which I happened to hear during that 1921 Moscow visit struck me with the force of a physical blow. During one session of a Congress committee, he was speaking of Béla Kun, the leader of the Hungarian revolution. "When I hear some nonsense going the rounds," he said, "my first reaction is to think, ah, Béla Kun's been talking."

How could he "liquidate" a major figure of European Communism like that? The fact is that whether he lived abroad—as he did for the larger part of his life—or lived in his own country, Lenin focused always on Russia, on her problems, her secrets, her psychology. And to the degree that he was attentive to and intuitively understanding of realities in his homeland, he exhibited inattention and misunderstanding with regard to other nations. This is true for Hungary, but is true also for Germany and Italy. Not that he failed to follow international political events, especially those in Italy. He used to read several French papers and the *Corriere della Sera* daily—or rather, he read them when they arrived, for there was no air delivery then. I remember that he used to decipher the Italian news by depending on any assonances that Italian shares with the French or German.

But he read with blinders. When we Italian Communists had occasion to talk with him about the situation in our own country, we got the impression that he was cataloguing the various trends and possibilities of Italian

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historical development in terms of the rigid canon of Russian experience, as if Rome were a hundred miles from Moscow, as if the Roman Catholic Church were the Eastern Orthodox Church, as if class interrelations in Italy were no different from those in Russia.

But one's intellectual and political disappointment upon becoming acquainted with Lenin was rapidly reabsorbed by the almost religious fascination he exerted over others, by the charisma of the conqueror. In the history of Communism, he is the achiever, the man who knew how to win power. And one might say that he did so single-handedly, in the sense that in October 1917 it was the intuition and the decision of Lenin, not of others, that overturned history and gave the Communists power together with their revolution. In the minds of most Russians—and of many Communists elsewhere in the world—this miracle is established in the firmament of a new history of holiness.

I'm not exaggerating. At the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party, when the eyes of the whole world were trained on Khrushchev and the de-Stalinization earthquake, an elderly woman delegate walked up to the rostrum. (Remember, it is no small privilege to step up to the tribune of Communism's highest court; it calls for a calculation of balances and a mechanism of idelogical controls.) She related to the assembled delegates how Lenin had appeared to her in a dream and had told her he no longer wanted to have next to him the tomb of that criminal. And those assembled atheists applauded the old hypocrite and the tomb of Stalin was removed, as the ghost of Lenin had requested.

For that matter, there exists also a scientific Lenin cult. One incident comes to mind. It must have been in 1926 or 1927. Togliatti and I went to visit a Leninist club of young Russian Communists on the outskirts of Moscow. In a largish room, the boys were gathered around a blackboard filled with strange signs—globes, triangles, arcs—that looked like cabalistic symbols. We asked the club's director what they meant. "We're discussing the theory of the origin of the world according to Lenin," he told us. I wanted to argue with him that the world and its origin are what they are and that, as good pragmatists, we Communists accept the lesson of science as we find it, without losing ourselves in other conjectures. Besides, as far as I knew, Lenin had never written anything on the subject at all. But Togliatti advised me to let it go, not to get involved in a deviant discussion. Indeed, Lenin and his myth had to satisfy the religious thirst of the Russian people, had to answer the questions that for centuries the priests had answered—Who created us? Who protects us?

To offer people a religious surrogate is not exclusively a Russian practice.

The Italian Communists—in a tradition that extends from Labriola to Gramsci to the present—boast of having achieved an interpretation of Marxism that is stripped of metaphysical claims, yet daily they concede that it is legitimate to leave the masses in the limbo of superstition when the masses indicate that they wish to remain superstitious. When a saint is created, when a dogma is enunciated—instances when intellectual scruple might well call for some reassessment—the Communists habitually prefer to circumvent the dilemma.

I remember one case that struck me at the time and does so still. Antonio Graziadei, who was one of the most authoritative leaders of Italian Communism, a cultivated and intelligent man, a professor of economics, wrote several books around 1926–27 in which he disputed the Marxist theory of value and surplus value. The Party censured him, but his theory was neither discussed nor disproved. The Party preferred to ignore his arguments. And even today the Italian Party's schools still teach a Marxist theory that Communist intellectuals know to be false, but it is a useful, highly effective teaching device to illustrate the exploitation of the worker in terms understandable to the

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masses. Of course, the masses—which is what Togliatti said to me, in annoyance, when I asked him to give some thought to the Graziadei matter. He didn't want to bother about it. Value, surplus value—they do well enough for the lower ranks, was his retort.

Certainly, today as yesterday, one asks oneself whether a party that claims a role in the cultural leadership of the country can introduce blind faith (and bad faith) into its dialogue with the people. However, this is a subject that takes us far from your present concern.

Q.: Actually, not so far. Even the official commemorations of Lenin, even the Italian Communist press has been emphasizing in the last few days how open and broad-minded the Soviet leader was in action; the papers have also recalled how his commitment to his cause bordered on fanaticism, and have mentioned his allergic distaste for literary intellectualism (Trotsky's, for example), and it's been conceded that while his principles were inflexible, Lenin was open to any compromise. Broad-mindedness, fanaticism, scorn for intellectualism, willingness to compromise—does not this strange Leninist cocktail exist also in Italian Communism? In any event, to what degree can the Italian Communist party call itself Leninist?

SILONE: Lenin had a precise, concrete sense of power. Depending on what the various prospects for seizing power were, his slogans were conceived to fit the occasion. Think of his attitude toward the Constituent Assembly and toward the Soviets; in the first, the Bolsheviks were a minority, but in the second, at the close of 1917, they were a majority. Therefore, his slogan was, "All power to the Soviets." If the Bolsheviks had been a majority in the Assembly, Lenin would have launched another, an opposite slogan. Later, when he realized what a heavy burden the Soviets were and that it cost a strenuous effort to make them function, he began to reduce their authority. Stalin took care of the rest.

The political formulas, that is, the rules governing relationships between groups, between majorities and minorities, among institutions and differing political tendencies, for Lenin were secondary, accessory, temporary; the essential thing was power, winning and retaining power. In that it is free of preconceptions and views politics simply as the conquest of power, the Italian Communist party is still Leninist. The Leninist concept of the political maneuver—that is, a pluralistic recognition of democratic-parliamentary rights limited to the short time needed to absorb or destroy the other groups—this concept was adopted by all Communist regimes and parties in the postwar period. At least nobody has ever abjured it. But the historical and social situation in Italy is profoundly different from the one in which Lenin acted and developed his doctrine. For one thing, as I said earlier, there is the presence of the Church; for another, the existence of classes, including, in Italy, a lower middle class that was lacking in Russia; and for still another, the influence of the intellectuals.

This differing historical and social situation has a bearing also on strategy. In Italy there is no straight, upward path to power; one has to follow many twistings and turnings. But the concept of power and the will to power are still the same, only with us the conquest of that power is more difficult.

The PCI apparat also can be called Leninist; it is comprised of men obedient and devoted to the cause, which is the difficult task of winning power. Their concept of revolutionary compromise is Leninist. On this score, people are often misled. They say, the Communists accept this or that compromise. In actuality, according to the Leninist notion, compromise is not a renouncing of something in the course of political negotiations in order to obtain valid agreement on some other point. To the Leninist way of thinking, compromise is a mental reservation;

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it is a renunciation of something today in order to recapture it tomorrow, when one has come into power. Exactly as the Communist press says in eulogizing Lenin: rigid as to principles and open to every compromise. Which means, after the compromise and when power is securely in hand, one reverts to principles and the concessions are wiped out.

This political concept calls for antidoctrinaire agility. Hence a kind of scorn, or at least a certain skepticism, which Communist leaders exhibit toward intellectuals, who take seriously what for the former is only a matter of tactics. This accounts for the decision Lenin took—when he saw it was necessary—to make the peasants the basis of his support, thereby contradicting Marxist orthodoxy. Hence the multiple strategy of the PCI today, which says yes to the demands of every class and category. Last, the language of the PCI is Leninist in confronting divisions within the Party and the extremism of the Left. You could take whole pages from Lenin's pamphlet *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder* and match them against the text of the PCI's condemnation of our Italian ultra-leftists' *Manifesto*.

Q.: Lenin, the power strategist; Lenin sanctified in the U.S.S.R.; Lenin, disciplinary instructor of Communist parties. . . . But for the history of culture, for the world of today, what is Lenin's significance?

SILONE: Lenin is the real inventor of the way to make a revolution—or rather, let me say he is its codifier. Before him, revolution was a sporadic episode in history, not its objective. In the wave of revolutions that is overrunning the world, Lenin becomes a point of reference, a constant symbol in situations that are otherwise very different and even antithetical. One can't really talk about socialist revolution for the North African fellahin nor for the Che Guevaras or Camillo Torres of Latin America. Nonetheless, although the conditions assumed by Marxist logic are lacking, although there are no proletarians, the African and Latin-American revolutionaries proclaim themselves socialists. Because behind the void of a socialism that does not exist there is the myth of Lenin, with the fascination of his triumph. Lenin won, he established Communism for the first time in a great nation, and he has become a point of reference for every revolutionary, Marxist or non-Marxist, populist or anarchist, who has one supreme objective: victory.

Lenin's ideas, however, are much inferior to his myth and the impact of his experience. All his books were written to meet the needs of the moment, and today it is impossible to grasp their real meaning unless one knows which polemics were shaking up the Party at the time. Their true purpose was propaganda, and their spirit sectarian. It is not without significance that the best contemporary Communist thinkers—Garaudy, Bloch, Fischer, Sartre—have never paid much attention to Lenin's philosophical ideas.

Moreover, Lenin's genius was concentrated in his study and his knowledge of Russia, and it was on the basis of that knowledge that he refined his technique for the conquest of power. Later, Stalin added to Lenin's technique another insight, which is the major political lesson bequeathed by Communism to totalitarianism: the new and decisive role that, in a modern mass society and in given circumstances, an efficient, centralized ruling apparatus can play. But it is a monstrous machine, and the more gigantic it grows to be, the more it devours the substance of the revolution. Until one comes full circle. . . . Lenin invented the revolution to gain power; to retain power, Stalin invented the machine of the apparat. And the machine devoured the revolution. In 1926, Lenin's widow, Krupskaya, had to say bitterly, "Were he alive, at this moment he would be in prison."

—*Translated by* ADRIENNE FOULKE

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Pran Chopra

Three Waves of Indian Terrorism

A First-Hand Report on the Naxalite Movement

FOR THE THIRD TIME in recent Indian history the cult of terror has burst into politics. The first time this happened was just over 40 years ago, when some scattered but daring young men decided they could win freedom for India with gun and dagger. They were impatient with the nonviolent struggle of Mahatma Gandhi; they thought it slow, humiliating, and unlikely to succeed. And they thought that their own method of conspicuous assassination would strike such terror in the heart of British rulers that they would quit and India would win freedom. So they started picking off individual British officers with the bullet or knife.

These early Indian terrorists paid a fearful toll. For every Englishman they killed, several of their own men were shot or hung. For every conspiracy that succeeded, several were ruthlessly crushed. Ultimately, they collapsed while the nonviolent movement carried India to freedom, mobilizing the support of vast numbers of people through peaceful mass agitation. But while it lasted, this terrorist movement fired the imagination of the young. There was romance in their deeds, which was lacking in the struggle Mahatma Gandhi waged with less dramatic weapons.

The second explosion of terrorism in Indian politics came 20 years later, when the Communists chose terror as a political weapon. Only a few years earlier they had been expelled from India's main political party, the Congress. The two had come to a clash over their interpretations of World War II. The Communists regarded it as a people's war against fascism and supported the Allied war effort, especially after Hitler had invaded Russia. The bulk of the Congress party, though not Nehru, opposed it as a war of British imperialism. For some years thereafter, the Communists got lost in an inner debate between rival strategies for power. Toward the end of 1948, barely a year after India won independence, they rejected parliamentary politics and chose insurrection instead. Encouraged, if not even financed by Moscow, and inspired by the recent example of China, they decided to set up a "liberated area," their very own Yenan, in Telangana. This is a barren, rocky, and poverty-ridden region, once part of the princely state of Hyderabad and now part of Andhra Pradesh, one of the larger states of southern India. The "base" was well-chosen. Whatever else grows here, resentment does, whether, as then, against the splendor of a princely court that mocked the poverty of the people, or, as now, against exploitation of the area by enterprising immigrants from the Andhra coast. Fanning the subnationalism of linguistic regions, which was just becoming a serious threat to India's survival as a nation, the Communists tried to build up a zone of independence. For their methods they chose peasant rebellion and forcible seizure of land and, for their weapon, individual terror. Several heads of landlords were paraded through the streets; "informants" were shot in public squares; justice was dealt out in people's courts and, for all practical purposes, a parallel government was set up.

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But all this lasted less than two years. The Communists failed to hold their gains, because the government was able to act against them. First, it took stern administrative and police action against the insurrectionists. Next, and more important, Nehru succeeded in isolating the Communists from the main stream of national sentiment. In this the Communists themselves helped him immensely by their previous support of a war that had been unpopular in India and by Moscow's continued denunciation of Nehru as the "running dog of imperialism." Nehru, however, was successful in denouncing the Telengana rebellion as an assault on India's freedom, which the people had only just won after almost two decades of struggle. Therefore, whatever their position in Telengana, in the country as a whole the Communists were like fish out of water, not at all what Mao Tse-tung wanted his guerrillas to be—fish floating in an ocean of popular sympathy. Later, Telengana was to become famous for other reasons: as the starting point of Bhoodan, a countrywide movement for the voluntary donation of land to the landless, and as the scene of a violent upheaval in 1969 over the separation of the area from Andhra Pradesh. But hardly anyone remembers it now as a former Communist base.

The third time for a politics of terror has come 20 years later, Extreme Left splinters of the Communist movement are fighting their way to the surface in large parts of eastern India and at a few places in north, south, and central India. They are mobilizing every local grievance they can find, and are training the discontented and farming bands of commandos. As yet, their movement has not assumed the intensity of the Telengana rebellion. Nor can it claim any conspicuous "kills," as the terrorists of 40 years ago could do almost as soon as they got going. But they have become a cause of unprecedented concern, and since the beginning of this year they have been the subject of the most agitated debate at all levels of our politics. The government of India is heckled almost every day for its failure to curb them, and, recently, had to promise it would take drastic action.

What disturbs most people is not the violence that accompanies this terrorism. India has grown used to political violence. The partition of the country into India and Pakistan was accompanied by the worst rioting recorded anywhere in its history—only the rioting during the reorganization of India's states in the mid-fifties can approach it. One more epidemic of violence would not startle anyone. But none of the violence since the Telangana insurrection was intended or seen as a revolt against the legal and parliamentary system. The latest Communist insurrection, however, is precisely such an assault.

THE INSURRECTIONISTS go by many names. The most formal among these is The Communist Party of India (Marxists-Leninist). This brand-new party celebrated its first anniversary together with that of Lenin's hundredth birthday on April 22 this year. More popular is the insurrectionists' other name: The Naxalite movement—because they first were active, about three years ago, in Naxalbari, a small village in the remote hills of northern Bengali. This is a sparsely populated, somewhat inaccessible area of small tea plantations—a narrow neck of Indian territory wedged-in by Nepal and Bhutan in the north and Pakistan in the south. Labor unrest has simmered here for quite some time, especially among tribal workers. Skillful Communist cadres took over the leadership of the unrest organized assaults upon a few scattered landowners and distributed their rice hoardings. When the police sent in a punitive team, there was a counterattack by the tribals and a senior officer was killed with a poison-tipped arrow. Historically, this marks the beginning of the Naxalite movement.

The Naxalities or the CPI(ML) are the latest to peel off from the Communist movement. For some years now, the Communist

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party of India has been steadily multiplying by fission. First, the Telengana insurrection caused a split between those who believed in adventurist methods and those who did not. Then, in the mid-sixties, the main CPI split into two almost equal halves: the CPI and the CPI(Marxist). The former was Moscow-oriented. The latter was much closer to Peking but, no less than the CPI, it worked within the parliamentary system, whether by conviction or convenience. From 1967 to 1969, the only two governments in India led by the Communists, in West Bengal and Kerala, were dominated by the CPI(Marxist), which began to resemble more and more the relative constitutionalism of the former, undivided CPI. In 1969 the CPI(ML) broke off from the CPI(M), denouncing it as revisionist, aged, anti-revolutionary, and wage-oriented, almost exactly as the CPI(M) had denounced the old CPI only four years earlier. Now there are Communists to the left of CPI(ML) who denounce *it* for accepting a party label and hierarchy, which they are convinced is the starting point of the downward path to revisionism; as for themselves, they insist that they only believe in perpetual revolution by spontaneous groups.

But whether spontaneous or hierarchical, the Naxalites and other ultra groups again have brought the gun into Indian politics. They are convinced that their best weapon is terror. But the violence in which they believe is of the cool kind, a carefully worked-out tactic, not the disorderly frenzy of a mob. The Naxalites would, if they could, bring the immense weight of India and China together, and thus swing world Communism away from the Soviet orbit and into that of China. They proclaimed in their May Day statements that "The Red terror activities in cities and towns have come to stay. No power, however great, can stop us, as China's Chairman is our Chairman, China's path is our path." Declaring "a revolt against the present bourgeoisie-oriented educational system and also against petty nationalism, an enemy of socialist unity," the Naxalites said the ruling class had

> no means of coping with the tremendous upsurge brought about in rural and urban areas by the CPI(ML)-led guerrillas who have waged a war against parliamentarianism . . . . To talk of an Indian path different from the Chinese path is to tread the road of class collaboration . . . . The task is to establish peasants' revolutionary power through the process of armed guerrilla actions in isolated pockets in rural areas and to create liberated zones.

In being comprehensively ideological, the third wave of terror resembles the second more than the first. But in their immediate tactics the Naxalites are more like the terrorists of the independence movement than like the insurrectionists of Telengana. They do not aim, or at least not yet, at capturing a territory, much less at holding it. Their aim is rather to demoralize the enemy and thus cause him to collapse than to defeat him in battle. Their tactics may change as opportunities develop; it is reasonable to assume that they will change as the present tactics yield their present objectives. Their aim, for the time being, is to intensify the confusion in the present structure of society, and to make the enemy feel acutely insecure by subjecting him to conspicuous, selective, and unpredictable violence.

Historical experience as well as objective conditions probably explain the difference between the Naxalites and the Telengana insurrectionists. In 1948, the Communist party of India had only the Soviet model to look to; the Chinese was not yet an established success, was little known and even less understood. The Sino-Soviet split had not yet occurred; the Communist world was still unicentric. Anything different from the Russian brand was heresy to all Communists, and the only true road to revolution was the one Russia had shown. This, probably, is how it happened that, going only by the model then available, the CPI reached for a strategy that exceeded its grasp. It opted

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for pitched confrontations with the enemy —mainly the police, but occasionally also military and paramilitary forces—to create a "liberated zone" which could be used as a base for expanding Communist power. Clearly, it overestimated its numerical strength; it was unable to sustain the tactics of concentration.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY whether the Naxalites today have hopes of any serious external assistance. There is evidence that they are receiving some: small quantities of Chinese arms have been found in their hideouts in West Bengal. But anything substantial would be contrary to their professions. They proclaim themselves devotees of Mao. Pictures of Mao are left by them, rather as the burning cross used to be left by the Ku-Klux Klan, at the scenes of their raids—university offices, students' examination centers, Gandhi peace exhibitions, family planning clinics, printing presses. But it is a well-known principle of Chinese-inspired insurrection that the rebel must rely on himself, and if he needs any arms he must capture them from the enemy. In this respect the Naxalites are doing very well. They rely mainly on home-made bombs, grenades, pipe guns, and acid bulbs; even then they exhort the cadres to rely, and they do, on daggers and knives, bows and arrows. At a few places they have been able to snatch sophisticated small arms from the police.

The Naxalites' tactics are those of a small party aware that for the time being it is small. Therefore, they avoid pitched confrontations and concentrate on well-timed harassment that causes confusion by being unpredictable, sudden, efficient, and drastic. Where a party with a larger peasant base, for example, will try to intimidate the landlord by occupying his lands or by forcibly seizing and selling his crops, the Naxalites try to terrorize him with the specter of ambushing him and chopping off his head. Where this is done to make the threat more vivid, the head is sometimes left hanging by a bamboo tree outside the village—an example to all. The ambush is usually carried out by a small and swift-moving band. Where the Naxalites feel strong enough to do so, as in the Girijan tribal area of Srikakulam, they carry out their strikes in much larger numbers. Up to a hundred of them may visit a selected village at night, march to the house of a selected landlord, beating drums and firing pistols to scare others away, and loot or kill according to plan after warning the villagers not to inform the police. But usually their tactics are to hit swiftly and run fast, which also makes it necessary that the raiding party be small.

Similarly, wherever they are active in labor agitation they do not organize strikes —which, to be effective, require cessation of work by large numbers of workers and, therefore, can be pulled off only by major trade unions and organized parties. Instead, the Naxalites operate through the guerrilla tactics of *gherao*—a loosely constructed Hindi word, both a noun and a verb, meaning encirclement or the act of encircling a place or a person. *Gherao* is India's most spectacular political invention and export since nonalignment. Suddenly, 30 or 40 persons will surround their victim, perhaps a professor, or a floor superintendent, or a works manager, or the editor of a paper. They will keep him surrounded until his morale breaks under the combined effect of personal insecurity, insulting words and gestures, and the acute sense of discomfort. Perhaps no one will unleash physical violence against him, but the danger is ever-present and makes all other provocations doubly demoralizing. Few commercial and industrial executives in Calcutta have been the same after being subjected to such treatment. Because of the critical push *gheraos* have given to labor agitation, workers' wage demands have been met that would not even have been considered by employers faced by the legitimate and peaceful methods of collective bargaining.

Similarly, by more economical but con-

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centrated effort, the Naxalites have succeeded in disrupting the educational system. When Mahatma Gandhi decided to call student power to his aid, as he did on occasions during the struggle for India's freedom, his weapon was that of widespread strikes in which several thousand students took part at any given time or place; they simply came out of their classes at the call of the Mahatma. The Naxalites work differently. They send a handful of their commandos into a campus and disrupt classes and examinations. Usually, they are able to do so because others are apathetic and do not defend their right to study though they outnumber the Naxalites a hundred to one. But another reason for their success is the sharp burst of intimidating violence that they suddenly let loose, with grenades, knives, and acid bulbs. In this way they have pushed the whole examination system over the brink in West Bengal and in several other places as well, and one university after another has had to shut down.

From their unwillingness or inability to mobilize large numbers of people, and the resulting dependence upon small but tightly knit bands, it inevitably follows that they have no use for elections, in which, in any case, they have no faith. Elections are largely a game of numbers; you cannot play unless you have numbers on your side. And winning in numbers means making compromises, which in turn means loss of the élan, the single-minded zeal of an uncompromising spirit, which are an essential part of revolutionary armor.

The Naxalites rely on numbers, to some extent, in only one area: to set up a repeat pattern of their activities in as many centers as possible. They may not need the help of more than 1500 or 2000 dedicated young persons to tie up the whole of an enormous city like Calcutta. But they need several such detachments to set up centers of discontent in other parts of the country, and they are setting them up wherever they find that discontents, especially those arising from social and economic causes, have created a favorable climate. This certainly suggests that their numbers are growing, and there is a possibility that once their numbers in a given region grow sufficiently large, they will try to raise a Telengana type of rebellion. But there is a significant difference at present between their tactics and those of the CPI 20 years ago; whereas the CPI threw all its resources into the single operation in Telengana, the Naxalites are keeping theirs well-scattered.

THERE IS MORE TO THIS DIFFERENCE than tactical refinement; it reflects a difference of interpretation about the state of India. In 1948 the CPI took the view that India had yet to establish a new structure after the dismantling of British administration and the shock of the separation of Pakistan. Therefore, it reasoned, a large piece of territory could be detached immediately and made the springboard of a Communist conquest of India. In the Naxalite view, a frontal blow is impractical; the structure is too large and well-integrated for that. But it can be hollowed out by termite action; there are enough soft spots in it for that, spots made soft by discontent with the established order.

The Naxalites may not yet have a clear vision of the future. But like the student rebels of Paris two summers ago, they have decided to wreck the present system in the hope that something more spontaneous will take its place. In this their position is somewhere between Cohn-Bendit and the Red Guards of China's Cultural Revolution. For this reason they are able to fire the imagination, almost equally, of two very different types of the discontented young.

In the short run, the Naxalite diagnosis is clever; but I do not think it is clever in the long run as well. In the first place, it underestimates the capacity of the system to rectify itself. It ignores the fact that only a year ago the Indian government went through a sharp upheaval, which has created

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the circumstances for a sharp readjustment. Under its impact the Congress party, which has ruled India ever since the dawn of independence, broke into two—and after doing so it not only survived, showing the durability of the parliamentary party system, it also imparted a new dynamism to India's politics. The Naxalites are ignoring all this because theirs is, I suspect, a belated reaction to what the system had become in the closing and tired years of the Nehru era —not a timely reaction to the new stirrings it is experiencing today. Therefore, the Naxalites may be overestimating the actual disillusionment prevailing today.

Second, the Naxalites make themselves extremely vulnerable when they lose touch with the mainstream of Indian life. This they do in two ways: first by the adoration of China, which the rest of the country still regards as an enemy power, and next by making an assault upon institutions that do not deserve it. They do not profit from the mistakes of the second as well as the first generation of Indian terrorists. At the time of Telengana, the Communists made the irreversible blunder of offending nationalist sentiment by their willingness to more than merely go along with the abuse heaped upon Nehru by Moscow. Nothing harmed them more than the gulf this created between them and the mainstream of Indian politics. The Naxalites are creating the same gulf today, and perhaps a wider one, by their unashamed espousal of China and its leaders.

By contrast, the first generation of Indian terrorists did not make that kind of an error. Yet they, too, became a tiny sidestream because the mainstream came under the control of Mahatma Gandhi. They had incandescence and dedication on their side, while Gandhi's nonviolent struggle was a hotchpotch of people, some of whom had very mixed motives. But Gandhi commanded the loyalty of the great bulk of the people, and not of only a few dedicated bands. That is why he succeeded and the terrorists failed. The same thing is now happening to the Naxalites. Not only are they out of the mainstream of Indian politics; they are also putting themselves out of touch with the mainstream of sympathy. What harms them as much as their support for China, India's enemy since 1962, is their senseless destruction of such institutions as universities, examination centers, Gandhi peace exhibitions, hospitals, and family planning clinics. Many people give them a hand when they voice, even if by distasteful methods, protest against social and economic injustice. But they get only opprobrium when they raise their hand against institutions that are largely beneficial even if not all that they should be. At the moment the opprobrium is passive. It does not prevent them, much less deter them, from doing their deeds.

But this will not last. Sooner or later the Naxalites will find themselves so isolated that organized authority will be able to eliminate them with public approval. In some parts of the country, as in Srikakulam, this has begun to happen; in others it is bound to happen too. For while the system is hospitable to free dissent and sometimes even responsive to it, it is not ready to be wrecked through termite action.

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Walter Benjamin

Paris, Capital of the 19th Century

Selections from the writings of Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), the distinguished social and literary critic, have recently become available in a volume entitled Illuminations *(Harcourt, Brace & World), edited and with a lengthy biographical and critical introduction by Hannah Arendt. There are, however, additional writings by Benjamin that have not yet been translated into English. One of these appears below, translated into English for the first time, by arrangements with the Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.*

It was apparently Benjamin's ambition to write a major work on Paris as a center of European and cultural life, to be entitled Pariser Passagen. *The essay that follows, written in 1927, is a kind of embryonic version of the book he did not live to complete: highly concentrated and at some points consisting of notations to be developed later. One outgrowth of Benjamin's interest in Paris was a book entitled* Charles Baudelaire: Ein Lyriker im Zeitalter des Hochkaptalismus.—ED.

> The water is blue, the flowers in bloom,
> The evening sweet to behold. It is time
> for the evening stroll. Great ladies
> step out now, the less great trot along
> behind them.
> —Nguyen-Trong-Hiep:
> *Paris capitale de la France* (1897)

I. Fourier or the Arcades

> These palaces' magical columns, the objects displayed in their porticoes, show the connoisseur that industry can rival the arts.
> —*Nouveaux Tableaux de Paris* (1828)

MOST OF THE PARISIAN ARCADES were built in the decade and a half following 1822. The flourishing state of the textile industry was the primary circumstance leading to their appearance. The *magasins de nouveauté,* the *établissements* that kept large stocks of goods on hand, began to appear at this time, forerunners of our department stores. This is the period of which Balzac wrote: "Goods on display sing their poem with colored stanzas, from the Madeleine to the Porte St. Denis." The arcades were a center for trade in luxury goods. Art became the handmaiden of commerce to create them, contemporaries never tired of exclaiming over them, foreign visitors hurried to see them. "These arcades, one of the latest inventions of industrial luxury, are glass-roofed, marble-paved passageways leading through entire city blocks of buildings whose owners have united in such speculation. On either side of the passageway, lit from above, are the most elegant shops, making each arcade a city, or rather, a world, in miniature." The arcades were a showcase for the first use of gaslight.

The second circumstance that brought the arcades into existence was the use, for the

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first time, of iron as a construction material. Under the Empire this new technique contributed to a Greek revival in architecture. The architectural theoretician Böttlicher was voicing the general opinion of his time when he said that "as regards artistic form under the new method, the principle of form in the Greek manner" should prevail. Empire is the style of revolutionary terrorism, which sees the state as an end in itself. Just as Napoleon failed to recognize the functional nature of the state as an instrument of power in the hands of the bourgeoisie, so the master builders of his time failed to recognize the functional nature of iron, which was to make the principle of construction dominant in architecture. These builders created girders in the image of Pompeian columns, factories in the image of habitations. So, too, later in the century, the chalet was to provide a model for the first railroad stations. "Construction takes on the role of the unconscious." All this notwithstanding, the concept of the engineer, which had emerged in the revolutionary wars, started to gain ground, and the struggle between construction and decoration, between École Polytechnique and École des Beaux-Arts, had begun.

Iron was the first processed building material in the history of architecture. As the century wore on, it played an increasingly important role in the development of architecture. A decisive factor in this evolution was the discovery that the locomotive—it already existed in experimental form in the 1820s—could run only on iron rails. The rail was the first building element made of iron, the forerunner of the girder. Iron was shunned in the construction of residences, but preferred for arcades, exhibition halls, railroad stations—buildings that served a transitory purpose. During this period, new architectural uses were also found for glass. However, the societal prerequisites for its widespread use as a building material were not to be met for another hundred years. Scheerbart's *Glasarchitektur* (1914) still links glass with notions of Utopia.

"Each age dreams of the age to come"
—Michelet: *Avenir! Avenir!*

THE FORM DETERMINED by the new means of production remains, at the outset, under the domination of the old form (Marx). There are in the collective unconscious images corresponding to these forms, the old interpenetrating with the new. These images express the wishes of the collectivity, and represent an attempt both to throw off and to transfigure the imperfections of the social product, the shortcomings of the social order of production. These images also evince a definite striving to break with the outdated order, that is, the recent past. These tendencies direct the imagination, impelled by new developments, back to the primeval age of mankind. Each age envisions the age to come in its dreams. These dreams always contain something of man's earliest beginnings depicted in terms of his earliest history, that is, in the form of a classless society. Man's earliest experiences, stored in the collective unconscious, unite with the new to beget Utopias that leave their mark on a thousand aspects of life—on edifices built to last and on fashions that change from one day to the next.

We can see this happening in the case of Fourier's Utopia. The rise of the machine provides the profound impulse that sets his thought in motion, but this is not given direct expression in his discussion of the immorality of commerce and the false morality created to serve it. The *phalanstère* is supposed to bring back conditions under which there will be no need for morality. In its highly complex organization, the *phalanstère* resembles a machine. The interlocking of the passions, the complicated meshing of *passions mécanistes* with *passion cabaliste,* are a primitive attempt to apply mechanical analogies in the field of psychology. This machine whose parts are men produces the never-never land. Fourier's Utopia gives new life to an ancient wish-symbol.

Fourier sees the arcade as the architectural canon of the *phalanstère.* This reactionary

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transformation is indicative. Built in the service of commerce, it becomes, in his vision, a dwelling place. The *phalanstère* will be a city of arcades. Under the Empire, with its rigorous devotion to form, Fourier creates the colored idyll of Biedermeier. Its splendor, somewhat dimmed, endures until Zola, who adopts Fourier's ideas in his *Travail* and bids the arcades farewell in *Thérèse Raquin*. Marx took a protective attitude toward Fourier's extolling his "colossal vision of man" calling attention to his humor. In fact, Jean-Paul in his *Levana* is as closely related to the pedagogical Fourier as Scheerbart in his *Glasarchitektur* is to Fourier the Utopia-builder.

II. Daguerre or the Diorama

Sun, take care!
—A. J. Wiertz: *Oeuvres littéraries* (Paris, 1870)

AFTER THE INTRODUCTION of iron as a building material, architecture and art began to go their separate ways. So too did painting move apart from the dioramas. Diorama-making was at its height at the time the arcades were being built. Enormous effort and all known artistic techniques went into creating a perfection in the imitation of nature, reproducing the changing light at different hours of the day, the rising of the moon, the roar of a waterfall. David advised his pupils to draw from nature when working on the dioramas. In seeking to create an illusion of change in nature, the dioramas pointed the way, beyond photography, to motion pictures and sound movies.

The literature of the time has its dioramic school. *The Book of One Hundred and One, The French as They See Themselves, The Devil in Paris, The Big City*—all belong to this category. These works were a preparation for the collective literary efforts Girardin was to publish in the feuilletons of the 1830s. The feuilletons were collections of sketches; their anecdotal form corresponded to the three-dimensional foreground of the dioramas, their informational content to the painted background. Socially, too, this literature was panoramic. For the last time, the worker appeared, out of his class context, as a figure in an idyllic landscape.

Heralding a turnabout in the relationship between art and technology, the dioramas also give expression to a new form of sentiment. The city dweller, who will have many occasions during the course of the century to assert his political superiority over the countryside, is here making an attempt to bring the country into the city. In the dioramas, the city spreads out into a landscape, as it will later, more subtly, for the *flaneur*. Daguerre is a pupil of the dioramist Prévost, whose place of business is located in the Passage des Panoramas. Description of Prévost's and Daguerre's dioramas. In 1839 a fire destroys Daguerre's diorama. That same year he announced the discovery of the daguerrotype.

Arago addressed the assembly on the subject of photography, assigning it a place in the history of technology, prophesying its scientific applications. The artists, for their part, began to debate its value as an art form. Photography led to the disappearance of miniature portrait painting. This was not a simple question of economics. Photography in its early days was superior to the miniature for several reasons, one technical: the long exposure time required great concentration on the part of the sitter; the other social: the first photographers were members of the avant-garde and their clientele came mostly from their own ranks. Nadar made a great leap forward when he ventured to photograph the Paris sewer system. This was the first use of the camera as an instrument of discovery. In the new technically oriented

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society, the subjective coloration of painting and graphic art detracted from their value as sources of information, making the camera all the more important.

The international exposition of 1855 included, for the first time, a special exhibit, "Photography." In the same year Wiertz published his important article on the subject, ranking photography equal with painting as a source of philosophical enlightenment. What he had in mind, to judge from his own paintings, was political enlightenment, which makes him the first to advocate, if not to foresee, the use of the photographed *mise en scène* for propaganda purposes. In an increasingly commercial society, the value of painting as a source of information was on the decline. In reaction to photography, painting began (the Impressionists) by stressing color, and finally (the Cubists) created a new realm where photography could not, for the time being, follow. Since mid-century, photography had been helping to broaden the sphere of the consumer economy, by flooding the market with an unlimited quantity of figures, places, and events that were of no use whatever to the buyer except as pictures. To increase turnover, there was always some fashionable improvement in the technique of photographing such subjects; these inventions were to determine the subsequent history of photography.

III. Grandville or the International Expositions

Yes, when the whole world from Paris to China,
O godlike Saint-Simon, has accepted your teachings,
The golden age will return in all its splendor,
The rivers will run cocoa, tea,
Sheep will gambol ready roasted in the fields
Poached fish will swim in the Seine
Spinach will grow pre-fricasseed
With breadcrumbs all around
The trees will bear stewed apples
We will harvest vegetables by the bunch
It will snow wine, rain chicken
Ducks will fall from heaven à l'orange.

—Lauglé and Vanderbusch: *Louis et le Saint-Simonien* (1832)

"To the World's Fair the pilgrims trooped to worship the fetish goods." All Europe has been traveling to see some goods for sale," said Taine in 1855. Prior to the international expositions there were national industrial exhibitions; the first in 1798 on the Champ de Mars was intended "for the amusement of the working classes and in celebration of their emancipation." The working class was the best customer at these exhibitions. At this time, a national holiday provided the framework that later was to be formed by the amusement industry. Chaptal's address to the assembly on the subject of Industry opened the exhibition. — The followers of Saint-Simon planned the industrialization of the entire world, hence latched on to the idea of the international exposition. Chevalier, leading authority in this new field, was a pupil of Enfantin and publisher of the Saint-Simonians' newspaper *Globe*.

The Saint-Simonians were able to predict the development of a global economy, but not the class struggle. Interested as they were in the industrial and commercial expansion occurring at mid-century, they were at a loss in questions concerning the proletariat. The international expositions served to glorify the exchange value of goods, creating a context in which their use value was obscured. They opened up a phantasmagorical world, where man entered to be entertained. The amusement industry made this easier for him by elevating him to the level of a commodity. He had only to surrender himself to its manipulations, while enjoying his alienation from himself and from others. — The deification of goods, and their aura of a life of en-

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joyment, is the secret theme of Grandville's art. This explains the tension in his work between the cynical and utopian elements. His preciosity in the representation of inanimate objects corresponds to what Marx calls the "theological whimsy" of goods, best exemplified in "specialty items." The designation comes into use in the luxury trade at this time. Grandville's pen transforms all of nature into "specialty items." He presents nature in the same spirit that advertisements —this term too dates from the period— present their wares. His life ends in madness.

Fashion: Signor Death, Signor Death!
—Leopardi: *Dialogue between Fashion and Death*

THE INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITIONS CREATE the commodity universe. Grandville's fantasies confer on the universe the character of commodities. They modernize it. Saturn's rings become cast-iron balconies where the planet's inhabitants can take the air of an evening. The writings of the Fourierist natural scientist Toussenal represent a literary counterpart to Grandville's Utopia — Fashion prescribes the ritual for the worship of the fetish goods. Grandville extends fashion's empire from commonplace objects to the cosmos. Pursuing fashion to such extreme lengths, he reveals its true nature: it is in basic opposition to the organic. Fashion couples the living body with the inorganic, treats the living being like a corpse. Fetishism supplies the basis for the sex appeal of the inorganic; it is fashion's vital nerve, and the cult of goods is well served by it.

On the occasion of the Paris exposition of 1867, Victor Hugo published a manifesto entitled *To the Peoples of Europe*. Their interests had earlier been represented, less equivocally, by the French workers' delegations sent to the expostions of 1851 and 1862, at which time the delegation was 750 strong. This was indirectly of significance in the founding by Marx of the International Workers Association. The phantasmagoria of capitalist culture reaches its most glorious development in the world exposition of 1867. The empire is at the height of its power. Paris is confirmed as the capital of luxury and of fashion. Offenbach prescribes the rhythm of Parisian life. The operetta is the ironic Utopia of the unending reign of capitalism.

IV. Louis-Philippe or The Interior

A head lies on the bedside table,
like a buttercup.
—Baudelaire: *Un martyre*

UNDER LOUIS-PHILIPPE the private citizen enters the stage of history. The extension of the democratic apparatus and the granting of the franchise to new groups coincided with a period of corruption in parliament, under the leadership of Guihot. Under cover of this, the ruling class was able to make history while doing business. It encouraged the construction of the railroads in order to improve its stock holdings. It favored the rule of Louis-Philippe, the rule of the private citizen in business. In the July revolution the bourgeoisie attained the goals of the revolution of 1789 (Marx).

For the private citizen, there existed, for the first time, an antithesis between living space and place of work, between home and counting house. In the latter he was accountable to reality. Within the four walls of his own home, he required a prop for his illusions. This necessity was all the greater because it had not occurred to him to extend his commercial outlook into the social sphere. In elaborating his private environment he shut out both business and society, and thus there came into being the phantasmagorical world of the home. For the private citizen, it represented the entire universe. In his in-

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terior he collected faraway places, the distant past. His salon was for him a box at the theater of the world.

Art nouveau, at the turn of the century, shook up the cult of the interior. Of course, according to its ideology, art nouveau appears to bring with it the final perfection of the interior. Its apparent goal is the transfiguration of the lonely soul. Its theory is individualism. Vandervelde makes the house an expression of personality. Decoration is to the house as the signature to a painting. But the true significance of art nouveau is not expressed by its ideology. Art nouveau represents the last-ditch stand of art, its ivory tower laid siege by technology. Inwardness has mustered all its reserves, as is evident in the spiritualistic vocabulary of lines, in the use of the flower as symbol of naked, vegetative nature confronting an environment armed by technology. Art nouveau takes an interest in iron construction, in girder forms. Making decorative use of these forms, it tries to win them back to the side of art. Concrete offers a new perspective on possibilities of introducing plastic forms into architecture. At this time the real center of gravity of living space shifts to the place of business. But he who has lost touch with reality creates his place in the privacy of his own home. Ibsen, in the *Masterbuilder*, sees the implications of art nouveau: the attempt of the individual to pit his inwardness alone against technology leads to his downfall.

I believe . . . in my soul: the Object.
—Leon Deubel: *Oeuvres* (Paris, 1929)

ART HAS RETREATED INSIDE, into the home. The collector is the true occupant of the home. To him falls the Sisyphean task of freeing objects of their existence qua goods, by the simple fact of possessing them. But he only confers on them heirloom value instead of use value; he is only a collector, dreaming not only of distant or bygone worlds, but of a better one, where the things men need are in as short supply as in the world we know, but where objects are freed of the drudgery of having to be useful.

The private citizen's home is not only his universe, it is also his jewel case. To live somewhere is to leave traces. In the home, traces are all the more noticeable; covers, antimacassars, linings and cases are all contrivances in which the objects of daily use leave their traces. The occupant of the home leaves his traces there, too. Here we have the origin of the detective story, the search for these traces. The *Philosophy of Furniture* as well as his detective stories makes Poe the first physiognomist of the home. The criminals in the earliest detective novels are of neither the leisured nor the gangster class; they are members of the bourgeoisie, private citizens.

V. *Baudelaire or the Streets of Paris*

Everything is Allegory to me.
—Baudelaire: *Le Cygne*

BAUDELAIRE'S GENIUS, feeding on melancholia, is an allegorical one. He is the first to make Paris a subject of lyric poetry, but not out of partiality to his home town. His allegorical vision of the city is that of an alienated man, an idler, whose way of life still has a certain glamor which reconciles it for a while to the comfortless existence that is to be ours in the big city. The *flaneur* is still on the threshold of the big city and of the bourgeoisie. Neither has overwhelmed him yet. With neither does he feel at home. He seeks asylum in the crowd, of which Engels and Poe were both students before him. The crowd is a veil, and looking through it the *flaneur* sees the familiar city as a fantastic world—landscape or interior. — The department store is both landscape and in-

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terior; there, even idleness helps increase the turnover of goods: the department store is the crowning achievement of the *flaneur*.

He comes, with his intellect, to the marketplace, ostensibly as an observer but, in reality, in search of a buyer. At this intermediate stage, intellect still has it patrons, but it is getting to know the market, too. This is its bohemian period. Its economic status and its political function are undefined, as is most clearly seen in the case of professional conspirators, who are usually members of the *bohème*. Their original field of activity was the army, later the petite bourgeoisie, occasionally the proletariat. But this group looks on the real leaders of the proletariat as its enemies. The *Communist Manifesto* spells the end of its political existence. The rebellious pathos of this group is what gives Baudelaire's poetry its strength. He takes sides with the asocial. His only sexual communion is with a prostitute.

The descent to Hell is easy.
—Virgil: *Aeneid*

WHAT IS UNIQUE about Baudelaire's poetry is the way in which the images of woman and death interpenetrate with a third image, that of the city of Paris. The Paris of his poems is a sunken city, more submarine than subterranean. The city's chthonic elements—its topographical formation, the old, abandoned bed of the Seine—have left their mark on his imagination, but what really counts in his "deathlike idyll" is the city's social substratum, a modern one. Modernity is very much stressed in his poetry. As Spleen he destroys the Ideal (*Spleen et Ideal*). But it is precisely modern history that is forever quoting primeval history, as we see from the ambiguity that is a part of the social relations and the products of this period. Ambiguity is the dialectic made visible, the dialectic at a standstill. This standstill is Utopia and the dialectic in visual form is thus a dream image. Such an image gives us goods —as a fetish. The arcades, which are both house and stars, give us this image. So does the prostitute, who is both salesgirl and goods in one.

The journey to learn my geography.
—*Diary of a Madman* (Paris 1907)

THE LAST POEM in *Les Fleurs du Mal*: *Le Voyage*, "O mort, vieux capitaine, il est temps, levons l'ancre." * The *flaneur's* last journey: death. His goal: something new. "Au fond de l'inconnu pour trouver du nouveau." Novelty is a characteristic of goods that has nothing to do with their use value. It is the source of the illusion that adheres to the images produced by the collective unconscious. It is the quintessence of false consciousness, with its tireless agent, fashion. This illusion of newness is reflected, like one mirror in another, in the illusion of the never-changing. The result of this reflecting process is "cultural history," in which the bourgeoisie indulges its false consciousness. Art, beginning to have doubts as to its function, ceases to be "inséparable de l'utile" (Baudelaire) and must make novelty its greatest good. The *arbiter novarum rerum* in art is the snob. He is to art as the dandy to fashion. — In the 17th century, allegory was the law governing dialectic imagery. In the 19th, the law is novelty. Along with the department stores there are the newspapers. The press organizes the market in spirtual values, which then starts booming. Nonconformists rebel at the sight of art abandoned to the market. They rally round the banner of "l'art pour l'art." This watchword will give rise to the total work of art, which attempts to seal off art from developing technology. Its ceremonies of self-celebration are a counterpart of the devotion to amusement that transfigures goods. Both make abstractions out of man's social existence. Baudelaire succumbs to Wagner's witchcraft.

* "Oh Death, old captain, the time has come, raise the anchor."

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VI. Haussmann or The Barricades

I worship the beautiful, the good, great things,
beautiful nature, the inspiration of great art,
whether to delight the ear or the eye.
I love the spring in bloom with women and roses.
—Baron Haussmann: *Confessions of an Aging Lion*

The flowering realm of ornaments,
The charm of landscape and of architecture,
And all scenic effects
Depend on perspective alone.
—Franz Bohle: *Theater-Catechism*

PERSPECTIVES OF VISTAS through long rows of streets were Haussmann's urban ideal, in keeping with the 19th century's pronounced tendency to ennoble technical necessities by turning them into artistic goals. The institutions of the bourgeoisie's temporal and spiritual reign were to find their apotheosis in the boulevards. Entire boulevards were protected by canvas sheets until completed and then unveiled like monuments. — Haussmann's activities fit in well with Napoleonic idealism. The latter favored financial capital. Paris went through a period of intense speculation. Playing the stockmarket replaced those games of chance that remained from feudal society. If the *flaneur's* fantastic world is a spatial one, the gambler's exists in time. Gambling makes time into a drug. Lafargue explains gambling as representing the mysteries of the business cycle on a miniature scale. The expropriations Haussmann brought about led to a deceitful kind of speculation. The ruling of the court of appeals, under the prompting of the bourgeois and pro-Orleans opposition, increased the financial risk of Haussmannization. — Haussmann tried to prop up his dictatorship by declaring emergency rule in Paris. In a speech to the Assembly in 1864 he gave vent to his hatred for the rootless population of the big city, whose ranks continued to swell as a result of his ventures. Rents shot up, driving the proletariat into the suburbs. The neighborhoods of Paris began to lose their particular flavor. The red belt came into being. Haussmann called himself a "demolition artist." He felt a special calling to carry out his work and stressed this point in his memoirs. And all the while he was alienating the Parisians from their city. They no longer felt at home there. They began to grow conscious of the inhumanity of big-city life. This consciousness gave rise to Maxime La Camp's monumental work *Paris* and, in the *Jérémiades d'un Haussmannisé,* it took the form of a biblical lament.

The real aim of Haussmann's activity was to secure the city against civil war. He wanted to eliminate all possibility of the barricades ever rising in Paris again. To this end Louis-Philippe had already introduced wooden pavements. Yet the barricades played a part in the Feburary Revolution. Engels discusses the technique of barricade fighting. Haussmann intended to suppress it in two ways: the width of the streets was meant to make the erection of barricades impossible, and the new avenues were to be the shortest route from the army posts to the working-class neighborhoods. Contemporaries dubbed Haussmann's work "strategic beautification."

Undo their treachery,
O Republic: show your Medusa head
amidst the red lightning.
—*Workers' song*, ca. 1850

THE BARRICADES DID GO UP once more during the Commune. They were stronger, better secured than ever. They ran the entire width of the *grands boulevards*, often rose a story high. Behind them there were extensive trench works. The *Communist Manifesto* brought to a close the age of professional conspiracy. The Commune meant the destruction of the phantasmagoric world that

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held in check the freedom of the proletariat. The Commune destroyed the illusion that it was the task of the proletariat to collaborate with the bourgeoisie in completing the work of 1789. This illusion had prevailed during the period from 1831 to 1871, from the Lyons revolt to the Commune. The bourgeoisie never shared this misconception. Its struggle against the social rights of the proletariat began with the great revolution itself and thereafter adopted the philanthropic movement as a cover. Under Napoleon III this movement developed significantly; Le Play's *Ouvriers européens*, was its major accomplishment. While waging the class struggle from the covered position of philanthropy, the bourgeoisie was nevertheless always ready to come out in the open. As early as 1831 the *Journal des Débats* acknowledged that "the position of every factory owner in his own factory is like that of a plantation owner among his slaves." What was wrong with the early workers' uprisings was that they lacked a theory of revolution to show them the way; yet this very lack was what gave them the direct energy and enthusiasm to tackle the creation of a new society. This enthusiasm waxed highest in the Commune and won for the working class the support, provisional albeit, of the best elements within the bourgeoisie. This same enthusiasm, in the end, enabled its worst elements to gain the upper hand again. Rimbaud and Courbet espoused the cause of the Communards. The burning of Paris was a fitting end to Haussmann's work of destruction.

My late father had been to Paris.
—Karl Gutzkow: *Letters from Paris* (1842)

BALZAC WAS THE FIRST to speak of the collapse of the bourgeoisie. But it took Surrealism to free our vision of it. The development of the forces of production shattered the last century's fantasy world even before the monuments created to house it had begun to decay. The developing forces of production had, in the 19th century, freed the forms that shape the environment from the domination of art, as in the 16th century the sciences threw off the yoke of philosophy. Architecture was the first to go its own way, as engineering construction. Next was the imitation of nature, which became photography. Imagination was preparing to take on a practical application, giving us commercial art. Literature accepted fragmentation in the feuilleton. These products were all getting ready to enter the market as commodities. But they hesitated on the threshold. This was the age of the arcades, interiors, exhibition halls, dioramas, relics of a dream world. The utilization of elements of a dream, even as one attacks it, is the model of dialectical thinking. Dialectical thinking is thus the instrument by which historical awakening occurs. Each period of history not only dreams of the next but, dreaming, presses toward the new awakening. Each age bears within itself its own end and unfolds this latent content, as Hegel recognized, with cunning. With the current tremors in the goods economy, we begin to recognize the monuments of the bourgeoisie as ruins, even before they crumble.

—*Translated by* SUZANNE RUTA

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Jeffrie G. Murphy

Preventive Detention—and Psychiatry

> They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.—*Benjamin Franklin*

IT'S NO SURPRISE that our society contains people who support the idea of preventive detention. What is surprising is that this support cuts across the usual political ideologies and allegiances. Dr. Karl Menninger, a benevolent humanist, and Attorney General Mitchell, a law-and-order hard-liner, have both recently come out in support of the idea of preventive detention as a partial solution to the crime problem—Menninger in his *The Crime of Punishment* (Viking, 1968) and Mitchell in proposed criminal legislation for the District of Columbia.[1]

Preventive detention, generally speaking, consists in locking people up for what they *might* do, rather than for what they have in fact done. It is generally taught that our legal system does not in theory countenance such proceedings. But, of course, it does countenance and even encourage them in fact—though generally under some euphemistic description. Obvious examples are status crimes (like vagrancy), refusal of bail for those accused—though not convicted—of crime, involuntary commitment for the "insane," and wide judicial discretion in matters of parole and length of sentence. Such discretion might allow a judge to extend a man's sentence (for either punishment or therapy) if he believes the man is still prone to crime. The old retributive idea that a man, having paid the price, may regain his liberty is being replaced with the idea that liberty depends on something more—on his "rehabilitation."

Both the attractiveness and danger of these proposals lie in their scientific and even benevolent facade—especially if detention is coupled with therapy. Who could object to rehabilitation? It seems more sensible than traditional punishment. And even those too tough-minded to object to vengeance *simpliciter* must admit that mere vengeance does not work. The people we put in prisons because they have harmed us get out, harm us again, and return to prison—a seemingly useless waste of time and resources. So, for once, it seems that the interests of benevolent men, prone to forgive the criminal, and harsh men, whose only concern is to prevent crime, coincide. Once we have determined that a man is dangerous, why wait until he actually does harm? Why not *prevent* the harm by detaining him in advance? Objections we might feel to this can be dispelled if preventive detention is coupled with therapy and rehabilitation. Punishing a man for what he might do is admittedly bad; but, we are to be led to believe, rehabilitating a man for what he might do is not. We can help the man and society at the same time.

THIS ROSY PICTURE is too good to be true. Let me outline the most important, and in my judgment fatal, objections to preventive detention—whether punitive or therapeutic.

1. *Prediction and Principle* One morally ineffectual way in which people sometimes seek to oppose preventive detention is to rest their case against it solely on the difficulty of prediction. This allows them to avoid the trouble-

[1] For a discussion of Menninger's views, see my article "Criminal Punishment and Psychiatric Fallacies," In *Law and Society Review*, August 1969, pp. 111–122. Menninger would no doubt be an opponent of any preventive detention that would not provide for therapy.

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some appeal to moral values. Professor Alan Dershowitz of the Harvard Law School, for example, has argued that no important issues of principle are involved in preventive detention. The important objection, in his judgment, is practical—the difficulty of accurate prediction and the institutional pressures that make a prediction of dangerousness much more likely than a prediction of non-dangerousness.

> When we establish rules for convicting the guilty, we do not require certainty; we only require that guilt be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt". . . . What difference is there between imprisoning a man for past crimes on the basis of "statistical likelihood" and detaining him to prevent future crimes on the same kind of less-than-certain information? The important difference here may not be one of principle; it may be, as Justice Holmes said all legal issues are, one of degree.
>
> The most serious danger inherent in any system of preventive detention is that it always seems to be working well, even when it is performing dismally; this is so because it is the nature of any system of preventive detention to display its meager successes in preventing crime while hiding its errors. One such area . . . is the confinement of the mentally ill on the basis of psychiatric prediction of injurious conduct. . . . The psychiatrist almost never learns about his erroneous predictions of violence. But he almost always learns about his erroneous predictions of non-violence—often from newspaper headlines announcing the crime. The fact that the errors of underestimating the possibilities of violence are more visible than errors of overestimating inclines the psychiatrist—whether consciously or unconsciously—to err on the side of confining rather than of releasing. His *modus operandi* becomes: When in doubt, don't let him out.[2]

Dershowitz's practical case is important. But surely he is wrong on the question of principle. First, it is important to see that the case for preventive detention is based on a kind of evidence that would be *constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal trial.* One may not, in a trial, introduce statistical evidence against the defendant—evidence that he is a member of a social group (say, vagrants) which manifests a high crime rate. Evidence at a criminal trial is, to be sure, less than certain, but this does not make it statistical evidence. To allow statistical evidence would represent a shift from an individualized conception of guilt to a collective or group criterion. This would seem a kind of guilt by association and would involve a moral regression of utmost gravity. It would represent a way of circumventing a basic rule of procedural due process and would surely, therefore, raise a vital issue of principle.[3]

Second, it is important to see that competing models of human nature are involved here. Traditionally, the criminal law has regarded men as agents of freedom and dignity—agents who, up to the very last minute, are capable of having changes of heart, of deciding *not* to perform a certain evil action in the face of even a very high probability that they will perform it. This is why the criminal law does not punish for merely intending, planning, and preparing for a crime. It also explains, in part, why the criminal law punishes less severely for attempts than for completed crimes. Preventive detention, of course, rests upon a totally different model: locate a man in a sociological framework and deal with him accordingly—deal with him, as you would with an object, solely in terms of prediction and control. As in so many other areas of contemporary life, an elevation of the importance of technology (especially that of the social sciences) results in the demotion of the importance of humanity, freedom, and dignity as these concepts have been traditionally understood.

2. *Therapy and Punishment* If preventive detention is coupled with therapy, objections to the program tend to be blunted. But they should not be. We should delude ourselves neither about the efficacy of therapy nor about its benevolence and justice. Attempts at criminal rehabilitation have not been markedly successful. They represent the promises of psychology

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[2] "On Preventive Detention," *New York Review,* March 13, 1969, pp. 22–27.

[3] This circumvention would be purely linguistic. That is, we would not *call* the preventive detention hearing a trial. We could then claim that the constitutional bar on statistical evidence did not here apply since the proceedings did not constitute a criminal trial. But we would, of course, be doing substantively exactly the same thing to the defendant. This may sound outlandish, but intelligent men have been taken in by even less: Consider, by way of example, how the injustices of the juvenile court system were masked by benevolent rhetoric—rhetoric finally exploded by the Supreme Court's 1967 Gault decision.

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rather than a fulfillment. Also, it is dangerously simple-minded to assume the moral preferability of a therapy system to a punishing system. For the central and often ignored point is that common to both criminal punishment and preventive rehabilitation is the *involuntary deprivation of liberty*. It is at least *prima facie* wrong to do to a man what he does not want done to him, to confine him against his will, no matter whether you call what you do to him punishment or therapy, or whether you call where you put him a prison or a hospital. If therapy is so benevolent and glorious, and rehabilitation so desirable, how can we account for the fact that people resist it as much as (sometimes more than) punishment? When we are to be punished, we at least know what we are bargaining for. Not so when we believe that someone is going to attempt to restructure our personality against our will.

Now I am not, let me insist, an opponent of therapy or rehabilitation. Quite the contrary. It is a moral disgrace that neither our prisons nor our state mental hospitals provide decent opportunities for meaningful therapy—little more than monthly talks with a psychiatrist or a few electric shock treatments. What I do oppose is the *involuntary* deprivation of liberty for the purpose of therapy, for the attempt at rehabilitation *against the will* of the man to be rehabilitated. Punitive detention is at least honest. It is oppressive and cruel, and everyone knows it. Thus, we are alert to guard our liberty against it. Therapeutic detention, however, masks practically identical treatment with the slogans of benevolence. But Big Brother is Big Brother—even if he wears a Jesus costume.

3. *Ideology and Rehabilitation* Another important and seldom noted problem is the extent to which political preference and ideology may affect our application of a notion like "needs rehabilitation."[4] Consider, for example, the psychiatric concept of the *psychopathic* or *sociopathic* personality. Psychopaths are said to "lack a moral sense" and to "show no normal care and concern for the interests of others." But just imagine the political danger of setting up persons with the authority to deprive people of their liberty on such nebulous grounds. How would Martin Luther King have fared at the hands of Southern state psychiatrists? How would the Black Panthers fare at the hands of some Northern state psychiatrists? Psychiatrists, especially state psychiatrists, are not immune from the tendency to project their own fears and hostilities onto the man they are evaluating.[5] What hope would any of us have under a system of preventive detention based on such criteria as "probably dangerous" or "lacks a moral sense"? This is not to say, of course, that all the people declared dangerous by judges and psychiatrists are in fact quite safe. Some of them are indeed frighteningly dangerous. But surely free men must have the courage to brave this sort of danger (the danger of waiting until they actually commit a criminal act before detaining them)—at least if we consider the *1984* alternative.

Finally, we should take an honest look at what sometimes counts as rehabilitation in our state hospitals and prisons. We should not kid ourselves into believing that those pronounced rehabilitated have necessarily developed morally sensitive and highly principled characters. Quite the contrary may be the case. They may have simply learned to identify with the aggressor and adapt to repression, to have learned the dubious virtues of civility and conformity, to have learned to do what others want them to do rather than what their own characters dictate. Some inmates will not so compromise, but they of course then pay the price of staying longer (in either prison or hospital) than their more pliable fellows.

It may be that I can harm myself by speaking

(Continued on page 460)

[4] Thomas Szasz makes a similar point about the concept "mentally ill' in his *The Myth of Mental Illness* (Harper, 1961). Not being a trained psychiatrist, I am not competent to pronounce on his claim that *all* so-called "mental illness" may be so analyzed. Surely at least some cases may be, and this in itself is enough to raise substantial political worries.

[5] *State* psychiatrists are particularly to be feared for the obvious reason that they act, not as the agent of the defendant, but as a paid arm of the established political structure. Surely some of them will (as would some of us in similar roles) be corrupted away from objectivity. Indeed, labels like "lacks a moral sense" invite such corruption.

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Neil Compton

Can the President be Sold?

THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968, by Joe McGinniss. New York: Trident Press. 253 pp. $5.95.

EVERYONE KNOWS that the rise of TV has had a profound impact upon politics. That everyone does know this may very well be the most important part of the impact. Elaborate and expensive attempts to define the exact nature of the influence have produced a great many interesting fragments of information, but no theory that is both definitive and all-embracing.

This does not seem to prevent any of us—experts and amateurs alike—from acting on implicit faith. According to received opinion, victory in the television debates elected John F. Kennedy in 1960; and a poor television image defeated Lyndon Johnson in 1968, making such archaic rituals as primaries, convention and campaign unnecessary. Richard Nixon lost in 1960 because he allowed anxiety to show on his sweaty, stubbly face during the debates; and he won both the nomination and the election in 1968 by deftly projecting the image of a new, warm, statesmanlike Dick Nixon. De Gaulle, Harold Wilson, and Trudeau are often similarly identified as politicians whose success can be attributed in whole or part to video charisma.

Nobody has embraced this new faith with more alacrity than the professional campaign managers. Each succeeding election sees larger teams of communications experts joining the campaign staffs and greater proportions of electoral funds made available to them. Every big advertising agency has one or two political campaign specialists, and the literature on the subject (both scientific and pseudoscientific) is proliferating alarmingly.

These new men differ from professional politicians. Even the most venal old-fashioned ward heeler was usually a devoted party man, his loyalty rooted in communal or family tradition. Either the candidate or the strong man behind him often exercised an almost feudal power over his retainers. On another level, the political affiliations of law firms generally bear some relation to the ideological convictions of the partners.

By contrast, media experts such as Gene Wyckoff, author of *The Image Candidates* (Macmillan, 1968) have no strong political opinions themselves and regard the beliefs of the aspirants they serve as problems to be overcome, rather than the basis of policies to be communicated. Their most despised rivals tend to be not members of opposing parties but issue-centered print journalists and their own candidate's political advisers. They are less interested in what their man really stands for than in creating an image for him based on some lumpen-Platonic idea of the kind of person the voters would like him to be.

The classic account of a campaign waged on these principles is now *The Selling of the President 1968*, by Joe McGinniss. This short narrative makes Theodore White's ponderous quadrennial volumes (whose titles McGinniss's parodies) seem as outmoded as a Victorian three-decker biography. It is a very funny book, at least until one remembers that its subject is a campaign for the presidency of the United States—not much of a laughing matter these days.

For some unaccountable reason Nixon's staff allowed McGinniss, a notoriously irreverent wit, to observe their campaign in close detail. When I first read the book, I thought he might have carried satiric exaggeration too far. Here, for instance, he quotes Nixon on the crisis of race and discipline in the New York schools:

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> Yep, this hits it right on the nose, the thing about this whole teacher—it's all about law and order and the damn Negro-Puerto Rican groups out there. I don't care whether they're white or whoever the hell they are. When they hit the teachers over the head, goddammit, they have no right to run the school. It's as simple as that.

It seemed incredible that the man who uttered these graceless and confused oversimplifications could be the candidate of a major party for the highest political office in the world. However, during the very week that I read these words, I saw him at the Pentagon, unaware that television cameras and microphones were recording what he had to say:

> You see these bums, you know, blowing up the campuses. Listen, the boys that are on the college campuses today are the luckiest people in the world, going to the greatest universities, and here they are burning up the books, storming round about this issue. You name it. Get rid of the war there will be another one. . . . [etc.]

Obviously, McGinniss had captured the idiom perfectly, and this confirmation of his accuracy makes us inclined to credit what he has to report on other subjects.

For understandable reasons, the candidate was seldom allowed to utter words that were really his own. At the ten hour-long regional TV programs, where carefully chosen panels (never more nor less than one black face) of "ordinary" citizens asked questions in the presence of a hand-picked Republican audience, Nixon's apparently spontaneous answers had all been rehearsed and worked over again and again during dry runs. The producers lived in terror of an off-beat question. The election-eve telephone shows were harder to rig, and Humphrey did not hesitate to have unrehearsed conversations with actual citizens: Nixon's callers' questions were funneled through rewrite men who emended them to match answers previously prepared on cue cards. It was rather like the quiz-show scandals once again—though this time with somewhat higher stakes.

The center of McGinniss's stage is occupied not by the candidate but by half a dozen practioners of the new political arts. There is Harry Treleaven, a onetime executive at J. Walter Thompson, who believes that "most national issues are so complicated, so difficult to understand and have opinions on that they either intimidate or, more often, bore the average voter." He did his best to see that Nixon's campaign was neither intimidating nor boring. Forming a kind of triumvirate with him were Len Garment, a Nixon law-partner, and Frank Shakespeare, a relic of the Aubrey era at CBS. Shakespeare's chief political emotions appear to be a hatred of the press and a conviction that the Russians are brutal murderers who are "out to get us. . . . They always have been and they always will be. They're ruthless bastards and they're trying to conquer the world. We have to stand up to them at every turn. . . . You can't coexist with men who are trying to enslave you." It is comforting to know that a man of this intellectual caliber is now Director of the USIA.

Roger Ailes, the boy wonder who used to produce the Mike Douglas show, had no illusions about the candidate whose television appearances he supervised:

> A lot of people think Nixon is dull. Think he's a bore, a pain in the ass. They look on him as the kind of kid who always carried a bookbag. Who was forty-two years old the day he was born. They figure other kids got footballs for Christmas, Nixon got a briefcase and he loved it. He'd always have his homework done and he'd never let you copy.
>
> Now you put him on television, you've got a problem right away. He's a funny looking guy. He looks like somebody hung him in a closet overnight and he jumps out in the morning with his suit all bunched up and starts running around saying, "I want to be President."

The man who produced most of the spot commercials used during the campaign expressed his doubts about Nixon in a manner that went beyond words. After turning out 18 sixty-second visions of postelectoral peace, order, and tranquility, Gene Jones had firm plans to move himself and his family out of the U.S.A. to Montsarrat in the West Indies. "I really don't see any choice," he said. "I mean I don't want my kids growing up in an atmosphere like this."

In the end, the professionals had to allow the candidate a little more liberty to be himself. Hubert Humphrey had been seizing every opportunity for exposure on all the media and the polls showed that he was gaining. The newspapers were beginning to jeer at the excessive caution of the Nixon campaign, and he himself was getting restive. He was booked

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onto both *Meet the Press* and *Face the Nation*, where the usual deferential questioning caused him little trouble. It was apparent, though, that the elaborately planned strategy had been less than a total success. From a commanding lead in mid-September, Nixon's support had gradually dwindled until, as Murray Kempton later put it, he had become the presidential choice of only half the country: "There seems no place larger than Peoria from which he has not been beaten back. He is the President of every place in this country that does not have a bookstore."

Is *The Selling of the President* a comedy or tragedy? In view of the special circumstances of 1968, any account of an election that brought Nixon to power would have to end on a somber note, and McGinniss does this very well. Yet his main theme is the failure of the image manipulators to deliver the votes as they claimed to be able to do. With the "wrong" kind of personality for TV, little money, and the albatross of the war and Chicago around his neck, Humphrey came close to winning, while every resource known to Madison Avenue barely helped Nixon scrape into power. Clearly, presidential candidates cannot be packaged and marketed just like soap or cereal, no matter what the wise guys say.

Television certainly favors certain physiques and personalities more than it does others, but history does not support the view that this need be crucial. It was, after all, Cook County and not public revulsion at his jowliness that really defeated Nixon in 1960. What would we all be saying now if Daley had failed to produce the vote for Kennedy? Johnson's ineptitude in front of cameras did not prevent him from scoring a smashing victory over a relatively telegenic Barry Goldwater. If he had refrained from escalating the Vietnam war and put his formidable energies into domestic reform, does anyone doubt he might still be President? I write this shortly after the news of Labour's defeat in Great Britain has just come through; here is Harold Wilson, a superb TV performer and the darling of the polls, being humbled by a man whose allegedly poor image was the despair of his campaign managers.

It is true that, by controlling camera angles and editing tapes, a skillful producer can do a great deal to rearrange reality in his candidate's favor, but not much more than others were able to do by other means before the days of television. Harding and Coolidge were at least as improbable occupants of the White House as Nixon is; one might even suspect that a little television exposure would have helped to wreck their prospects. On the other hand, as a polio victim myself, I have always been impressed by the way in which Franklin D. Roosevelt's disability was (I suppose deliberately) suppressed or disguised whenever he was in front of press or movie cameras. I am sure that many Americans were not even conscious of his paralysis—a situation that, for better or for worse, would be difficult to arrange today.

Fortunately for democracy, the influence of mediated communications upon public opinion has been greatly exaggerated. All of us—no matter how intelligent and sophisticated—have a remarkable talent for either ignoring whatever messages do not fit our preconceptions, or interpreting them in accordance with our prejudices at whatever cost to logic and consistency. This makes life difficult for people who, like me, want to see a radical reordering of the way we live now, but at least it seems to mean that if Richard M. Nixon is now President of the United States, it is not because people like Harry Treleaven, Frank Shakespeare, and Gene Jones decided to help him get there.

Erazim V. Kohák

Revolution of Sanity

THE COWARDS, by Josef Škvorecký. New York: Grove Press, 1970. 420 pp. $7.95.

WITH THE PUBLICATION of *The Cowards*, one of the major literary figures of our times is making a belated appearance in English. Josef Škvorecký has given East European readers a perspective of sanity in an insane world and a human perspective in an inhuman one. His books have been alternately banned and published, withdrawn and reprinted not only in

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Czechoslovakia, but in Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and even Germany. His appearance in English is a literary event, especially if American publishers follow up *The Cowards* with *The Emöke Legend, The Lion Cub,* and any of his other works currently oscillating from unprintable manuscripts and out-of-print editions to the *index librorum prohibitorum.*

If the criterion of revolutionary literature is that it in fact starts revolutions, *The Cowards* definitely qualifies. Written orginally in 1948–49, the manuscript remained in the author's drawer through the Stalin years when Czech literature was restricted to Marxist tracts and tractor romances. Its publication in November 1958 may well have been a slip of the censors who let the book get by with only minor changes while banning some of Škvorecký's rather innocuous stories.

The reaction of the regime to *The Cowards* was swift and overwhelming. One somewhat positive review appeared, again through a slip, but the second review described the author as a rotting kitten that should be shipped off to the vet. A week later, the regime brought out its heaviest ideological and administrative artillery. The novel was attacked viciously day after day in press and radio broadcast. The manager of the publishing house, an editor-in-chief, and some five editors were fired; Škvorecký was transferred and his salary drastically cut. Even Novotný, then President of Czechoslovakia, attacked the book at a mass meeting in Prague's Julius Fučík Park.

The reaction of the readers was no less swift. The book sold out overnight, was lent and borrowed, copied and talked about. It became a rallying point of life. Five years later, when the Party rescinded its original decision, it went through three large editions in Czechoslovakia as well as numerous editions and bans in other "socialist" countries.

Yet *The Cowards* is anything but revolutionary in any usual sense. Quite the contrary. Revolutionary literature as we have come to think of it thrives on illusions or disillusionment, extolling a vision of Utopia or condemning reality with utter revulsion. *The Cowards* does neither. It is an ordinary book about ordinary people. It does not condemn or extol; it describes. It describes, with the perceptions of a major writer, and the men and events it describes are basically ordinary, at least by Czech standards in the closing days of the war. There is no posturing, there are no gimmicks, whether literary or political.

Škvorecký's fundamentally human perspective is by no means unique to him. It is shared by other Czech writers like Vaculík, Hrabal, Havel, Kundera, and others. Not that the Czechoslovak upheaval has failed to produce political literature: there are such works as Mňačko's *Belated Reports,* or the memoirs of Josefa Slánská who is the widow of one of the prominent victims of the age of ideology. Yet the books that speak for us most clearly are different. They represent a new type of revolutionary literature, a literature that is non-ideological, even nonpolitical, but is, in an age of ideological abstraction, revolutionary in that it rediscovers the value and reality of concrete human life.

Škvorecký's *The Cowards* tells the story of the end of a war and an era in a provincial city on the eastern border of Bohemia. Or, better, it tells the story of people caught in the drift, the human rub of history. Škvorecký tells it from the perspective of young men who are only marginally touched by the political manias of their elders. They are capable of ideals, of love, even heroism, but their lives are made of different stuff. They measure abstractions in human terms. Their fears, their hopes, their adolescent loves and casual flirtations, their music—not the official music of brass bands, but intensely private music, jazz and blues—are all essentially personal. History ingresses into their lives, but does not displace them.

The history is there: the last spasms of German rule, the skirmishes between armies, the ambiguous liberation, and the full canvas of the end of the war. But it is measured in the concrete terms of human life. Škvorecký's young men, workers and students closed out of schools, appear as cowards to an ideological age, and they make no attempt to refuse the label. They live through the exhilaration of the end of the war, only to see liberation reduced to the careers of petty-bourgeois and party bureaucrats. Virtue has become official. The heroes are official, virtues are official, ideals are official. Škvorecký's protagonists have no taste for official heroism. They see the cruelty and pomp. In a skirmish between the two armies they destroy a tank—with a machine gun carefully, unspectacularly preserved in hiding

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throughout the war—and they refuse to claim credit. They have discovered human reality, and Škvorecký's presentation is more than anything else a reaffirmation of the tangible reality of human life in an age of posturing and ideology.

The book was written in a time of gathering clouds. In official statements, ideology was becoming the measure of reality, and there were things not to be said, thoughts not to be thought. Yet beneath the politicized facade human life went on, real, and good, more precious for the seven war years.

THIS FUNDAMENTAL AFFIRMATION runs through all of Škvorecký's works, from the detective stories, *The Mourning of Lt. Blueberry,* serialized on Prague TV, to the recent *The Tank Battalion.* But already in *The End of the Nylon Age,* the early companion piece to *The Cowards,* a second theme appears. The affirmation of human reality now appears empty without an affirmation of a human ideal.

This is the theme Škvorecký works out in a book that cries out for translation, *The Emöke Legend.* The world in which this book was written was different from that of *The Cowards.* In the coup in 1948, ideology had triumphed. And in the subsequent years, the Czechs lived through a spasm of fanaticism. Total surrender to constantly changing, contorted ideology became the price of survival. By the time the fury had subsided in the early sixties, the effect was clear. Ideology gains its force by placing the ideal in history. But in the process it reduces the ideal from a reference point for the present to a distant promise for the future. Deprived of a yardstick, the present becomes vulgarized, expendable: anything is possible. And by being placed in a finite future, the ideal becomes vulgarized as well. In the wasteland that is left, affirmation of humanity becomes trivial without the affirmation of an ideal.

This is the theme Škvorecký tackles in *The Emöke Legend.* The dust jacket describes the book as a romantic novella about a jaded man and a demurring woman. Like most blurbs, it is true but misses the point. Overtly, it is a story about a man at a vacation resort who tries to seduce a woman who, by all expectations, should be willing enough—and becomes more and more fascinated as she refuses him. But the point is the figure of the woman, Emöke. She appears frigid with suggestions of just the opposite, rather neurotic and unfit for the world. But she has something the postideological age lacks, an ideal that is not just a temporal, temporalizable plan for a future, but a normative ideal. Her faith, to be sure, is a strange mixture of theosophy and outright superstition with some Freudian admixture which Škvorecký obviously does not commend to his readers. But even that faith gives her something others lack, a sense of her own identity, a confidence that there still is truth, that there is a right and a wrong. Precisely because her ideal is not a program, a unity of theory and praxis, but a genuinely normative ideal, it gives her a perspective and raises her to a different level.

In *The Lion Cub,* which is to appear in English in the near future, Škvorecký fuses the themes of affirmation of humanity and affirmation of the ideal. Leona, the lion cub of the title, is not a theosophist or a neurotic. She describes herself as "just an ordinary girl," and she is that—yet in a postideological age that precisely is what makes her extraordinary. She is an ordinary girl who survived a Nazi concentration camp and the age of fanaticism which followed it. She refuses to strike heroic poses, but she also refuses to rationalize. Leona affirms her very ordinary humanity by retaining a sense of justice and a moral norm that does not bend to practical or ideological convenience.

The world in which Leona moves is one Škvorecký knows well, the world of Czech intellectuals in the final years of Novotný. But it is also the universal world of advanced industrial countries in the postideological age, the world of official illusions and ordinary lives, of bending spines and heroic poses. Škvorecký

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describes its effect on the men who inhabit it with clinical accuracy. It is an utterly fascinating description. The lion cub who "survives it all and grows into beauty" is the Marianne of the only revolution which still makes sense in a posttechnological, postideological world. She has rather more in common with Jane Eyre than with Raskolnikov, but precisely that makes her revolutionary. Past revolutions have destroyed men in the name of ideology—killed their bodies for the sake of their souls, and destroyed their souls for the sake of Utopia. Their bankruptcy testifies not only to the bankruptcy of Hitler's nationalism or Stalin's communism, but to the bankruptcy of all ideologies which sacrifice men to utopian blueprints and destroy in the name of love. The only revolution which makes sense today is the affirmation of man in all his concreteness, in all his ordinariness, in all his humanity.

THIS IS WHY Škvorecký should be read, together with all the authors whose books breathe the faith of the Czechoslovak spring. This is why Czechoslovak "socialism with a human face," its socialist democracy, remains significant even two years after Russian tanks replaced Russian ideology. Perhaps the most frustrating thing about being a Czech in America today is that one meets with so much sympathy and so little understanding in a society conditioned to ideological abstractions. The Czechoslovak spring was not the anti-Communist revolution of which Middle America approves. Nor was it a Central European analogue of the revolt against reality which amuses American intellectuals. It was something far more profound, far more fundamental: a rediscovery of the reality of human life, of the tangible goodness of being human, ordinarily human.

This, finally, is the dilemma of democratic socialism as well. In a world that understands itself almost entirely in ideological abstractions, democratic socialism is an affirmation of concrete humanity in an ideological age. It speaks of a reality, but the listeners hear only the usual abstractions. The Czechs, having lived through both a technological and an ideological revolution, have outgrown the residual illusions. In a mad world, they speak with a sane voice. The publication of *The Cowards* is a happy omen. In a mad world, sanity is revolution.

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LETTERS

Mandarins and Sociologists

Editor:

In his thoughtful review of my *Decline of the German Mandarins,* [DISSENT, January–February 1970] Arthur Mitzman argues that I do not sufficiently connect the writings of the great German sociologists with the "middle- and working-class opposition to the bureaucratic empire." While charging, on those grounds, that I am too much concerned with "pure *Geist*," he also accuses me of "reducing the critical social theory of these men to a variety of mandarin *ressentiment*," of "denigrating as little more than maudlin rhetoric a body of social theory whose assimilation by contemporary radical thought is at once imperative and long overdue."

To state his case as efficiently as possible, Mitzman uses the perfectly respectable techniques of exaggeration and simplification. I thought my passages on Weber, Simmel, and Tönnies were often quite enthusiastic. More important, I did stress the extra-academic involvements of some of the men I called "radical modernists." Mitzman strengthens the point, but he also runs the risk of overestimating such tenuous connections as Huguenot ancestry (Sombart and Weber) and distant family relationships ("Weber's uncle and grandfather were capitalists in textiles"). In the cases of Tönnies, of Sombart and of Mannheim, I pointed to more or less enduring sympathies for aspects of the German labor movement or of Marxism. Mitzman, curiously enough, calls for additional emphasis in the case of Sombart, a political changeling whose later views encompassed an immoderate enthusiasm for the bureaucracy and something close to a flirtation with fascism.

In my account, the extra-academic connections of the radical modernists merely help to account for the maverick stance, the critical spirit through which these men achieved self-conscious distance from their own "mandarin" tradition. Mitzman would rather see them as spokesmen for a nonacademic world of popular radicalism. My argument is sustained by vaguely "bohemian" influences upon the radical modernists, and these are not hard to find. I can also shamelessly make Weber's intelligence a factor in his near-total liberation from his heritage. This is my obligation to pure *Geist*. Mitzman's requirements, though, are far more extensive, and I wonder whether he sees that clearly enough. He cannot be content with Huguenot ancestries or other presumed occasional sources of heterodoxy; he must uncover substantial and permanent involvements with left-liberal and working-class politics. Yet all he talks about is Sombart's temporary, distant and one-sided sympathy with revisionist Social Democrats or unionists, and Weber's certainly more serious and self-critical attempt to approach and inspire an honest bourgeois liberalism. There were a mere handfull of socialists among German academics after 1919, and practically none at all before that time.

It strikes me that intellectuals have seldom been truly immersed in a popular-radical context. Professor Marcuse may speak for oppressed groups in contemporary society; but one can hardly associate his thought with the experience of a black family in an American slum. I partly share Mitzman's dislike for the metaphor of pure *Geist,* where "pure" means unrooted, unaccountable. But that merely increases my determination to see the intellectual as he really is, that is, with his own psychological attachments to his own immediate "situation." For the German sociologists, that situation was above all an academic community and tradition, not just a bureaucracy (another of Mitzman's simplifications), and only rarely and tangentially a world of popular left-wing politics.

Is it not curious that Mitzman accuses me at one and the same time of leaning too much on pure *Geist* and of "denigrating" the work of the sociologists by linking it to a context? Either the tracing of thoughts to "situations" is always in part, or it is never in part, a denigration; surely radical roots alone are not exempt from this alternative? And if it is always partly a denigration, then where are we but back with pure *Geist* for thinkers we approve? Mitzman must make some consistent theoretical choices. Too great a determination to find popular-radical contexts for our favorite thinkers would seem to me doctrinaire, and a bit sentimental as well. So would the insistence that the good intellectual necessarily deserves to be regarded as a spokesman for all social groups, or for "the old Adam in us all," as Mitzman says. What really impresses me in Weber, Simmel, and other modernists among German academics is their capacity for self-criticism, their ironic distance from their own role *as intellectuals.* We might try to emulate some of the best of them in this respect also.

FRITZ K. RINGER

ARTHUR MITZMAN *replies:*

It explains much in Professor Ringer's rebuttal that he finds the techniques of exaggeration and simplification "perfectly respectable." Otherwise one would find it difficult to comprehend why he should suggest that I see the radical modernists as "spokesmen for a nonacademic world of popular radicalism," or that I believe intellectuals should be "immersed in a popular-radical context," or have "too great a determination to find popular-radical contexts for [my] favorite thinkers."

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I do not once use the term or imply the concept of "popular radicalism" in suggesting an alternative social framework to the "Mandarin" modernists. I do argue that the most sensible framework for understanding the "radical modernists"—especially the sociologists Tönnies, Weber, Simmel, Sombart, and Michels—is not the Mandarin academy, in which before World War I they were a marginal group (most of them with poor appointments or no appointments for most of the period from 1890 to 1914), but rather the extra-academic milieu of *bourgeois* radicalism, which on the whole was hopeful and political before 1900, and despairing and largely aesthetic after 1900.

If Professor Ringer "did stress the extra-academic involvements" of the sociologists before and after the turn of the century, he must have done so in an edition other than the one sent to me. True, he does devote half a page to Sombart's relation to the German labor movement, and more briefly links Weber and other scholars to Friedrich Naumann's left-liberal Protestant party. And it could be a mere oversight that the name of Heinrich Braun, the revisionist socialist who published the journal which served in the nineties as a link between liberal-left intellectuals and the labor movement—a journal in which Weber, Sombart, Tönnies, and other radical modernists published extensively and which Weber and Sombart jointly edited after 1903—does not appear in Ringer's index. What is more puzzling, considering Ringer's "stress" on the extra-academic side of the radical modernists is the paucity of references to Stefan George and Nietzsche. George appears in Ringer's book only once, in connection with the postwar intellectual scene. But before the war Georg Simmel, Heinrich Rickert, Arthur Salz, Alfred Weber, Friedrich Gundolf, Ernst Kantorowicz, and E. R. Curtius all were either friends or adherents of the George circle. Simmel wrote essays on George. Weber had a number of discussions with the poet around 1910, and the importance in Weber's prewar Sunday salon of Gundolf, George's closest disciple, was matched only by that of Georg Lukacs, then a Tolstoian mystic and aesthetician: neither Lukacs nor Gundolf seem to be worth mentioning in Ringer's account.

Nietzsche, whom in 1918 Weber listed with Marx as one of the two men who had most shaped the German intellectual world, also receives short shrift in Ringer's "stress" on the extra-academic connections of the academy. Although he notes briefly that Nietzsche "disliked the official role which the universities had come to play, their subservience to the bureaucracy and their excessive nationalism," and places Nietzsche among the cultural critics of the Wilhelmian era, he locates him in an intellectual no-man's land; before World War I he was suspect, together with "his simplifiers and distorters" among the "radical modernists." After World War I, "The Nietzsche revival . . . on a popular level . . . had no marked repercussions in the German academic world." Not the slightest hint, then, of Nietzsche's influence on virtually all the important prewar sociologists, most of them radical modernists: Simmel's book, *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche, Tönnies' Der Nietzsche-Kultus,* Scheler's Ressentiment, Sombart's *Der Bourgeois,* Weber's sophisticated use of Nietzschean themes, especially in "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," all seem to have escaped Professor Ringer's "stress" on the "extra-academic involvements" of the modernists. Could it be that the interest of such men in Nietzsche does not support Ringer's view of the "situation" of the sociologists as "above all an academic community and tradition"?

Most inappropriate, however, is Ringer's implication that I believe intellectuals should be "immersed in a popular-radical context." Radical, perhaps, because I believe that genuinely independent social thought often brings a theorist into radical conflict with the shibboleths of his society, a position with which I think Ringer would agree, given his generally positive attitude toward the men he describes as "radical modernists." Popular, no, since as Barrington Moore recently suggested, a scholar who cannot on occasion say "the people be damned" when they support injustice is no freer than one who cannot say "the government be damned." It is, incidentally, this kind of "unpopular" radicalism with which I associate Herbert Marcuse, whose most important work when I was his student was *Eros and Civilization,* hardly an attempt to "speak for oppressed groups in contemporary society."

One final point: Ringer now claims that he "shamelessly make[s] Weber's intelligence a factor in his near-total liberation from his heritage." So do I, but Ringer might have pointed out that we have fundamentally different notions of what we mean by "heritage" and "liberation." For my part, the heritage includes but goes far beyond the academic and intellectual framework Ringer discusses, into such matters as the Victorian morality and Puritanical work ethos Weber received from his mother and the political and social feeling of epigonism which he said publicly in the nineties was the destiny meted out to his generation by his father's. I see no discussion of these questions in Ringer's book: for me they are central to an understanding of Weber and his epoch. ■

Kudos from Sweden

EDITOR:

Just a line to let you know that the March–April issue, which I've recently been reading, may well be the best one I've seen during several years as a subscriber—just the thing, of course, to make me eager to remain one!

Congratulations.

GÖRAN BENGTSON
Stockholm ■

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Letters to an Editor

Mr. Theodore Draper has asked us to print the following exchange of letters:

I

October 7, 1969

Mr. Lawrence Grauman, Jr., Editor
The Antioch Review
136 Dayton Street
Yellow Springs, Ohio 45387

Dear Mr. Grauman:

I have just seen the summer 1969 issue of *The Antioch Review*. In it, one of your contributors, Tom Curtis, wrote:

> Chomsky painfully documents the role of intellectuals, in government and scholarship, who have concerned themselves with questions of technique rather than morality. His impassioned criticism of contemporary liberal intellectuals recently in government, such as Kennedy-appointees Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Walt Rostow, Richard Goodwin, Theodore Draper, and others, parallels that of Bourne for men like Dewey, Charles Beard, Columbia University's Dean Frederick Keppel and the *New Republic*'s Walter Weyl—all of whom enlisted their talents in Wilson's war (p. 251).

This reference to me is nothing but gratuitous and ignorant malice.

1. I was not a Kennedy-appointee. I have never been appointed to anything by President Kennedy or by any other President. I have never even remotely held any government position.

2. As far as I am concerned, Professor Chomsky's book [*American Power and the New Mandarins*], to which Mr. Curtis refers, painfully documents and passionately criticizes exactly nothing. As far as I can make out, he refers only once to me in what appears to be an appreciative footnote (p. 282).

3. There is something sad and ludicrous about the implication that I have supported the Vietnam war the way or parallel to the way others supported "Wilson's war."

What justification can there be for this stupid and malignant nonsense?

Sincerely,
THEODORE DRAPER

II

October 10, 1969

TOM CURTIS *to* THEODORE DRAPER

Larry Grauman has shown me your letter. The reference to you in my *Antioch Review* article is flatly wrong. It was in a section added hurriedly after the manuscript was turned in: I meant Roger Hilsman and through a lapse I cannot explain somehow wrote your name instead. Please accept my apology, futile and inadequate though it is at this point. I am asking Larry to note the error in the next issue. I will not make the mistake again.

III

October 10, 1969

LAWRENCE GRAUMAN, JR. *to* THEODORE DRAPER

Thank you for your inquiry of 7 October. I am quite concerned by your response to Tom Curtis' article in our Summer issue, and by the information you provide in regard to the appearance of your name in the context of the passage you quoted.

I cannot offer an explanation for this "stupid and malignant nonsense"—if indeed it should prove to be that; however I have been in touch with Curtis and he has agreed to write you directly as soon as he has checked the notes and reading he used in the preparation of his article. If his reference to you turns out to be nonsense, I feel sure that it was not the result of malignant intent. Stupid maybe, even "sad and ludicrous," but not malignant.

In any case I shall await a copy of Curtis' explanation. If it seems that he mistakenly identified you in the context of that quote I will do whatever I can to acknowledge the error.

It so happens that I personally have a great deal of respect for your work. I still remember the formidable case you made against our invasion of the Dominican Republic, and I thought your long article on Black Nationalism in the recent *Commentary* was the most persuasive and authoritative analysis of the subject I have read. I have not, however, read any of your recent work on national policy, so I did not think to question Curtis' reference when I edited the article.

IV

October 13, 1969

DRAPER *to* CURTIS

I am intrigued by the psychology of this case of mistaken identity. But I do not wish to make a mountain out of a molehill. I was irate because this was not the first case of its kind.* In the present political climate, I do not expect it to be the last. It is sometimes uncomfortable being shot at from both sides.

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* I recently came across a publication called *Subliminal Warfare: The Role of Latin American Studies*, issued by the North American Congress on Latin America. On page 19, I suddenly found my name in a list of "consultants" for the ill-famed and ill-fated "Project Camelot," with an explanation that I was one of those who "agreed to assist in the technical development of the research design for Project Camelot" and whose "substantive contributions and criticisms were valuable in this process." I was curious where this information came from, and on April 24, 1970, I wrote a letter to the editors of this publication to the effect that there was not a word of truth in the role ascribed to me, and I asked where they had obtained this utterly false information. I have not yet received an answer or even an acknowledgment of my letter.

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V

October 13, 1969

DRAPER *to* GRAUMAN

Many thanks for your prompt reply. I have received a letter from Tom Curtis of which you no doubt have a copy. I was irate because this was not the first case of its kind. For reasons I can only guess at, some "New Leftists" have made the most outrageously perverted attacks on me. Tom Curtis seemed to fall into that pattern, and I decided I had had enough. Now he says it was a case of mistaken identity. I do not know Tom Curtis, and I had no way of judging his intent. I would still insist that this kind of thing is "malignant" in its practical effect. One well-known "New Leftist" charged that I was "politically" responsible for the death of Che Guevara! If Tom Curtis has learned anything from this incident, something good will have come out of it.

VI

Seven months passed.

VII

May 29, 1970

DRAPER *to* GRAUMAN

I am puzzled by your apparent failure to publish an acknowledgement of the error about me in the Summer 1969 issue of *The Antioch Review*, as promised in your letter of October 10, 1969. At least two more issues have come out without a word on the matter. Have you changed your mind? Or is this another peculiar psychological slip? If you refuse to publish a retraction, you should at least publish my letter of October 7, 1969.

VIII

June 25, 1970

GRAUMAN *to* DRAPER

I'm sorry it has taken me so long to answer your letter of May 29th. . . . I suppose I misunderstood your last response of the exchange we had over the unfortunate mistake in the Summer '69 issue of the *Review*. I assumed that Tom Curtis' explanation and apology had satisfied your understandable concern, and that you no longer cared about a printed retraction. I will still print such a retraction if you insist; however it is difficult for us to accommodate a request like this—we have no Letters column, nor any other convenient department for retractions—and I doubt that many people who read Curtis' article will read the retraction. (This is generally the case, but probably more so with a publication like the *Review*.) Nevertheless, it was our mistake, and if you want us to print a correction I will try to work it out.

Incidentally, since you have been reading the *Review* so faithfully lately, I would very much appreciate your candid opinion of our general effort.

IX

June 30, 1970

DRAPER *to* GRAUMAN

I have come across cases of shameless effrontery, but your letter of June 25, 1970, sets a new record in my experience.

In his letter to me of October 10, 1969, Tom Curtis wrote: "I am asking Larry to note the error in the next issue."

In your letter to me of October 10, 1969, you wrote: "If it seems that he mistakenly identified you in the context of that quote I will do whatever I can to acknowledge the error."

And now you tell me that you thought Tom Curtis' purely private explanation to me was enough and that a printed retraction was not necessary.

Of course if you wait for three or more issues to pass, your readers will find it hard to connect a retraction with the original issue.

It is your obligation to find a way to make adequate and suitable amends for a flagrant falsification in your pages. I had assumed some minimum of honor and ethical principle on your part. I now recognize that I was wrong. ■

PREVENTIVE DETENTION — AND PSYCHIATRY (continued from page 450)

frankly and directly, but I do not care about that at all. Of course I want to get out of prison, badly, but I shall get out some day. I am more concerned with what I am going to be after I get out. I know that by following the course which I have charted I will find my salvation. If I had followed the path laid down for me by the officials, I'd undoubtedly have long since been out of prison—but I'd be less of a man. I'd be weaker and less certain of where I want to go, what I want to do, and how to go about it.[6]

Here is a man holding on to his personal integrity against heavy odds, odds which are probably even greater in state mental hospitals than in state prisons.

The protagonist of Anthony Burgess's novel *A Clockwork Orange* acts on violent impulses. Diagnosed a criminal psychopath, he is subjected to Ludovico's Technique—a refined Pavlovian technique that conditions in him utter revulsion to any form of violence. It also results, alas, in his being rendered incapable of appreciating the music of Beethoven—the one experience in his previous life that had any meaning or character. There's a lesson here.

[6] Eldridge Cleaver, *Soul on Ice* (Delta, 1968), p. 17.

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Henry Pachter

The Problem of Imperialism

The Question Asked: Clearly, a superpower that maintains bases and troops on foreign soil, wages war in faraway countries, provides others with arms worth $3 billion a year, and influences their foreign as well as domestic policies;

- a country, moreover, whose currency serves as monetary reserve for half of the world's currencies, whose capital export and foreign trade are the main sources of new investment in underdeveloped areas, and whose corporations influence economic policies even on the most advanced continent;
- a country whose consumption of raw materials amounts to more than half of total exports from a number of other countries, and whose exports of manufactured articles and cultural goods determine and revolutionize the style of life in the rest of the world;
- finally, a country that defines its own foreign policy in terms of a historic world struggle with one or two other expansionist powers and on whose ambitions smaller countries rely for their own protection—clearly, such a power must be called imperialist by any definition of that term.

Yet, to say this is not to say much. Any structure as big as the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China or, for that matter, as big as the Lever Brothers Concern, the United Fruit Corporation, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the Ford Foundation, or the Catholic Church is bound to engage others of its kind in a power struggle that affects the interests, and often the fate, of the bystanders. Bigness itself provides opportunities and engenders a dynamism of its own, expansion feeding upon further expansion. Hegemony makes enemies. To be rescued by Big Brother may seem almost as painful as to be swallowed by the Big Bad Bully.

The limited concerns of small nations are distorted when they are projected on the screen of world politics, which is of much more vital interest to the larger nation. Such big-power supremacy is resented, even if exercised without malice and intent—as Gulliver found out in Lilliput.

Still, we are not likely to be satisfied with a definition explaining imperialism as a mere byproduct of bigness. Imperialism is a deliberate, well-profiled policy, executed with powerful means and accompanied by an ideology that justifies the striving for empire and domination. Bigness with a direction, expansion with deliberate intent, display of power, the wielding of influence abroad—these are the characteristics of imperialism.

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The question is: whose interests does this effort serve? What motives or instigations are backing it?

We must not beg the question by including these driving forces in our definition. If we were to follow Lenin, defining imperialism as "the last stage of capitalism," [1] we would have answered the question. But we also would have to find another word for the policies of Japan in 1894, in 1905, in 1931, and in 1941; for, obviously, when Japan first took Korea and Formosa she was not capitalistic, and when she attacked the United States she was not in the last stage. If we are to follow Ronald Segal, whose book has been widely acclaimed in Europe,[2] we will see imperialism largely as a matter of white domination over colored races which, again, puts us at a loss to explain the U.S. interventions in the Caribbean area, or the Soviet invasions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The only correct way to approach the question is by first isolating the phenomena of imperalism and colonialism and then to ask whether they are perhaps connected and how they are related to the social structure of the country afflicted by these practices.

The answer is pregnant with political consequences. Should we conclude that America is inherently racist, colonialist, and expansionist, that our interventions in Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Vietnam were prompted by corporate influences in the White House, that the wars this country has fought were the *inevitable* consequences of our not-so-free enterprise system? Then our political outlook would have to be gloomy. On the other hand, we might start with the more benevolent assumption that blunders have been committed by individuals who were perhaps ignorant or had miscalculated the effects of their decisions; that we had stumbled into quagmires from which we did not know how to extricate ourselves, had gotten involved without knowing how, etc. In the first case, imperialism is the manifestation of a rotten system that will produce My Lais over and over again; any attempts to reform the monster then are futile, naive delusions; and unless a revolution comes to rescue us, we can only watch and wait for humanity to be blown to pieces.

If, however, imperialism is not institutional or "systemic," not inherent in the structure of American politics and business; if imperialism is but a policy one can adopt or reject, perhaps a series of blunders and at worst the willful extravaganza of idealistic dreamers or the brutal pursuit of special interests by the military, certain corporations, or demagogues who thrive on chauvinism—then wise reforms or political action can curb such arrogance of power, and the outlook will be more optimistic.[3]

The latter view is held by the followers of Senators McCarthy and Fulbright, by the large majority of those engaged in the Moratorium movement, by the democratic Left and all those whom Lenin contemptuously called "petty-bourgeois pacifists"; their protest is in the Populist tradition of Bryan and La Follette. But the same view is held also by neo-isolationist writers who are not necessarily committed to social reform, such as Professors Morgenthau and Kennan, and even by many people whom we must count among the Right: followers of the old isolationist school, the Republican opponents of American intervention in the two world wars and in the Korean war, the late Senators Taft and Langer. The *Wall Street Journal* is as critical of the Vietnam war as it was of Korea.

The pessimistic view is held by the New Left, by the more militant leaders of the

[1] N. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Communism* (first, Russian, edition: Zurich, 1917).

[2] Ronald Segal, *The Race War* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966).

[3] For argument's sake, I exaggerate the difference between the two types. Obviously, the real situation is more complex and the arguments are confused: radicals denounce individual culprits while moderates in Congress also attack institutions.

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Black Liberation movement, by the orthodox Marxist-Leninists who reject America as the country of trust capitalism. Despite Khrushchev's doctrine of coexistence, most Communists abroad also hold to Lenin's vision that imperialism is the apogee of capitalism and its apocalypse. None of which is surprising. What comes as a shock is that a large non-Marxist segment of public opinion in the Western countries and in the underdeveloped world also views U.S. policies as determined basically by the structure of its economy. The latest example of this view is a book that has earned the prize of "Best Political Book of 1968" in Paris and has been translated into many languages. Its author, Claude Julien, chief of foreign reporting of the highly-respected Paris daily *Le Monde*,[4] charges that American imperialism is mostly guided by economic interests and that these interests make imperialism inevitable.

This kind of economic determinism is, I believe, no longer tenable. *Specific* class and professional interests and certain industries or corporations do stand to profit from imperialistic policies and armament. But to name these, to denounce and to fight their influence, is not tantamount to the proposition that "American capitalism"—an abstraction—brings forth another abstraction, imperialism. Nor is there an "intermediate position" or third choice: we shall have to decide whether American capitalism is inevitably, inextricably, and fatally bound up with imperialism, or whether the two evils can and must be dealt with in separate, different ways. Before going into details, however, I shall propose a preliminary definition:

Imperialism is a complex of political, diplomatic, military, financial, and economic strategies to secure the hegemony of one nation over others. Overlapping with but distinct from imperialism, the term "colonialism" shall mean for the length of this paper the subjection of one nation by another for purposes of economic exploitation. Our aim is precisely to determine the relationship of these two terms in the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs.

Economic Interpretations

MR. JULIEN'S INDICTMENT is neither new nor convincing. He charges that "the American consumer society is plundering the natural resources of the world." He quotes statistics showing that the U.S., with only 6 percent of the world's population, is buying 30 percent of the world's output of bauxite, 40 percent of the produced nickel, 36 percent of the chromium, etc., and generally consumes 30 percent of the world's raw materials. He further says that "contrary to Senator Fulbright's assertion, the U.S. cannot abandon its empire and use its enormous resources to give the world a shining example of the good life. On the contrary, to maintain its well-being, the U.S. must secure for itself access to the great resources of the entire world of which it consumes the largest part." [5] Looking at this same argument from a slightly different angle, Professor Gabriel Kolko emphasizes the poverty of the United States in industrial raw materials and especially in such defense-related ores as uranium, copper, and zinc. "At least 80 percent of 39 necessary commodities, 50–79 percent of 15 commodities, 10–49 percent of 23, with a total import value of $6.6 billion," are being imported from abroad. "Confident access to industrial materials is a precondition for expansion into new fields of industrial technology. . . . America's ability to procure such materials . . . is one of the keystones of its power. The stakes are vast. . . ." [6] This view was very popular be-

[4] Claude Julien, *L'Empire Américain* (Paris: Grasset, 1968).

[5] *Ibid.*, concluding statement.

[6] Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 51 and 55. Since no breakdown by countries is provided, the reader remains unaware that the bulk

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fore World War I; Karl Kautsky, one-time grand oracle of Marxism, defined imperialism as the policy of an advanced power to secure sources of raw materials, and he observed that the U.S. needed no overseas colonies, for it treated its South as a colony.[7]

Strangely, the same argument has also been used in reverse: apologists of imperialism claimed *Lebensraum* for their respective fatherland and proposed to make it self-sufficient (autarchic) in case of war. To such ideologies Sir Charles Dilke and other British opponents of imperialism replied that you don't have to own a country to buy from it. Provided you pay a fair price, the colonies will be only too glad to sell; in fact, they may complain—as do our Latin neighbors today—that the metropolis does not buy enough from them.

Here we distinguish three different processes: the conquest of a colony in order to fence it off for plunder; the use of political and economic advantages to exploit a country commercially by selling dearly and buying cheaply in its market; the "opening" of a country, pulling its economy out of the precapitalist into the capitalist orbit. Often the three will appear in intimate symbiosis. In India, for instance, the British first reaped enormous extra-profits which they used partly to build up their own industries.[8] Then they excluded others and also prevented the Indians from founding native industries; but eventually they had to recognize that in order to sell you have to buy. There is a limit to robbing a country of its treasures, and the primitive methods of enriching one country at the expense of another, which certainly had played a great role in the beginnings of capitalism, lost much of their significance—proportionally—as the forces of capitalism grew. Not that the hunt for gold and diamonds ever stopped, but the method to get them now had to be capitalist. As Marx wrote in the *Communist Manifesto:* "The need for a constantly expanding market chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. It has given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country." This is the third and final mode of expansion: the transformation of precapitalist, self-sufficient producers into capitalist suppliers and customers of the market.

Rosa Luxemburg has shown that the motor of capitalist accumulation itself creates the need for expansion into noncapitalist areas; as capitalism engulfs all underdeveloped countries and plants become more sophisticated, the struggle for markets grows fiercer; militarism, colonialism, and imperialism are summoned to forestall the crisis.[9] Rosa Luxemburg drew attention to contradictions in classical and Marxian economics, and to real conflicts in capitalist development. But modern economists have not sustained her theory; empirically, it fits early capitalism better than the most highly developed countries which are each other's best customers; it fits America quite poorly because, except in wartime, our foreign trade has never exceeded 5 percent of GNP.[10]

of strategic goods comes from such countries as Canada, Russia, Australia, England, and Chile, which are economically independent. "Moreover, were raw material prices to rise, it would become profitable for U.S. corporations to produce them here or to develop substitutes." Nor does Kolko account for the fact that countries without empire, such as Germany, Sweden, etc., can prosper. Their "confident access to raw materials" is assured by that archcapitalistic device—buying them. Most countries are more import-dependent than the U.S.

[7] Karl Kautsky, "Aeltere und neuere Kolonialpolitik," in *Die Neue Zeit,* 1898, pp. 809 ff.

[8] John Strachey, *The End of Empire* (New York: Random House, 1959).

[9] Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital* (first edition: Berlin, 1913). Rosa Luxemburg is part of a long line of nonclassical economists, beginning with Malthus, Sismondi, and Rodbertus, and including Hobson (see below) who denied that capitalism can expand its scope, as it must, unless it finds resources outside its circuit of exchanges. Lord Keynes, a disciple of Hobson, found a way out of the dilemma.

[10] It may well be that statistically 5 percent constitutes the margin between depression and prosperity. But our question is not one of economic analysis but one of the weight export-oriented busi-

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Rosa Luxemburg missed an important point, both in theory and empirically: when the geographical frontier was reached and closed in 1898, new industrial frontiers were opened in depth; capital found outlets for expansion at home and became protectionist. By contrast, if the American farmer wished to retain his liberal orientation, he had to support a foreign policy that was anti-imperialist in ideology—though in practice that does not mean anti-interventionist. The farmer, almost everywhere, was chauvinistic. He also was anticapitalist; for he was the victim of the market mechanism. Professor Williams shows that populists, agrarians, free-silverities, and other farm spokesmen tried to impose a "market mentality" on other nations.[11] "Make the Chinese eat American food!" exclaimed one farm editor; cotton exporters felt threatened by the Special Treaty Rights obtained by England, Russia, Japan, and Germany in China. No doubt, those who upheld these interests were glad when 2,500 American Marines joined the expeditionary corps to subdue the Boxer Rebellion in 1900; and therefore Professor Williams has called our "Open Door" policy the fountainhead of imperialism.[12] But President McKinley made it clear that the Marines would be withdrawn—and they were—as soon as other nations withdrew their forces. I find it difficult to call this American counterintervention "imperialist" or "colonialist." The interest and aim of American policy in China clearly was to safeguard the political, financial, and commercial independence of the old Middle Kingdom. The point is that the interests of the U.S., as a latecomer to the power game, happened to coincide with the interests of China, its victim. Today the Soviet Union is in a similar position: as a latecomer, she often can coordinate her interests with those of underling countries. But in neither case does the relationship, of itself, necessarily imply an intention to exploit or subdue. Williams's argument about the Open Door fails to prove either imperialism or colonialism. McKinley clearly tried to save China's integrity from Russian, German, English, and Japanese threats and to protect normal trade relations that were endangered by the Special Treaty Rights.

Naive or demagogic muckrakers always howl when they hear the word profit. I am not implying that America's intervention in China was motivated by philanthropic reasons. On the contrary, the presidents were defending ordinary business interests. But if words have any meaning, imperialism implies an uneven relationship; the safeguarding of trade interests is not the same thing as imperialism. What American business was doing in China and elsewhere reminds us of Karl Marx's paean to the revolutionary force of capitalism which "has dislodged old wants . . . creates new wants instead of those satisfied locally . . . draws even the most barbarian nations into civilization and batters down every Chinese Wall."

Allegedly, business interests had encouraged the annexation of the Philippines as a stepping stone to the "great China market." But business was hostile to both the Spanish war and the Boxer expedition; U.S. consuls in China constantly complained about the "apathy of business," and exports to China totaled $16 million in 1910. The "big China market" was, according to Paul A. Varg, "a myth." [13] Nor were our two great rivals in

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nesses have in influencing public opinion and government policies. Most other advanced countries depend for 80 and more percent of their industrial output on exports.—A detailed criticism of Luxemburg's theory is in Paul Sweezy, *Theory of Capitalist Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942; Monthly Review Press, 1968).

[11] In contrast to the theories relating imperialism to big business, William A. Williams argues in *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (New York: Random House, 1969) that the American farmer in the 19th century was desperate to find outlets for his surplus and therefore tried to extend his market philosophy to other nations. See DISSENT, July–August 1970.

[12] William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Foreign Policy,* (Cleveland: World, 1959).

[13] *American Historical Review,* February 1968, pp. 42 ff. "If government support of consular service

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the China tangle, Russia and Japan, "capitalist" powers. The roots of empire lie deeper than trade! (See the section entitled "Political and Psychological Theories," p. 467)

Big Business Imperialism

ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE IMPERIALISM either to the desire for imports or the need for markets in general have been unsuccessful. But in 1902 J. A. Hobson offered a theory that has remained most influential because it links big business, and in particular monopoly, with both imperialism and colonialism: monopoly prevents a fair distribution of purchasing power; therefore the economy of the metropolitan states becomes more vulnerable to depressions; investment becomes risky and the trust magnates find more money on their hands than they can employ profitably; hence they seek new investment opportunities abroad.[14]

"The adventurous enthusiasm of President Theodore Roosevelt must not deceive us," Hobson wrote. "It was Messrs. Rockefeller, Pierpont Morgan and their associates who needed imperialism because they desired to use the public resources of their country to find profitable employment for their capital which otherwise would be superfluous." [15]

But Hobson felt that a more equal distribution of incomes, tougher antitrust laws, and vigorous trade-union action could eliminate the calamity of surplus capital in the hands of Morgan. Hence, for him imperialism was not inevitable. It was a cancer, a parasitical, retrogressive, stultifying force, a bastard child of capitalism that honest business could and had to repudiate. Though he denounced the "economic taproot of imperialism," he thought the interests that were riding the nationalist bandwagon were illegitimate; their unhealthy influence could be defeated.

Many Americans share a vulgarized version of this view. They think that directors of, say, United Fruit or Grace Line or ESSO routinely inform the State Department or the President about American interests in each particular country. Do not their agents abroad work hand-in-glove with the U.S. ambassadors? Do not their lobbies dominate a Congress that is as uninformed as its voters? By default, its decisions usually favor the special interests. Presidents have indeed performed small and large services for their corporate campaign contributors; ambassadors have naively assumed that what is good for American corporations is good not only for America but for the natives, too. They identify (or confuse) the presence of American corporations abroad with American prestige and influence.

Nor was this new in the 20th century. Goethe wrote that "the Trinity of trade, war, and piracy cannot be split"; Sir Thomas More complained that "everywhere do I perceive a certain conspiracy of rich men seeking their advantage under the name and pretext of the Commonwealth." The air of corruption that Hobson smelled in imperialism had been there a long time—even in antiquity, when as virtuous a senator as Marcus Junius Brutus used the army to collect a debt from a Greek city. Corruption, however, is not an explanation but an effect; scandal-mongering and moral indignation do not overthrow the capitalist system. The

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is a measure of how seriously Washington took the . . . interests in China, . . . [it] approximated apathy."

[14] J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism* (first edition: London, 1902; now Ann Arbor paperpack). See also Hobson, *Modern Capitalism* (first edition: London, 1906).

[15] *Imperialism*, pp. 76–77. Hobson was still more outspoken in *Modern Capitalism*, p. 262. The bland assertiveness in these two lonely references to U.S. imperialism contrasts with Hobson's well-balanced, circumspect analysis of the multiple sources of imperialism in countries he knows first-hand. The famous chapter on "the economic taproot of imperialism" is one of 14 chapters dealing with the sociology and psychology of the parasitic classes. As a liberal, Hobson placed the emphasis on the parasitic character of imperialism; from this Lenin concluded that capitalism itself had become parasitical.

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Marxists Rudolf Hilferding and V. I. Lenin used Hobson's theory by turning it right-side up: [16] imperialism is not the bastard child of capitalism but its legitimate scion, "the last stage of capitalism"—"last" in three senses: the latest, the most highly developed, and the terminal stage; capitalism at the point of its supreme organization but already toppling over into ruin and waiting to be replaced by socialism. The brilliance of Lenin's work resides entirely in this Hegelian approach: imperialism is systemic, inevitable, and fatal. Its root is not corruption, but corruption is the inevitable consequence of monopoly capitalism as it has developed in this century, with its intertwining of finance and manufacturing capital, its cartels and trusts, its fierce struggle for hegemony in the world. This capitalism has become destructive and is digging its own grave; but it has not stopped revolutionizing the world. In its deterministic radicalism Lenin's theory is unsurpassed and still attractive to modern Marxists who feel that a revolutionary theory must give a comprehensive picture of a system of evil riding to its inevitable doom. Magdoff and Baran have offered American versions of Lenin's view.[17]

I shall address myself to this theory later on; but first I wish to complete my survey with a brief glance at the noneconomic theories.

Political and Psychological Theories

PIZARRO MAY HAVE LOOKED for gold; but the Spanish king and nobles wanted dominium, rule over others, power. When Kipling speaks of the white man's burden, he certainly does not mean profit; he is describing a way of life—that of the master race, the warrior caste. Even Hobson saw that the imperialist interests "appeal to the lust of domination surviving in a nation from early centuries of animal struggle for existence." He characterized imperialism as an atavism, "a remnant of the roving instinct." [18] And numerous are the literary documents exposing this instinct to rule over the nether breeds.

On this foundation Joseph Schumpeter built his denunciation of imperialism as an atavistic hangover from the feudal order and from barbarian conditions.[19] Speaking from the no-nonsense viewpoint of the enlightened capitalist, he held that war is bad business and empires cost too much. Pointing to the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Egyptians, the Romans, he denied that empire-building has any specific connection with capitalism, which is by nature rational; by contrast, he emphasized the *irrational* nature of imperialism, its restless, mindless drive for more and more expansion, its hunger for power after power without any reasonable objective or definable limit. In fact, this compatriot of Freud called imperialism a disease, the madness of a ruling class going to seed, a sure sign of decadence, the fulfillment of a death instinct. Drawing on the experience of his native Austria, Schumpeter saw monopoly and imperialism as creatures of the feudal state; militarism and chauvinism he saw as means to maintain the hierarchical structure of society.

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[16] Rudolf Hilferding, *Das Finanzkapital* (first edition: Berlin, 1910) and N. Lenin, *Imperialism*. Both works are exciting examples of Marxism's ability to present a coherent picture of all observable phenomena. The single motor of imperialism is Marx's "law of the diminishing rate of profits": as capital finds no more profitable employment in high-wage areas, it is driven into a mad scramble for overseas investment.

[17] Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, *Monopoly Capitalism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966). Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969). Ernest Mandel, Traité d'Économie Marxiste (Paris: Julliard, 1962). Also Kolko (see Note 6). For a critical review of this conception, see Michael Harrington, *Toward a Democratic Left* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), and John Strachey (see Note 8).

[18] Needless to say, the "social Darwinists" tried to turn all these characteristics into assets, making imperialism praiseworthy. See A. P. Thornton, *Doctrines of Imperialism* (New York: Wiley, 1965).

[19] Joseph Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Class* (first edition: Tübingen, 1919; now, transl. by H. Norden, in a Meridian paperback).

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An obvious objection to this view is the question: why, then, did the middle class so avidly follow the imperialist ideals? Is it not reasonable to assume that the bourgeoisie was using the feudalist fantasies, the Holy Grail, the Quest for Glory, the Superman and National Honor, merely as a screen for its very material interests? In the framework of a capitalist society all ideologies must serve the profit motive. But this answer underestimates the radicalism of Schumpeter's attack on the only imperialism he knew: in its servility the bourgeoisie had adopted the values of its feudal rulers, had not outgrown its political diapers even while it had to supply the "sinews of war"; it did so enthusiastically, no matter how much its material interests were hurt, precisely because those atavistic notions were stronger than economic rationality. This was true even more of the peasants, though their interests were even less identical with those of imperialism.

Incidentally, the cartoonists have not failed to note the sexual symbolism in the arms race, and if we have to have a "system," the psychoanalytical or the anthropological models are just as good as the economic model.

Curiously enough, Herbert Marcuse, though a Marxist, supports these sociopsychological views. He rejects the notion that the U.S. government is protecting any investments in Vietnam, but suggests that the ruling classes need this war to maintain their domination. He also concurs with the anthropological view that "The destructive instinct strives for the annihilation of the individual's life. . . . We may speak of a suicidal tendency on a truly large social scale; the national and international play with total destruction may well have found a firm basis in the instinctual structure of individuals." [20]

Leaving psychology aside, most historians define imperialism simply in terms of power. It occurs when one national state encroaches on the power of other nation-states. It is nationalism writ large when it enters world politics. Carlton Hayes, authority on 19th-century history, doubted that "the flag has to follow trade or investments." Though he admitted that "once flag-raising became common and competitive, economic considerations undoubtedly spurred [the Powers] to greater efforts," he held that "basically the new imperialism was a nationalistic phenomenon; it followed hard on the wars that created Germany and Italy, that brought Russia within sight of Constantinople"; he considered the conquest of Africa by England and France "a fearful reaction [to Bismarck's successes], an ardent desire to recover national prestige." Other historians saw imperialism before the world wars as the struggle for "mastery in Europe." [21] Is it not a fact that the great Ententes of 1902 and 1907 settled the colonial rivalries between France and England in Africa, between Japan, England and Russia in the Far East, between England and Russia in the Near East and Central Asia? Is it not a fact that England offered the German Kaiser advantageous arrangements in the Near East and Africa if only he would renounce the naval race? Is it not a fact that German diplomacy used its business interests in the Maghreb and in Anatolia merely as small change on the bargaining counter of "high policy," where the stakes were not profits but superiority, power? World War I broke

[20] Quoted by George Kateb in *Commentary*, January 1970. While Marcuse often displays a crude, almost superstitious belief in "capitalism's" ability to make consumers desire what it wants to sell, in this and other passages his subtler sensibility suggests that ideologies cannot be made to order but must be based on psychological dispositions which are not one-dimensional at all. The poetry of the imperialistic age and the colonial novels confirm this insight.

[21] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954). It is remarkable that the great historian manages to tell his story without mentioning weapons technology or arms manufacturers—and defense budgets only when they become objects of rivalry. A better source is William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1960). See similar arguments in Raymond Aron, *The Century of Total War* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954; now a Beacon paperback).

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out, not because the Powers could not agree on the distribution of the colonies—they had agreed—but because none could back down in a game of chicken without losing its standing in the concert of Europe. This also applies to the Cold War.

WHOSE INTERESTS WERE SERVED by these contests of prestige, which ultimately precipitated Europe into two world wars? James Mill called imperialism "a vast system of outdoor relief for the upper classes." Hobson remarked that in jingo politics the sports-loving upper crust is joined by the sensation-hungry mob. Hannah Arendt has shown how the dregs of all classes—lumpen proletariat, lumpen bourgeoisie, lumpen aristocrats, and lumpen intellectuals—find expression of their resentments in racism and imperialism.[22] Healthy, progressive capitalists create fields for innovation at home; the misfits the adventurers, the freebooters—an Evelyn Cromer, a Cecil Rhodes, a Carl Peters—go abroad, found empires, and fire the imagination of other rootless people. It is not surprising to find their jingoism in frequent alliance with anticapitalist, pseudo-socialist, anti-Semitic ideas.[23] Likewise, the shaky businesses are the ones that lobby for protective tariffs, empire preference, and similar schemes to milk the nation instead of serving it. Agriculture—the one industry that in most European countries is least capable of survival and decidedly underdeveloped—also is the most protectionist and jingoist.

In England, Austria, and Germany the big estates also were the cradle of the caste that provided the empires with army officers and governors. For both Junkers and gentry, protectionism and imperialism were vital in their fight to stay in power. Their estates could not compete with American farmers; their privileged position in the hierarchical structure of European society was under attack.[24] Their pernicious alliance with big industry in the conservative parties made World War I inevitable. Professor Fritz Fischer has shown the intertwining of business and state interests in the Kaiser's "world political" saber rattling.[25] His research brings out two things: the middle class could hope to gain prestige only by throwing itself into the role of the military caste; and in prewar imperialism the retrogressive, parasitical interests were far more prominent than the modernizing interests. We may add a third conclusion, to be drawn from the literature of imperialism: the empire was a safeguard of the domestic class structure. It absorbed those who did not fit into the establishment and diverted those who might have attacked it. It overawed those who might have doubted the wisdom of the upper classes, and forced all to find their places on the ladder of domination.

Imperialism and Colonialism

IT IS EASY TO CITE outrageous feats of financial piracy or enormous profits made by some freebooters and imperial freeloaders. Some of these operators may have had an illegiti-

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[22] Hannah Arendt, *Imperialism* (originally Chapter II in *Origins of Totalitarianism,* Harcourt, Brace, 1951; now available as a separate Harcourt, Brace & World paperback). Imperialism here is seen as the alliance of capital with the mob.

[23] One can verify this in Thomas Mann's World War I book, *Betrachtungen Eines Unpolitischen* (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1918)—"Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man"—which merely reflects the ravings of famous German professors; their war was the defense of *"Geist"* against the mercantile (*Krämer*) mentality of the British "traders" who greedily grabbed all the world markets for themselves. The Kaiser's ideologists saw the German Young Siegfried, pure and innocent in spirit, of chivalrous bearing and noble race, forever fighting the dragon of Mammon. Following this Wagnerian mythology, the Nazis conjured up the foggy ideologies of "blood and soil" and exalted the rebellion of primeval tribal instincts against the rationalist spirit of Western plutocracy. Similar observations are true of D. H. Lawrence.

[24] Max Weber has shown that the desperate attempt to preserve the Prussian estates made it impossible for East Germany to become the industrial center whose emergence might have changed the course of history for all of Eastern Europe.

[25] Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1961).

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mate, surreptitious influence in some policy-makers' backrooms. But this proves the opposite of Lenin's thesis, for the colonialists were not typical capitalists. That conclusion is forced upon us by statistics:

It is not true that the surplus capital went to the colonies. The bulk of overseas investments went to other advanced countries: not to underdeveloped areas but to Europe, to the United States, and to the white Dominions. At the time Lenin wrote, France had put 2 billion francs into her colonies, but 35 billion into independent countries. More than half of England's investments were in the United States; and vice-versa, the United States had invested more capital in Canada than had the mother country. Of Germany's overseas investment—25 billion marks in 1914—3 percent was invested in all of Africa and Asia, and a small part of that 3 percent in her own colonies. And Russia's imperialism was built on borrowed money!

Lenin may have known these figures, but he did not cite them; his economic theory was so logical and coherent that no attempt to verify it could have made it more convincing. It happened to be mistaken. The great struggle between the Powers was for supremacy in Europe—a supremacy that certainly included economic power but must be seen in the context of domination, hegemony, exercise of power, rivalry, and security. This brings me to a further distinction. Normally, we can point out an empire on the map—the Egyptian, the Roman, the Inca empire, all had boundaries. The Chinese emperor even built a wall; in England and Germany we still see the ruins of Hadrian's Wall, which once enclosed the Roman Empire. In Berlin a wall was erected under our very eyes. In brief, an empire seems to be a well-defined area, a territory dominated by *one* power. But when you speak of the British and Dutch empires, a map is not sufficient. You need a globe, and there is no land connection between the various parts of the empire. This is usually called colonialism, a term based on "the seawater fallacy": If you conquer a neighboring country by the sword, riding on horses, or rolling in tanks—that may be imperialism but is forgiven sooner or later; who cares today about the independence of the Circassians or of Texas? People get used to seeing a larger area on the map colored yellow or blue and forget that there lives a subjugated nation. If, on the other hand, you have to board a ship and cross salt water to conquer a foreign tribe, that is "Colonialism," very reprehensible and never forgotten or forgiven. The Decolonization Committee of the United Nations cannot by its Charter debate "contiguous territories." It cannot deal with Biafra, Kashmir, the Kurds, or with the Baltic and Caucasian nations in the Soviet Union; neither with Tibet and Sinkiang nor with the blacks in the Sudan or the Berbers in Morocco. The Russian invasions of Hungary and of Czechoslovakia also concerned "contiguous territories"; they were imperialistic but by the U.N.'s definition not colonialist—although those countries are clearly exploited and subjugated. Nehru refused to be bothered by the invasion of Hungary because that was not colonialism; and India holds sovereignty over the Nagas. It would be better to speak of colonialism only if the relationship is exploitative, if it benefits one side more than the other in terms of money. One should speak of imperialism when a relationship is primarily of a political and military nature. In many cases the two will go together; but more often they are distinct and different.

Imperialism without Empire

THE U.S. EMPIRE CANNOT BE FOUND on any map or globe, yet it is worldwide. The U.S. has no colonies to speak of; the few it has retained serve strategic purposes. But it has been accused of "financial" or "neo-colonial-

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ism," and the loudest outcry against American domination does not come from underdeveloped countries whose raw materials we buy but from the most highly industrialized nations, which have themselves practiced imperialism and colonialism in the recent past: from France and Japan.[26] Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, the editor of *L'Express* and now leader of France's traditional middle-class party, the Radicals, has charged that through superior techniques of management U.S. corporations can "use our own money to dominate our industries." Also, with political pressure U.S. corporations have infiltrated the allied economies and exploit them in subtle, and often not so subtle ways.[27] A "superimperialism" is said to overarch the old colonial and neocolonial countries. Thus we have the following types of domination:

(1) Territorial imperialism: old-fashioned rule over conquered nations.

(2) Naval colonialism: exploitation of less developed nations by settlers or managers, usually with political rule.

(3) "Neo-colonialism": domination of newly independent countries by investors or traders, usually without political rule.

(4) Superimperialism: domination or hegemony of a superpower over developed economies and independent countries which themselves may exploit other countries, thus forming a pyramid of primary and secondary dependencies.

In this tableau the U.S. is in very distinguished company. Ancient Athens certainly was an imperial power, although she owned no territory beyond the barren rocks of Attica. Medieval Venice was built on even less land; but she ruled the waves and financed the Crusades—which always ended up in places where the Venetians needed trading posts. For, of course, all these big naval powers—Athens, Venice, the U.S., Genoa, and we even might add the Phoenicians—were commercial republics, and they were ruled by the rich. Socrates could afford to loaf in the marketplace because his wife managed a lucrative export business. The Athenians were democratic at home; but they spoke harshly to their allies, and they dealt brutally with defectors. Here is how they lectured the unhappy citizens of Melos:

> Of the Gods we believe and of men we know that by a necessary law of nature they rule wherever they can. We did not invent this law, we are only following it. . . . If you are well advised, you will not think it dishonorable to submit to the greatest city in Hellas when it makes you the modest offer to become its ally without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to you.[28]

In Thucydides, this speech is only a few pages away from that other Athenian oration, the first and proudest manifesto of democracy—Pericles' famous celebration of the virtues of Athens and of its idea of government. Indeed, all these maritime republics share one remarkable characteristic: they fight ideological wars—against dictatorships, against the barbarians, against the infidels. Democracy, freedom, humanism are ideas that claim universality, precisely because they are not nationalistic. Indivisible freedom cannot tolerate areas of servitude. It was natural for Athens to fight for the freedom of cities in Asia, for Venice to fight against the closed society of the Moslem Turks. The United States fought for Freedom of the Seas and proclaimed the principle of the Open Door against those imperial powers that conceived of their empires as fenced-in

[26] Also from Canada and from some Latin-American countries which have reached a certain stage of industrialization and now feel that they could do better under national management.

[27] Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *Le Défi Américain* (Paris: Denoël, 1967); in translation, *The American Challenge* (New York: Athenum, 1969). In contrast to Julien, Servan-Schreiber is neither shrill nor anti-American. The more seriously must we take his charge.

[28] Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, Chapter I.

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territories.[29] Woodrow Wilson fought for collective security; Franklin D. Roosevelt first quarantined the dictators and then fought for the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter. Truman had to clothe his power conflict with Stalin into the ideological drapes of anti-Communism, free enterprise and collective security.

Does this sound suspicious? Are these democracies imperialist because they are commercial? [30] "Open Door" has meant that a new imperialism tried to pry open some doors that older imperialisms held closed. It has even been said that the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed to fence South America in as a preserved hunting ground for U.S. capital. The trouble with this theory is that in 1823 the U.S. had little to sell to the Latin republics and no capital to invest. All documents of the time show that the Doctrine was a diplomatic move, designed to assert the independence of U.S. policies.[31] But the ideology on which the doctrine was based certainly expressed both America's interests and her "way of life" (see the concluding section).

Dollar Diplomacy

THE MONROE DOCTRINE was political and self-serving; but it also served the interest of other American nations. It asserted the United States' hegemony in this hemisphere; but that did not mean financial exploitation. The reverse is true: the financial troubles of the Caribbean republics were exploited to ascertain the political ascendency of the United States. The dollar was the means rather than the motive or the purpose of policy. In China likewise, the "Open Door" policy was to stop the Russo-Japanese partition of Manchuria; the State Department asked the ill-famed railroad tycoon Edward Harriman—grandfather of the present champion of liberal imperialism—to save Manchuria by investing a few million dollars there. But Harriman and Morgan found the proposition unprofitable and asked for a government guarantee. When Woodrow Wilson came to power, he refused to endorse the scheme. Only 30 miles of railway were built —not in Manchuria but far to the south in Fukien; not a dollar was invested in Manchuria. But the Chinese government could use these tokens of American interest to maintain its independence until World War I. It is all too clear that U.S. imperialism then could not be financial:

The total of U.S. investments in Asia and Africa was $200 million, in South America $400 million—nothing to compare with the $7 billion investment of foreigners in the United States. Yet the imperialist phase of U.S. policies coincides with this premonopolistic period.

But if neither trade nor finance drove the U.S. into expansion, what did? It was Jefferson—hardly a representative of finance—who talked of annexing Cuba.[32] But as the

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[29] The principle of the Open Door was first enunciated by Jefferson in a memorandum of December 16, 1793, "On the Privileges and Restrictions of the Commerce of the U.S. in Foreign Countries": ". . . should any nation, contrary to our wishes, . . . continue its system of prohibitions, duties and regulations, it behooves us to protect our citizens, their commerce and navigation by counter-protection. Free commerce and navigation are not to be given in exchange for restrictions and vexations."

[30] "Our navigation involves still higher consideration. As a branch of industry it is invaluable; as a resource of defense, essential."—From the same Jefferson memorandum, quoted in R. J. Bartlett, *The Record of American Diplomacy* (New York: Knopf, 1960), p. 77.

[31] "If the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine was an act of imperialism," asks William Langer, "where was the export of capital which ought to have been its conditions? At the time of the Spanish-American war, even when Theodore Roosevelt intervened in the Caribbean republics, the United States was still a debtor nation, importing capital. In Russia, the heyday of imperialist expansion coincided with heavy borrowing."

[32] "We must have the Floridas and Cuba," quoted by T. Bailey, in *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York: Appleton, 1969), p. 195. Also, possession of the island "would fill up the measure of our well-being," quoted by J. W. Pratt, *History of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1955) p. 293.

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Louisiana Purchase showed, Jefferson had a strong sense of geopolitical realities; he was pursuing power politics, and the other presidents after him who coveted the Isthmus of Panama or moved to build a canal and deployed the Marines to protect it, also were thinking in terms of strategy. We may call Jefferson an imperialist in the older sense, but not in Lenin's.

Nor was it always the dollar that called in the big stick. President Taft wanted to replace the big stick with subtler means. He defined "the purpose of the present administration": "to encourage the use of American capital in the development of China by the promotion of essential reforms." He promised to "remove countries in this hemisphere from the jeopardy involved by heavy foreign debt and from the danger of internal complications due to disorder at home."

His Secretary of State, Philander Knox, sounds almost modern when he says that he "could imagine no better use for American dollars than to replace insecurity by stability in neighboring states." And again: "The malady of revolution and financial collapse is most acute precisely in the region where it is most dangerous to us. It is here that we seek to apply the remedy." [33] Taft and Knox called the technique they were using "dollar diplomacy"—meaning the deliberate, purposeful exploitation of commercial and financial interests in order to bind other countries to the United States, to further strategic projects, to counteract designs of other powers.

Dollars were mobilized to serve diplomatic ends. Received wisdom has it the other way around: that diplomacy had to follow the initiative of the dollar. Actually, American bankers complained that they did not have enough dollars to do the job the President asked them to do.[34]

Alas, we all know what Taft's lofty resolutions later came to: outright intervention by Marines in Nicaragua, Honduras, Mexico, Santo Domingo—and this under Woodrow Wilson, of all presidents, who had begun his adminsitration by repudiating dollar diplomacy in China! The U.S. was talking to her neighbors as Athens had talked to Melos. There is no doubt that her concern with the Caribbean area, her solicitude for the safety of the Panama Canal, her fear of foreign intervention on this continent generated naval and financial imperialism. Inevitably, we established five protectorates—states that remained nominally independent but were governed by U.S. commissars—and interests of a commercial and financial nature were grafted upon this empire.

In the period before World War I this must still be called hemisphere imperialism. America was not yet a world power. She played no role in the rivalries that led to the catastrophe of 1914; and as we have seen, her imperialism was not motivated by primary financial interests. Her trade with the Latin-American countries was minimal, her investment there negligible; above all, being poor in capital she had no need to export it. The compulsion to expand was not economic but strategic. Financial imperialism, the so-called dollar diplomacy, was a tool, one of the means available to an over-all policy; but this tool was soon to dominate the scene. In trying to develop techniques of humane, peaceful intervention, Knox created precisely

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[33] *Loc. cit.* (Pratt).

[34] In their classic study of *Dollar Diplomacy* (first edition: 1925, now a Monthly Review Press paperback), Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman have shown how capital used the opportunities offered by U.S. diplomacy. But they have failed to show—if that was their intention—that capital interests guided U.S. diplomacy. By skillful manipulation of their quotations they have conveyed the impression that Knox and Taft were contemplating something more sinister than their own use of the term "dollar diplomacy" implied. For the original conception see Willard Straight, *The Politics of Chinese Finance* (Published Address, May 2, 1913, East Asia Society, Boston), and Croly's biography of Straight, who was consul general in Mukden and later J. P. Morgan's agent.

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those financial interests which Hobson and Lenin denounced as the roots of imperialism; the seeds he had planted sprouted like dragons' teeth. It may be necessary to invent a special term for this relationship—pseudo-colonialism.

Dilemmas of Power Politics

THIS LEADS TO a second observation about means, ends, and intentions. We have found that intentions don't really count. The attempt to stay out of the power game leads straight into it. The Open Door policy required meddling in the affairs of China; the design to stave off foreign intervention called for intervention; the wish to substitute dollars for bullets ended in more bullets. Worse: motives and ends initially seem to permit a wide choice of means—some of them even, in the beginning and in the intention, quite humane; but the means then take over and tend to determine the ends.

When we established ourselves as tutors and guardians of the smaller American republics, we established exactly the kind of preserved hunting ground we pretended we had to deny the Russians and Japanese in Manchuria. When we created a safety zone in this hemisphere, we provided for American capital precisely those opportunities that then, in turn, had to be protected by the Marines.

In opposing imperialism abroad the United States had to develop the weapons imperialists used: a two-ocean navy, a military establishment, the draft, a propaganda agency. It occupied bases abroad and tried to influence, nay to dominate other governments. Even if we grant that all this was not done from imperialistic motives, the means certainly were imperialistic, and the old motto of all absolute pacifists was proven once again in resisting evil one ends by doing evil: in fighting the totalitarians, the United States came to imitate some of their methods. This is the tragedy of all politics, the tragedy of power: it becomes absolute, independent of its purposes. The question is not for a theologian alone; it confronts the honest politician every time he must make a decision that may hurt someone.

The choice of means is hardly a dilemma for dictatorships; they can mold their ideology to fit their policies. The problem plagues democracies whenever they engage in world politics: at some point their ideology will find itself at odds with policy.

The U.S. has found it expedient, for example, to do business with dictators who are repugnant to our sensibilities—Trujillo, Batista, Somoza, Chiang Kaishek, Diem, Franco. Some say that such alliances disclose the true reactionary nature of U.S. imperialism. Is guilt revealed by association? We do not "support" Franco, but he is extorting an exorbitant price for a piece of real estate the Navy thinks it needs; that is a different story. For similar reasons of self-interest we have "supported" Tito, Nasser, Sukarno, and other heroes of the Left. The CIA even supported Ho Chi Minh,[35] and worked against Diem;[36] we caused the downfall of Trujillo and Batista by withdrawing support from them; we offered to support Castro's farm reform.[37]

There may be, in certain circles within and outside the U.S. government, a predilection for military dictators. They are considered reliable as anti-Communists; their insatiable appetite for hardware is considered a guarantee of their continued dependence on U.S. subsidies; and their notorious inefficiency is supposed to keep them beholden

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[35] It is ironical that the French Communists then declared they "had not joined the government to liquidate the French empire."

[36] See Morris West, *The Ambassador* (New York: Morrow, 1965) a novelistic account based on information.

[37] See Theodore Draper, *Castro's Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1962). It is well-known that Batista's officers deserted him when Eisenhower stopped supplying him with arms. The Latin-American desk at the State Department, the *New York Times,* and influential New York bankers had openly supported the insurgents since 1958.

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to U.S. "advisers." Recently, however, we have found rats in this brew: some dictators don't stay bought, but find the Russians just as eager to provide them with hardware or even more amenable than the U.S.; their appetite transgresses the boundaries we deem safe—and the Russians provide them with ideologies and propaganda techniques; they discover expansionist goals of their own which enhance their popularity. Some proceed to expropriate U.S. property. Still others—like Duvalier, Thieu, Papadopoulos—become so embarrassing that at least part of the U.S. establishment would rather get rid of them.

The U.S. government is not always of one mind. In the case of Greece, for instance, it is well-known that the CIA supported the king rather than the generals; in South Vietnam, two factions of the CIA seem to have been pulling in different directions, and Mr. Helms is known to have been at odds with military intelligence for years. Thus, while the record is by no means edifying, we might conclude this section with these observations:

U.S. interests have led U.S. policy-makers to support regimes of various descriptions, republican and dictatorial, progressive and reactionary. Among the dictators we have supported we must distinguish between those—like the Brazilian and Guatemalan—for which U.S. agents bear direct responsibility, and those—like the Greek or Argentinian—with whom fate has forced the U.S. into harness on a limited number of policy issues. The record is not consistent and clear at all, but it shows a frequent wavering between extremes. For a while we would not recognize any Latin-American dictator; then we decided to give the abrazo to any leader who actually was in possession of a country.[38] *Often American interests pulled in different directions, with the CIA, the army, the ambassador, business interests, and the State Department backing different contenders.*

The Rationale of U.S. Interventions

IT IS OFTEN SAID that we support dictators because they protect American business. Some do protect American business interests; but the conjunction "because" is erroneous. The national interest is not to protect individual American firms but to preserve a system of business, which the American public identifies with its way of life and which the American government considers the alternative to the rival system of Communism. As the U.S. International Cooperation Administration declared,

> The U.S. is convinced that private ownership and operation of industrial and extractive enterprises contribute more effectively than public ownership and operation to the general improvement of the economy of a country. . . . It is therefore a basic policy of the ICA [International Cooperation Administration] to employ U.S. assistance to aid-receiving countries in such a way as will encourage the development of the private sectors of their economies.[39]

In this matter, the American government agrees with Stalin, who said: whoever conquers a territory introduces his own economic system into it. The American empire expresses its presence and exercises its influence through the capitalist mode of operation for which it keeps as much of the world "open" as possible. It also prefers democratic governments that guarantee the free exchange of goods and ideas.

There was an enlightened self-interest be-

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[38] As a principle of international law and as a maxim of diplomacy, one should recognize all governments—Right or Left—exercising sovereignty in a given territory. Recognition means neither moral approval nor attestation of legitimacy. To withold it makes sense only if one expects an early overthrow of the government. Nonrecognition is very popular as a form of public pouting.

[39] U.S. press release, ICA, September 11, 1957, quoted by Kolko (see Note 6), p. 78.

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hind the Marshall Plan and the containment policy of the late forties—the twin weapons of the so-called Cold War. No doubt it was in the interest of both the American and the European democracies to keep the Soviet armies at bay and to avert the danger of a Communist take-over. To do that, the European economies had to be rebuilt and the reconstruction site had to be shielded. These policies not only helped to restore a capitalist world market. The interests of all parties also demanded a restoration of democracy in those countries of Europe that had lost it; democracy of necessity became the watchword of the Western coalition. Hence, like Athens, America fights an ideological war.

In Europe the U.S. found congenial forces —democratic and capitalistic—to work with. It never was equally chummy with European dictators. Contrary to the charge that it always uses dictators, it often collaborates with democratic forces and institutions if they are available. Unfortunately, there are not many of them, especially in the Third World—and some whom we mistook for democrats, like Diem, disappointed us. Yet the U.S. has given $7 billion to Nehru despite his preference for socialism and his pronounced anti-Americanism; it could not save U Nu in Burma; it loyally supported the socialist Adoula in the Congo against Tshombe, an avowed puppet of the Société Générale. It tried to defend democracy in Argentina against the dictator—without success, but not for want of trying. In Peru the U.S. Ambassador supported the Accion Popular, with President Belaunde, and even Haya de la Torre, the venerable leader of the APRA (American Popular Revolution Alliance); in Bolivia we supported Paz Estenssoro; in Costa Rica we have supported Figueres, in Venezuela the liberal President Betancourt and his successor Leone; in Chile we rooted for Frei. The French even accused the CIA of aiding the Algerian rebels. And Velasquez, the Peruvian darling of the New Left, now advertises for American capital!

Where U.S. Business Comes In

CLEARLY, AMERICAN AND OTHER BUSINESS INTERESTS find a more favorable climate under republican governments than under such populist-nationalist generals as Perón, Ovanda, Velasquez, or Nasser. Such pseudo-revolutionary leaders were analyzed 120 years ago by Karl Marx: his pamphlet on Louis Napoleon has not been improved upon, nor has the original model. Some of the dictators find it profitable to cast themselves in an anti-imperialist role—even while soliciting American investments.[40] In all countries entering the industrial age, labor is being exploited, by native even more cruelly than by foreign capitalists. But what is actually a *social* question is made to appear as a racial or national question.

In the distorted view of demagogic dictators, class war is being deflected into "war of national liberation." Paul Baran and Herbert Marcuse therefore have characterized the pseudoprogressive, national-revolutionary governments as "the last and most dangerous disguise of business rule" over underdeveloped nations. Indeed, Libya throws the

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[40] Velasquez bought full-page ads in several U.S. papers to assert that in Peru the press is free and foreign capital safe. Incidentally, the largest bank in Peru is Italian, the biggest cotton textile plant Japanese, the railways are British. But the American presence is resented because U.S. policies bear a greater threat to Peruvian sovereignty. It is true that the big Cerro de Pasco mines and the International Petroleum Company are American; but next-door in Bolivia, the mines are owned by the Argentinian Señores Aramayo, Patiño, and Hochschild—and the U.S. is still considered the imperialist. Obviously, the people have not read Lenin but know where power lies. See also Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), pp. 134 ff: "in the developed countries the bourgeois dictatorship results from the power of the bourgeoisie. In underdeveloped countries the Leader stands for moral power, but in his shelter the thin and poverty-stricken bourgeoisie of a young nation intends to get rich. . . . In spite of his honest conduct and sincere declaration the Leader is objectively the fierce defender of the interests"; and again: "The Leader who has behind him a life-time of devoted patriotism, constitutes a screen between the people and the rapacious bourgeoisie."

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Americans out only to call in the French, and Western firms can do business with dictators of the Left as well as of the Right. American firms were prepared to work for Castro until he forced a showdown, and only after he had opted for the Russian orbit did Eisenhower break with him. Ceylon and Indonesia were allowed to expropriate oil firms because, unlike Cuba, they did not simultaneously fall into the Russian or Chinese orbit. Nixon avoided invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment against Peru because he hopes that Velasquez will continue to do business with the U.S.

These pragmatic policies have paid dividends that could hardly have been expected by the policy-makers. The Marshall Plan was supposed to stop the Russians in Europe; but at the time of its conception American capitalists would not bet their own money on European recovery.

Today American direct investments in Europe amount to $18 billion, in Canada and Australia to $21 billion—together four times as much as all our investments in all countries abroad 20 years ago. U.S. firms also own $10 billion worth of investments in Latin America, and $7 billion in Africa, Asia, and the Near East. Five billion dollars are invested in mining, $24 billion in manufacturing, $13 billion in construction, finance, commerce, shipping, utilities, etc. The $17 billion invested in the oil industry produce the highest profits. But if we disregard oil and mining—where location is the decisive factor—American investments in the Third World are neither as substantial nor as profitable as those in the highly industrialized countries.

The benefits have been distributed very unevenly; they are concentrated in a few industries and a limited number of large Corporations. The Aluminum Corporation of America generates two-thirds of its total income in its foreign subsidiaries, Colgate-Palmolive three-quarters. Nearly half of the hundred biggest corporations in the United States depend for a sizable part of their dividends on foreign sources. Vice-versa, foreigners own $10 billion worth of plants in this country; but if we count all assets, including stocks and bonds, the relationship is more balanced: Americans have invested $93 billion abroad, and the U.S. government has claims to $23 billion; foreigners own $70 billion of U.S. assets.[41]

The Divorce of the State from Business

IN RECENT YEARS something new has been added to the economic structure of the West: the international corporation. Books are already being written about these new corporations, which know no frontiers and no nationality. They may establish themselves for production purposes in one country, for tax purposes in another. They may be owned by nationals of one country and managed by nationals of another. They know no government and no homeland but are international freebooters, following their interests to any place that may suit them. They even plan across national frontiers. German firms build chemical plants in South Carolina and electric power plants in South America with World Bank financing. Mutual funds overseas also sell shares in U.S. corporations.

The importance of international corporations in world trade is staggering. The gross value of goods produced by U.S.-owned firms or affiliates abroad alone is $40 billion a year—twice our export of manufactured goods, and the equivalent of total consumer expenditure in a good-sized country like Italy. In another context A. A. Berle has compared the new corporations to nations. They account for a certain percentage of

[41] All figures quoted here are from *The Statistical Abstract of the United States.* Obviously, fixed investments give U.S. capitalists control over foreign business; the liquid assets of foreigners in the United States, however, constitute a danger to the stability of the dollar. At the time of this writing, Nixon cannot stop inflation because German marks are fleeing from Willy Brandt's government. Should these marks be repatriated suddenly, there will be a run on the dollar.

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world trade; part of their product is re-exported to the U.S., another part elsewhere. Magdoff has pointed out that in certain industries, such as rubber, chemicals, and transportation equipment, the foreign plants export more than the mother company. Magdoff would add those $40 billion to the volume of U.S. exports. But that would be misleading, for the labor and materials were bought in the countries of origin, and the product is their export, often our import. In Latin America, U.S. firms employ 1,230,000 people, and nine out of ten in managerial positions are hired locally. It is interesting to note that some of these ventures are not profitable, but must be pursued, nevertheless, because businesses are in a growth competition and must be "present"—just as the U.S. government must show a "presence" abroad—wherever a rival has established affiliates. The directors of big business care little what dividends are paid to the stockholders; big business is in a power game just like states. On the other hand, they think it good business to help build "socialism" in the U.S.S.R. Fiat, Mannesmann, and Ford extend credit lines to the "reds" and calmly listen to the speeches which condemn them as colonialists and imperialists.

The planning of such firms is now global, with loyalties determined by the political situation on each of the continents. Often the profits have to be reinvested locally, so the companies are Arab in the Middle East, Pan-European in the countries of the Common Market; in Latin America they enjoy solidarity with the Hochschilds, the Patinos, and the Aramayos. Far from serving any American interest in Peru, the American owners of the Cerro mines plead the Peruvian government's case in this country. What matters here is not where the profit goes but where the power resides; while financial control may remain in New York, the thinking of the corporation assumes a "colonial" coloration, and something similar to the the managerial revolution might be in the making, eroding the prerogatives of ownership and substituting functional criteria for all other motives.

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONS may contribute to the development of some countries. More often now they merely seem to transfer business, plant, and work force from a high-tax, high-wage country to one that offers low wages and taxes; or, as in the case of recent investments in Europe, they wish to get in under a customs wire. Such runaway businesses re-export into the U.S. or to other countries, and the AFL–CIO has charged, not without reason, that they are taking thousands of jobs from American workers, especially from minority people and hard-core poverty areas. These workers are not, as Lenin charged, sharing the profits of colonialism. When State Department officials are confronted with Latin-American demands for lower tariffs, they actually may be dealing with front men for international corporations. Nevertheless, it remains U.S. policy to encourage private investment abroad; for governmental and international development aid cannot provide an adequate substitute for the formation of new capital in the underdeveloped countries themselves.

Now I submit that these new corporations constitute a phenomenon that is the opposite of imperialism.

"Imperialism" is definitely and unmistakably tied to the policies of one country or government. The term makes no sense if one cannot point to a government that supports the imperialist or economic interests. An international corporation knows no exports or imports; whether its policies are good or bad, progressive or reactionary, coinciding or colliding with any government interest, they cannot be identical with "American imperialism." A corporation may be an octopus, but without a navy it cannot be "imperialist"; we must stay with our definitions, and we shall see later on that these definitions have social-political meaning.

On balance, of course, more U.S. com-

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panies operate abroad than foreign companies do here; more U.S. citizens draw income from overseas sources than vice-versa. U.S. private income from investments abroad is about $7 billion, whereas foreigners draw about $4 billion from dividends and interest in this country. Nevertheless, the international solidarity of capital seems to be guaranteed institutionally much more firmly than in any previous decade: the new arrangements to protect currencies from speculators, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, international cartels and trade agreements constitute an international directorate of banking, industry, and commerce. When, 60 years ago, Walther Rathenau wrote that the world was "ruled by 200 people who know each other," [42] communicate with each other, and understand one another, he may have thought of Greek ship owners, Armenian cannon kings, Latin-American copper barons, Dutch oil men, Jewish bankers who acquired British knighthood, and also American heiresses who guilded rusty escutcheons. But his hyperbole might come true now in half of the world at least, with interlocking directorates extending into many countries.

While the international corporations have lost their identification with the country of their origin, nations in turn do not identify their interests any longer wtih those of the corporations. Lord Palmerston still could call upon the might of the Britsh Empire on behalf of a Maltese Jew who happened to be its citizen; the U.S. no longer protects the passengers of its airliners from kidnapping. President Harding still considered U.S. corporations in Mexico quasi-extraterritorial; Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon have recognized the right of any country to nationalize corporations in its territory. For their part, the corporations often act in flagrant contradiction to national policy or even become spokesmen for the country in which they operate. American oil companies, which once thought they had the sheiks in their pockets, now plead with President Nixon to change America's Near East policy in favor of the Arabs—fortunately in vain, but that will not change the New Left prejudice that oil determines U.S. policies in the Near East.[43]

Incidentally, even at a time when the U.S. government considered itself the errand-boy of U.S. business, frequent misunderstandings often prevented agreement on what the national interest was. When the State Department tried to mediate a quarrel between Chile and Peru over the Tacna-Arica territory, an arms manufacturer complained that it was "interfering perniciously with legitimate business." While the government was internationalist, business remained isolationist; while presidents seek to make the country defense-conscious, the Stock Exchange has consistently given defense industries a lower rating than other firms and in recent years has responded to peace rumors with bullish, to war with bearish behavior. The *Wall Street Journal* and the right wing of the Republican party were isolationist and anti-interventionist through two world wars, the Korean war, and even in Vietnam. They all think it bad business to

[42] A German Jewish industrialist, author of technocratic books, and 1922 Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic.

[43] This is one of those arguments you cannot win. When U.S. policies seem to favor Israel, it is said that the oil companies want to use it as a spur in the flank of their Arab retainers; when U.S. policy veers away from Israel, the oil companies are said to fear for their property in Arab lands. In New Left lore, oil and Zionism usually appear as twin evils, though actually oil has always been hostile to the Jewish state. The "long arm of Zionism" was unveiled by *L'Opinion de Rabat* (Istiqlal) when it wrote that the Paris student riots of May 1968 had been instigated by the CIA in complicity with the Zionists to punish de Gaulle for his pro-Arab, anti-American stand the year before. (Quoted by *Le Monde,* May 30, 1969.)

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spend $30 billion a year to protect a piddling few millions of trade and investments in Southeast Asia—never mind anti-Communism and big-power aspirations. (As I make my final revisions, Henry Ford has to call off a profitable deal with the Soviet government; Secretary of State Laird vetoed it for strategic reasons—as though to prove this point.)

Neo-Colonialism

IF BUSINESS IS no longer patriotic it may still display a "colonialist" stance vis-à-vis the underdeveloped countries. At international conferences like UNCTAD, we hear charges that the rich get richer and the poor, poorer; that the producers of raw materials enrich the makers of machinery; that the debtors feed the creditors. Yet the have-nots must ask for even more loans and complain that not enough funds come their way. U.S. capitalists prefer to invest in highly developed countries. Contrary to the Lenin-Hobson theory, capital is not under pressure to find investment opportunities. The opportunities are offered and the U.S. government vainly implores U.S. business to help industrialize countries suffering from underdevelopment. But even though profit may be high, capital no longer takes risks; it demands, and gets, government guarantees; it expects the government to organize and finance preliminary surveys and research. Much of the international aid program is actually seed money—developing areas that may provide a hospitable environment for private capital. But as we have seen, U.S. capital prefers areas that already have developed markets. Only petroleum and ores, of necessity, have to be produced at the location where nature put them.

The structure of the situation may be gathered from the following table citing U.S. Investments abroad:

	Investments 1965	Income 1965	Yearly Increase of Investments 1966/67
	(millions of dollars)		
In Latin America			
Oil and Mining	4,148	653	500
Other	5,223	236	776
In Africa			
Oil and Mining	1,381	288	125
Other	523	43	63
In Asia			
Oil and Mining	2,421	923	195
Other	1,190	110	225
In Canada			
Oil and Mining	5,075	232	540
Other	10,097	460	916
In Europe			
Oil and Mining	3,484	25	490
Other	10,411	735	1,500

Despite the higher profit rates in the underdeveloped countries, capital went to Europe and Canada. At the Conference of Viña del Mar (Chile) in May 1969, and again at Caracas in February 1970, Latin Americans complained that the inflow of capital had dwindled to a trickle and now amounted to less than they were paying back in interest and dividend!

A word about the economics of these operations. The foreign companies, especially those in the oil and mining businesses, make enormous profits. But where are these profits realized? We must distinguish between two very different cases. The first is the case of utilities, railways, and most of the manufacturing industries: their profits are made off the natives and—unless reinvested as is often required by law—are taken out of the country. An absolute loss; these na-

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tions would be better off if such companies were nationalized and profits were retained and used for development. Brazil now has a law making it obligatory that at least 50 percent of every company be owned by Brazilian nationals—though to profit from American know-how they may have a management contract with an American firm. On the whole, this is a good arrangement which also has been adopted by other countries.

Quite different is the second case which concerns the extractive industries—mines, oil, bananas, and timber. These companies produce a commodity that cannot be consumed in the underdeveloped country. They must sell it, and they can sell it only to industrialized countries, above all to the United States. It is only here, in our country, that the profit can be realized. This is as true of bananas as it is of oil. The local powers in South America or Arabia may raise wage rates, ground rent, or royalty; they may write new laws or make new contracts; but neither the United Fruit Corporation nor ESSO will suffer. They will just raise prices and the American consumer will pay. But without monopoly powers in the consuming centers, the world market sets limits to the return on other commodities, as coffee and cocoa producers found out. Even though no United Fruit Corporation stands between them and the American consumer, their national and international cartels were unable to stabilize prices. Incidentally, this also happened to the price of gold; its main producer, South Africa, has much in common with black Africa.

Developing countries with one-crop economies suffer from the vicissitudes of a world market they cannot control. But the case of Cuba has shown how difficult it is to diversify and to find alternative markets. In many cases it is the structure of the market that leads to grievances against the big, wealthy customers: the terms of trade favor the industrial nations and discriminate against developing countries; the rich are always in a better bargaining position than the poor; the supply of industrial goods is easier to monopolize than farm products. But above all, the markets of the developed nations are not sufficiently open to late-coming competitors and the highly industrialized countries are trading more with each other than with the underdeveloped world.

Since the developing countries are debtors, they should export more than they import; but the U.S. consistently achieves export surpluses in trading with underdeveloped countries. In 1968 we exported $23 billion worth of goods to industrial countries and imported $24 billion worth from them. But we exported $11 billion worth to underdeveloped countries and imported from them only $9 billion worth of goods. We buy Volkswagen cars and Sony radios, but pay low prices for our coffee. We buy less bauxite, magnesia, and chromium, as in many utensils metal is being replaced by plastic materials; and, unfortunately for our friends in Manila, Dupont is producing fibers that replace sisal. In another variation of this context: if the Arabs should raise the price of their oil, it would pay to develop our wells in Alaska. The world market is a game in which the raw-materials producers cannot win.

Brazil, Ghana, Columbia, and a few other countries have an agreement on coffee, but wholesale prices follow a declining trend. Industrial countries limit their production when prices fall; in backward countries, farmers respond to price falls not by cutting production but by increasing it, thus making the problem worse. As a result we have the phenomenon of the "scissors," i.e., industrial goods fetch ever-rising prices, while farm products and other goods underdeveloped countries must export are constantly depressed. All underdeveloped countries lose in these exchanges; moreover, they are far more dependent on exports and imports than we are. What is gravy for us is their living. They produce an excess of certain

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goods which they must exchange in order to satisfy their other needs, especially if they wish to industrialize. Now, unfortunately, our economy is so big that the 3 percent of GNP constituting our imports for other countries constitute almost half of the world trade. When we sneeze they get a cold; when we have a cold, they get pneumonia. When our imports decline by an ever so small percentage point, their exports decline catastrophically; by the same token, a small concession on our part might mean significant help for them.[44]

Mr. Conor Cruise O'Brien has written that if America were to sink into the ocean tomorrow, Africa would not know it. He errs. We would not suffer if Africa were to disappear; but if we were to disappear—to whom would Africans sell their coconuts, aluminum, coffee, etc.? In the recent discussion on Biafra, New Left writers have charged that American and British imperialists supported Lagos because they would not buy oil from Colonel Ojukwu. I see no reason why they should not, or why a revolutionary government should be defined as one that sells to and buys from Pompidou. Colonel Ojukwu, an illiterate in economics, might be forgiven for saying that Biafra would "sell in the world market with absolute equality" and thereby bring colonialism down; but why should this empty boast be the motto of an admiring essay in a semi-literary New York review? The only way for new countries to increase their oil income would be to acquire refineries and tankers; in due course, no doubt, someone would sell them this equipment—at a price.

[44] I must warn against a common fallacy. One compares "their" lot and "ours"; one deplores that, whatever we do, we come out on top. But one cannot conclude that they are poor *because* "we" are rich, or that they are poor because they are *exploited* by us. Their wage level was low before "we" came in; it is much higher among employees of U.S. firms than among their compatriots, and it would be much lower if we were to disappear.

Pseudo-Colonialism—What's in a Name?

MANY OF THE COMPLAINTS underdeveloped nations have voiced against U.S. trade practices are justified. At Caracas they requested freer access to U.S. markets and capital, renegotiation of licenses granted under duress, better terms of trade. Most of these requests, however are no different than those discussed in trade negotiations between *any* two nations and do not imply an imperialist or colonialist relationship. The U.S. could allow tourists to bring wood carvings home from Haiti, or bird-lovers to buy seed in Ecuador. Denial of this demand would not prove "imperialism," nor would its granting remove the plagues of overpopulation and underdevelopment. But in bargaining about such (literally!) chicken-feed, the U.S. usually is in the stronger position, and its partners make up for their weakness by raising the hue and cry of "colonialism"; it may shame the U.S. into making concessions, but it also creates a mood of recrimination that converts business negotiations into a contest between "haves" and "have-nots." I have called this tactic the "Pseudo-colonialist bogeyman."

Pseudo-colonialism has another dimension which, though not economic and demonstrable, is nevertheless real. Citizens of an underdeveloped country are hypersensitive to the slightest lack of respect; they tend to feel humiliated by the mere hint that they may be petitioners or dependents. Whenever they have demands, they must feel righteous. Their poverty cannot be their fault; it must be the consequence of discrimination and unlawful exploitation. All their frustrations, therefore, are blamed on Big Brother, and their demands are presented as liberation from an oppressive "System." This substitution of resentment for analysis we shall call "psycho-imperialism."

The United States actually can do little to alleviate the plight of the underdeveloped countries or to overcome their resent-

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ment; as long as they feel dependent on the decision of their overweening neighbor, they will experience his decisions as encroachments on their sovereignty. If the U.S. buys their raw materials, it depletes their resources; if it does not buy, it acts selfishly, perhaps in the interest of its oil companies. If the U.S. supports the governments of underdeveloped countries unconditionally, it helps to perpetuate an unjust system; if it demands reforms, it is meddling in the affairs of other countries. The U.S. government has been blamed for helping the U.N. wage war in the Congo and for refusing to wage war in Biafra, Rhodesia, and Palestine. A U.N. study has shown that any serious effort at big-power disarmament would hurt most severely the exports of the underdeveloped countries. No matter what big powers do or leave undone, the Third World will be wronged in one way or another, and this is the definition of neo-colonialism as a state of affairs.

The three optical deceptions of pseudo-colonialism, "psycho-imperialism," and neo-colonialism prevent the people of underdeveloped countries from seeing their true plight: they need to modernize their economy, and that often means considerable disruption of the time-honored web of social and cultural relations, of cherished customs and traditions. The foreigner often is the agent of that change,[45] the visible target for the hate of the old ruling classes, and for the anxieties of the unsettled proletarians. Even where the Westerner tries to be helpful, he seems to impose his ways, to tell others what's good for them, to threaten ancient cultures with extinction. He also threatens the old caste rule, staunchest obstacle to the most urgent and necessary reforms. At the Inter-American meeting in Caracas, the Latins desired "more action under the Alliance for Progress . . . [but] there was no talk of the social reforms that were its basic principles." [46] Instead, demagogic leaders of the underdeveloped nations brandish the banner of "nationalism" and "anticolonialism"; their solution to a number of insoluble problems is a nationalization which is often costly.

Economic nationalism cannot solve problems any better in the 20th than it did in the 19th century. The problems of the underdeveloped countries are serious; they require fundamental restructuring of their domestic and foreign exchanges. To escape the thralldom of exploitation and competition, the raw-material-producing countries should accept international planning on a scale much greater than we have known hitherto.

Trade in the great international commodities must be brought under the control of international boards; mining operations also should be controlled by agencies modeled after the European Coal and Steel Community or Euratom. No private company has the right to exploit the natural resources of any country for its own benefit or for the benefit of a foreign country; vice-versa, no country has the right to reserve its natural resources for its own exclusive use.

These principles obviously are complementary, and their realization is not utopian.

[45] Only during World War II, when the Allies paid any price and were unable to export any of their goods, did some industries establish themselves in Latin America. They are not likely ever again to enjoy a similarly sheltered situation. See Albert O. Hirschmann, *How to Divest in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). See also John H. Adler, ed., *Capital Movements and Economic Development* (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

[46] *New York Times,* February 9, 1970. See also Frantz Fanon, "To the national bourgeoisie, nationalization only means the transfer into its hands of the unfair advantages which are the legacy of colonialism." *The Wretched of the Earth,* p. 124. By contrast, Soviet economists distinguish between big bad imperialist capitalists and nice national bourgeoisie "which are opposed to the [American] interests." See R. Avakov and G. Mirsky, "Class Structure in Underdeveloped Countries," in *The Third World in Soviet Perspective,* T. P. Thornton, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 278.

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The United States government has provided a precious precedent in its draft proposal for the control of atomic energy through a worldwide agency (the so-called Baruch Plan, actually the work of Acheson, Lilienthal, and Oppenheimer). At present, the United Nations is discussing a similar proposal to assure the resources of the seabed to all nations.

Aid Imperialism

SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS must be designed to internationalize the supply of capital. It is generally agreed that the present development aid mechanisms are unsatisfactory. Low-interest loans must be provided for long-term projects. A world development tax of 1 percent on national income could serve as the basic fund on which expansion of the world economy could be built with Keynesian techniques. Professor Prebisch recommends, in addition, the creation of a "residual lender capable of providing capital without regard to returns." [47]

But when we compare these desiderata with the reality of "development aid," the contrast could not be greater. What is announced as "aid" often is a promotion gimmick for U.S. exports, and what is pompously called "aid" is often export financing, a legitimate but certainly not philanthropic business. Loans have been tied to the purchase of certain goods, or guarantees that were demanded have bordered on receivership.[48] Or "aid" serves as small change on the counter of political bargains, to buy votes at the U.N., to support allied governments, etc. While it is unrealistic to condemn these practices, it is hypocritical to include the amounts in the statistics of "foreign aid." Also objectionable is the inclusion of loans that are purely commercial arrangements.

Only recently did the Latin Americans move the Nixon administration to renounce the scandalous "additionality clause" (forcing them to buy more of the goods they had first received as grants) and to give them a wider choice of suppliers for goods bought with aid money.

Even genuine aid, however, has come under attack. "I fear the Greeks, especially when they carry gifts," said Virgil, and many recipients of American aid have become critical of its results. Bilateral aid is often made conditional upon certain political services or on economic concessions that convert the aid into a fetter. We often speak to recipient countries like a banker, telling them what is good for them. Or, perhaps, what may appear to the donor as a reasonable guarantee for the grant's purpose is experienced by the recipient as an instrument of control or domination.

For all these reasons, U.S. aid has been denounced as a subtle form of "colonialism"; even grants have been criticized because they are in fact subsidies not for the needy but for our own industries.[49] This is certainly true of food shipments. But, after all, the money to facilitate them was collected in the U.S., the needy received the goods (minus what their officials stole), and the beneficiary government usually was allowed to convert the counterpart funds into capital for development work. Yet most governments do not like aid programs designed and earmarked for specific purposes; they want the money

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[47] Paul Prebisch, the Argentine economist and chairman of UNCTAD, is the leader of the Third World claimants at international economic powwows.

[48] These criticisms should not be interpreted, however, to deny the usefulness of development aid. Nor is aid through international agencies always better than bilateral aid, and it certainly is not cheaper.

Even Magdoff (see Note 17) admits that without U.S. prodding Pakistan could not have improved its productive capacity.

[49] It is well-known how reluctant Congress is to vote grants tc nonvoters. Presidents, therefore, have used the most bizarre arguments to prove that foreign aid is good for American business. Kolko and Magdoff, in turn, have not failed to exhibit these quotations as so many proofs that the U.S. gives foreign aid in order to aid American business.

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free of conditions and strings, and here I beg to disagree:

The purpose and use of international aid should be under rigorous control. Today much aid is given not for purposes of development but for pork-barrel projects. The World Bank complained in its report for 1962 that aid often was given for no economic reasons, or even against economic reason. Most seriously: when President Kennedy told the Latins: no reforms—no money, they sabotaged the Alianza para el Progreso.

These "strings" the U.S. government should never have relaxed, and it should have insisted on another "string": no aid to governments that buy heavy arms in the world market. It is obvious that a government that can afford the luxury of arms does not need grants. If a government does not like such "strings," which might embarrass its ruling classes, it is always free to refuse the "Greek gift." And, incidentally, the alleged burden of political strings sits lightly on those who have repudiated all debts of such nature, as India has done often enough with impunity.

Proposals for Action

THE PLIGHT OF the underdeveloped nations does not stem from "imperialism" but from the coincidence of a health revolution (population explosion) with the pains of modernization. These nations must telescope the three industrial revolutions through which the West has passed into the lifetime of one generation. Colonialist practices often have started this process, but now can only obstruct the path toward further progress and self-determination. Colonialist powers have earned extra profits from the services they have rendered and, for the sake of principle, should agree to pay restitution. However, the amounts involved may be too small and, even combined with realistic estimates of available aids and loans, will not be sufficient to provide the desirable amount of seed money. The main effort must come from the underdeveloped countries themselves, as it did in the older industrial countries. In most countries this effort will not come forth without fundamental changes in their social structure and without the psychological and political shock of a reformation or revolution.

The key reform of the international economy must be a higher price of labor in the underdeveloped countries and a subsequent increase in the price level of their products. In addition to paying these prices, the advanced countries could help by abandoning rights acquired through unequal treaties with corrupt governments. Since much of the uneasiness in the Third World stems from the lopsidedness of our bilateral relations, we ought to handicap ourselves in negotiating with its representatives. To balance our advantage we should, in Gunnar Myrdal's words, "discriminate against ourselves," [50] and agree to the following measures:

(1) Common Market arrangements in Latin America and Africa, permitting these continents to protect their industries a-building while not excluding them from our markets.

(2) Conclusion of international raw material and foodstuff agreements to stabilize prices and to allot production and import quotas (as in the case of sugar). Cash surpluses should be used to subsidize diversified farming.

(3) Conversion of military budgets into development funds at least to the extent that cancelled defense orders mean a loss of export for Third World countries.

(4) Renegotiation of all mining and prospecting rights and royalties, with special regard to each nation's sovereignty over its natural resources. Establishment of interna-

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[50] See two works by Gunnar Myrdal: *An International Economy* (Harper Torch paperback) and *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions* (Mystic, Conn.: Verry, 1957).

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tional authorities for the world's fuel economy and for strategic materials.

(5) Transfer of industrial properties in underdeveloped countries from foreign companies to state agencies or to international development boards.

Especially this last measure should help to overcome the image of neo-colonialism. It would apply particularly to establishments that have caused resentment and whose economics are not well understood by the public. Such a proposal can no longer be considered revolutionary. The pioneering precedent was set by Franklin D. Roosevelt, more than 30 years ago. Up to the early 1930s the State Department had supported the oil companies in their dealings with the Mexican government. But in 1938 President Cardenas expropriated U.S. oil properties valued then at a quarter of a billion dollars. Roosevelt, much more concerned about the international situation than about corporate rights, forced the oil companies to settle for $40 million—one-sixth of the asking price.[51] The American taxpayers had to pick up part of the bill, and in future settlements the U.S Treasury might indemnify the companies totally and present the plants to the nations as a gift.

Using the latest figures, we are dealing here with comparatively small sums: $4 billion in mining, smeltering, and petroleum in Latin America; a similar amount in all of Asia and Africa. In the manufacturing industries, many firms may not lend themselves to nationalization, nor have they aroused resentment. But it may be advisable to include public utilities such as gas, electricity, telephone, and public transportation, which in most of Europe were nationalized long ago. The whole bill would be equivalent to the current foreign aid appropriations for only a few years.

A Theory and a Strategy

THE SURGERY I HAVE PROPOSED may however reveal two ugly pieces of naked truth:

- The rivalry between big powers and their ideological antagonism will not disappear and the so-called cold war will go on in new forms.
- The gap between developed and developing nations will remain wide for at least one generation, and their relations will still be governed by the Gulliver complex.

For, unfortunately, the problem of economic dependence which plagues the underdeveloped areas is not directly connected with the problem of political hegemony which plagues the United States. What conscience-ridden Americans may do in one sphere hardly affects the other sphere, and therefore I must give an ambiguous answer to my opening question:

Imperialist policies are not a necessary consequence of economic pressures, but they may have their own inevitable logic. Colonialist methods may not constitute the behavior pattern of U.S. relations with the Third World; but the Third World projects its own predicament into a pattern which the naked eye—or hate-tinted glasses—can hardly distinguish from colonial dependence.

Finally, the national revolutionaries of the Third World may be mistaken in identifying their enemy as "neo-colonialism"; but they do provoke responses which they see as "imperialist." As Canada's Prime Minister Trudeau said: it is uncomfortable to lie down with an elephant, be the beast ever so friendly.

It is necessary and possible, however, to separate the purely economic aspects of this relationship from the psychological and political irritations. It is not necessary, though it is possible, to confuse the negotiable issues of economic policy with the power issues of world politics. The first are accessible to

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[51] Robert Engler, *The Politics of Oil* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1961). The precedent for Franklin D. Roosevelt's good-neighbor policy had been set by Woodrow Wilson, who stubbornly stood by Mexico's President Carranza in his fight against the Standard Oil Company.

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reasoning; the latter, unfortunately, are charged with emotions and made manageable only through fear. But fear is also the agent that invites power to assert itself. It has often been remarked that in the Cold War, as in earlier contests of alliances, each side interpreted the defensive moves of the other as aggressive and therefore increased its own defense preparations, which in turn escalated the other's fear. This game has been called "balance of power" or "deterrence," and it is obvious that the instruments of security which are useful in this game—military, political, and economic ones—should become values per se in the eyes of the players. When that happens, when the means of security acquire a life of their own and become goals, we have imperialism: the desire to expand for the sake of expansion, the desire to have the strongest military forces, the strongest alliance, the greatest influence on other governments, the greatest economic penetration of other countries, and also an ideology claiming universal validity.[52]

It would be foolish to deny that money interests ride this engine—but, even without money interests, America's drive for hegemony in the Western world or its struggle with the U.S.S.R. would be no less vigorous. After all, Soviet imperialism has yoked to its wagon ten formerly independent nations without any prompting by such money interests. It is clear from the behavior of the two "powers," as they are rightly called, that their game is one-upmanship, power lusting after power, with the agent becoming the master.

I am aware that some American liberals will disagree with this statement. They have been trained to believe that power is always derived from economic interests or directed toward economic goals. They are power-blind; they even manage to "explain" how a Hitler, a Stalin, a Nasser, a Genghis Khan may be driven "ultimately" by hope of economic gain. Even if I were to grant that, I would still argue that in the real world, the "ultimate" never appears and "power" may well have become autonomous (or in Marxian language: *verselbständigt*). The profundity that the profit motive explains all is utterly shallow and flies in the face of all the evidence we have about the motives of policy-makers. Tribes, nations, races, states establish themselves as entities which define their identity in contrast or conflict with others.

Moderating forces within and without may domesticate these drives, and if we are lucky the rivalry may be contained within certain channels; but what we are containing here are the symptoms, not the disease. The disease itself is a constitutive element of our international system, which is a system of states; imperialist policies are nothing but exaggerated, perverted, unleashed functions of the legitimate security interests of national states; imperialism is nationalism writ large, and it cannot disappear unless the national state itself withers away.

Colonialism as Lenin knew it was mostly liquidated after World War II; so-called neocolonialism is capable of being converted into measures to aid the development of backward countries; problems of pseudocolonialism may be difficult to solve but they are a headache for the statesmen rather than a cause of real antagonism; imperialism, the self-justifying Will to Power, remains as the enemy of progress, justice, and peace. It is frightening to think how much de-escalating and disarmament would be necessary to lower the tension even to the level that pre-

[52] I would give less weight to ideology and the defense of capitalism, for as early as 1916 Woodrow Wilson began to worry that a world war might result in Europe's subjugation by the Czar. The U.S. has emerged from the two world wars as the only power capable of containing the Russian advance. Smaller Western nations and their friends in the U.S. have criticized the way in which this was done; they would have preferred a multicentrist to a polarized structure of international relations. But it is erroneous to think that only the latter is "imperialist."

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ceded the world wars, let alone the wars of the 19th century.[53]

But the new means of destruction are not the only and not even the major reason why imperialist confrontations have become so much more dangerous in recent times; nor is the cold-war tension explained by the development of two worldwide empires whose interests clash at the fringes. It seems to me that empires can settle their differences as long as their leaders are aware of the overall interests which each must serve in his policies. But the means of competition—whether economic or political or military—may render themselves autonomous and create antagonisms which in turn degenerate into confrontations. Hobson, Schumpeter, and Arendt, starting from assumptions widely apart from each other, agree on this one point: that imperialist policies are parasitical, often atavistic outgrowths of particular forces which have superimposed themselves upon the body politic and exploit it rather than serve it. This is most evident in countries where the conduct of foreign policy is dominated by a military elite which considers the rest of the country merely as strategic resources.[54]

Such a view, however, leaves one important question unanswered: why would sound social forces within a country submit themselves to such pernicious leadership? I believe that we shall never understand imperialism fully until we know more about the importance of power in society. Tribes and nations are held together by certain mechanisms of group relationship; every system of society is maintained and grows under the protection of a power apparatus that is essential to its survival. At certain, rare stages of societal development such a special apparatus can be dispensed with and replaced or supplanted by ritual and routine, usually at the price of further development. At other stages the instruments of power may be liberated from supervision, initiate their own dynamism, accelerate evolution, or revolutionize the system. Then new elites, new classes come to the fore, armed with new techniques and uninhibited by the old codes of values or cultural traditions. Various power apparatuses—military, political, cultural, economic—are allowed to spread into all directions, to subdue the remnants of older social structures, preach a new gospel, and to profess new ideas that justify its conquest as morally and historically right.

I am aware that I have taken up more space saying what imperialism is not than saying what it is. The reason is twofold: it is indeed difficult to find the common root of the many phenomena which can be described as imperialist, and Lenin has misled an entire generation of anti-imperialists by insisting that the root was always economic. Today we cannot be so sure, and it is perhaps better to describe different types of imperialism. In particular, it may be useful to distinguish the "youthful," dynamic style of an expansionism based on the exuberance of new social forces from the "late" imperialism described by Spengler or witnessed in the unsuccessful disengagement maneuverings of empires in liquidation.

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[53] See Raymond Aron, "The Leninist Myth of Imperialism," in *A Century of Total War*.

[54] Juan Bosch, *Pentagonism—A Substitute for Imperialism* (New York: Grove Press, 1969). It is understandable that the martyred Dominicans should single out the Pentagon as the main enemy of small nations in this hemisphere. On a world scale, the Nassers and Giaps share at this moment the responsibility for the escalation of tension, and the Soviet general staff has more influence on foreign policy than is good for the world's peace.

As we go to press, a review article by Robert Heilbroner draws my attention to Seymour Melman's new book, *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War* (New York: McGraw-Hill). I gather that Melman's view is similar to the one presented here: that the power drive, in this case of the military establishment, has precedence before the calculus of profitability.

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